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Piotr Gruza

Publications and source records attributed to Piotr Gruza.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

Tightness and solidity in fragments of Peano Arithmetic

It was shown by Visser that Peano Arithmetic has the property that any two bi-interpretable extensions of it (in the same language) are equivalent. Enayat proposed to refer to this property of a theory as \emph{tightness} and to carry out a more systematic study of tightness and its stronger variants that he called neatness and solidity. Enayat proved that not only $\mathsf{PA}$, but also $\mathsf{ZF}$ and $\mathsf{Z}_2$ are solid. On the other hand, it was shown in later work by a number of authors that many natural proper fragments of those theories are not even tight. Enayat asked whether there is a proper solid subtheory of the theories listed above. We answer that question in the case of $\mathsf{PA}$ by proving that for every $n$, there exist both a solid theory and a tight but not neat theory strictly between $\mathsf{I}\Sigma_n$ and $\mathsf{PA}$. Moreover, the solid subtheories of $\mathsf{PA}$ can be required to be unable to interpret $\mathsf{PA}$. We also provide simple examples of proper solid subtheories of $\mathsf{ZF}$ and $\mathsf{Z}_2$, as well as further separations between properties related to tightness, including an example of a sequential theory that is neat but not semantically tight in the sense of Freire and Hamkins.

math.LO

Definiteness properties of first-order schemes

The paper aims to establish a convenient formal framework for investigating the phenomenon of scheme definiteness, exemplified by first-order internal categoricity as studied by Väänänen, among others. To this end, we introduce the notion of $Φ$-definiteness, thereby refining and extending the conceptual landscape that underlies various first-order categoricity notions in the literature (internal categoricity, strong internal categoricity, intolerance). We provide arguments for the robustness of our definition and present examples of schemes that separate different categoricity- and completeness-like notions. Finally, we offer a brief glimpse into the issue of the definiteness of two canonical foundational schemes - the induction scheme and the replacement scheme.

math.LO

Varieties of truth definitions

We study the structure of the partial order induced by the definability relation on definitions of truth for the language of arithmetic. Formally, a definition of truth is any sentence $α$ which extends a weak arithmetical theory (which we take to be EA) such that for some formula $Θ$ and any arithmetical sentence $φ$, $Θ(\ulcornerφ\urcorner)\equiv φ$ is provable in $α$. We say that a sentence $β$ is definable in a sentence $α$, if there exists an unrelativized translation from the language of $β$ to the language of $α$ which is identity on the arithmetical symbols and such that the translation of $β$ is provable in $α$. Our main result is that the structure consisting of truth definitions which are conservative over the basic arithmetical theory forms a countable universal distributive lattice. Additionally, we generalize the result of Pakhomov and Visser showing that the set of (Gödel codes of) definitions of truth is not $Σ_2$-definable in the standard model of arithmetic. We conclude by remarking that no $Σ_2$-sentence, satisfying certain further natural conditions, can be a definition of truth for the language of arithmetic.

math.LO