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Piotr Krysta

Publications and source records attributed to Piotr Krysta.

16 recordsLinked to original sources

Tight Sample Bounds for Renyi and Min-Entropy Estimation

Estimating entropy from samples is fundamental in information theory and property testing. Shannon entropy measures average uncertainty and can be estimated to constant additive accuracy over a $k$-symbol alphabet using $\Theta(k/\log k)$ samples. Min-entropy depends only on the most likely symbol. Both are special cases of order-$\alpha$ R'{e}nyi entropy, $H_\alpha$. We characterize the sample complexity of estimating min-entropy and R'{e}nyi entropy for $k$ and integer $\alpha>1$; our lower bounds also hold for noninteger $\alpha\ge1.001$. We prove that min-entropy estimation to constant additive accuracy has sample complexity $\Theta(k\log k)$. The upper bound uses the largest empirical frequency and concentration via dyadic grouping. The matching lower bound hides a slightly heavier symbol at a uniformly random location. Thus, min-entropy requires $\Theta(\log^2 k)$ more samples than Shannon entropy and corrects a previously stated $\Theta(k/\log k)$ characterization. For every integer $2\le\alpha\le c_0\log k$, we prove the matching fixed-accuracy bound $\Theta_{c_0}(\alpha k^{1-1/\alpha})$. Previous results gave $\Omega_\alpha(k^{1-1/\alpha})$ for fixed integer $\alpha>1$ and $O_{c_0}(\alpha^2k^{1-1/\alpha})$ for all integer $\alpha>1$. Our upper bound analyzes an unbiased falling-factorial estimator based on $\alpha$-way collisions, while a hidden-heavy-coordinate construction gives the matching lower bound and shows that the factor $\alpha$ is unavoidable. For every real $1.001\le\alpha\le c_0\log k$, we prove the uniform lower bound $\Omega_{c_0}(\alpha k^{1-1/\alpha})$. Finally, since $0\le H_\alpha(p)-H_\infty(p)\le\log k/(\alpha-1)$, min-entropy uniformly approximates $H_\alpha$ when $\alpha$ is a sufficiently large multiple of $\log k$. Combining this reduction with our min-entropy bounds gives $\Theta_\varepsilon(k\log k)$ sample complexity in the high-order regime.

cs.IT

Position Auctions with a Capacity Constraint

Sponsored search auctions are commonly modeled as an assignment of a fixed set of slots (positions) to a set of advertisers, with welfare maximization being reducible to a standard matching problem. Motivated by modern ad formats, we study a richer variant of the classical position auctions model, in which ads have heterogeneous sizes and the platform must jointly select and assign a subset of ads to positions subject to a global space constraint. We formulate this as a matching problem with a capacity constraint, and propose an algorithmic technique that goes beyond simple greedy methods while achieving constant factor approximation guarantees. Our allocation rule augments density-based ordering with capacity-aware local improvements, which allow for re-allocations that improve welfare, while respecting the capacity constraint. Applied in the context of position auctions, we analyze this mechanism under the assumption of single-parameter agents and position-dependent click-through-rates (CTRs). We show that a minor modification to our approach yields a universally truthful randomized mechanism with a constant factor approximation guarantee. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first truthful constant-approximation mechanism for this variant of capacity-constrained matching.

cs.GT

Selling Privacy in Blockchain Transactions

We study methods to enhance statistical privacy in blockchain transactions. We analyze economic mechanisms for privacy-aware transaction owners whose utility depends not only on the outcome of the mechanism but also negatively on the exposure of their economic preferences. First, we consider an order flow auction, where a user auctions off to specialized agents, called searchers, the right to execute her transaction while maintaining a degree of privacy. We examine how the degree of privacy affects the revenue of the auction and, broadly, the net utility of the privacy-aware user. In this new setting, we characterize the optimal auction, which is a sealed-bid auction. Subsequently, we analyze a variant of a Dutch auction in which the user gradually decreases the price and the degree of privacy until the transaction is sold. We compare the revenue of this auction to that of the optimal one as a function of the number of communication rounds. Then, we introduce a two-sided market - a privacy marketplace - with multiple users selling their transactions under their privacy preferences to multiple searchers. We propose a posted-price mechanism for the two-sided market that guarantees constant approximation of the optimal social welfare while maintaining incentive compatibility (from both sides of the market) and budget balance. This work builds on the emerging literature on privacy-preserving mechanism design, integrating statistical privacy guarantees into economic protocols to capture the impact of information leakage on blockchain users' utility.

cs.GT

Delegation with Costly Inspection

We study the problem of delegated choice with inspection cost (DCIC), which is a variant of the delegated choice problem by Kleinberg and Kleinberg (EC'18) as well as an extension of the Pandora's box problem with nonobligatory inspection (PNOI) by Doval (JET'18). In our model, an agent may strategically misreport the proposed element's utility, unlike the standard delegated choice problem which assumes that the agent truthfully reports the utility for the proposed alternative. Thus, the principal needs to inspect the proposed element possibly along with other alternatives to maximize its own utility, given an exogenous cost of inspecting each element. Further, the delegation itself incurs a fixed cost, thus the principal can decide whether to delegate or not and inspect by herself. We show that DCIC indeed is a generalization of PNOI where the side information from a strategic agent is available at certain cost, implying its NP-hardness by Fu, Li, and Liu (STOC'23). We first consider a costless delegation setting in which the cost of delegation is free. We prove that the maximal mechanism over the pure delegation with a single inspection and an PNOI policy without delegation achieves a $3$-approximation for DCIC with costless delegation, which is further proven to be tight. These results hold even when the cost comes from an arbitrary monotone set function, and can be improved to a $2$-approximation if the cost of inspection is the same for every element. We extend these techniques by presenting a constant factor approximate mechanism for the general setting for rich class of instances.

cs.GT

Beating Competitive Ratio 4 for Graphic Matroid Secretary

One of the classic problems in online decision-making is the *secretary problem* where to goal is to maximize the probability of choosing the largest number from a randomly ordered sequence. A natural extension allows selecting multiple values under a combinatorial constraint. Babaioff, Immorlica, Kempe, and Kleinberg (SODA'07, JACM'18) introduced the *matroid secretary conjecture*, suggesting an $O(1)$-competitive algorithm exists for matroids. Many works since have attempted to obtain algorithms for both general matroids and specific classes of matroids. The ultimate goal is to obtain an $e$-competitive algorithm, and the *strong matroid secretary conjecture* states that this is possible for general matroids. A key class of matroids is the *graphic matroid*, where a set of graph edges is independent if it contains no cycle. The rich combinatorial structure of graphs makes them a natural first step towards solving a problem for general matroids. Babaioff et al. (SODA'07, JACM'18) first studied the graphic matroid setting, achieving a $16$-competitive algorithm. Subsequent works have improved the competitive ratio, most recently to 4 by Soto, Turkieltaub, and Verdugo (SODA'18). We break this $4$-competitive barrier, presenting a new algorithm with a competitive ratio of $3.95$. For simple graphs, we further improve this to $3.77$. Intuitively, solving the problem for simple graphs is easier since they lack length-two cycles. A natural question is whether a ratio arbitrarily close to $e$ can be achieved by assuming sufficiently large girth. We answer this affirmatively, showing a competitive ratio arbitrarily close to $e$ even for constant girth values, supporting the strong matroid secretary conjecture. We also prove this bound is tight: for any constant $g$, no algorithm can achieve a ratio better than $e$ even when the graph has girth at least $g$.

cs.DS

Online Sampling and Decision Making with Low Entropy

Consider the problem: we are given $n$ boxes, labeled $\{1,2,\ldots, n\}$ by an adversary, each containing a single number chosen from an unknown distribution; these $n$ distributions are not necessarily identical. We are also given an integer $k \leq n$. We have to choose an order in which we will sequentially open these boxes, and each time we open the next box in this order, we learn the number in the box. Once we reject a number in a box, the box cannot be recalled. Our goal is to accept $k$ of these numbers, without necessarily opening all boxes, such that the accepted numbers are the $k$ largest numbers in the boxes (thus their sum is maximized). A natural approach to solve such problems is to use randomness to sample randomly ordered elements, however, as indicated in several sources, e.g., Turan et al. NIST'15, Bierhorst et al. Nature'18, pure randomness is hard to get in reality. We present an algorithm for this problem, which is provably and simultaneously near-optimal with respect to the achieved competitive ratio and the used amount of randomness. In particular, we construct a distribution on the orders with entropy $Θ(\log\log n)$ such that a deterministic multiple-threshold algorithm gives a competitive ratio $1-O(\sqrt{\log k/k})$, for $k < \log n/\log \log n$. Our competitive ratio is simultaneously optimal and uses optimal entropy $Θ(\log\log n)$, improving in three ways the previous best known algorithm, whose competitive ratio is $1 - O(1/k^{1/3}) - o(1)$.

cs.DS

MEV Sharing with Dynamic Extraction Rates

Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) has emerged as a new frontier in the design of blockchain systems. In this paper, we propose making the MEV extraction rate as part of the protocol design space. Our aim is to leverage this parameter to maintain a healthy balance between block producers (who need to be compensated) and users (who need to feel encouraged to transact). We follow the approach introduced by EIP-1559 and design a similar mechanism to dynamically update the MEV extraction rate with the goal of stabilizing it at a target value. We study the properties of this dynamic mechanism and show that, while convergence to the target can be guaranteed for certain parameters, instability, and even chaos, can occur in other cases. Despite these complexities, under general conditions, the system concentrates in a neighborhood of the target equilibrium implying high long-term performance. Our work establishes, the first to our knowledge, dynamic framework for the integral problem of MEV sharing between extractors and users.

cs.GT

First Order Methods for Geometric Optimization of Crystal Structures

The geometric optimization of crystal structures is a procedure widely used in Chemistry that changes the geometrical placement of the particles inside a structure. It is called structural relaxation and constitutes a local minimization problem with a non-convex objective function whose domain complexity increases according to the number of particles involved. In this work we study the performance of the two most popular first order optimization methods in structural relaxation. Although frequently employed, there is a lack of their study in this context from an algorithmic point of view. We run each algorithm in combination with a constant step size, which provides a benchmark for the methods' analysis and direct comparison. We also design dynamic step size rules and study how these improve the two algorithms' performance. Our results show that there is a trade-off between convergence rate and the possibility of an experiment to succeed, hence we construct a function to assign utility to each method based on our respective preference. The function is built according to a recently introduced model of preference indication concerning algorithms with deadline and their run time. Finally, building on all our insights from the experimental results, we provide algorithmic recipes that best correspond to each of the presented preferences and select one recipe as the optimal for equally weighted preferences. Alongside our results we present our open source Python software veltiCRYS, which was used to perform the geometric optimization experiments. Our implementation, can be easily edited to accommodate other energy functions and is especially targeted for testing different methods in structural relaxation.

math.OC

Optimal Algorithms for Free Order Multiple-Choice Secretary

Suppose we are given integer $k \leq n$ and $n$ boxes labeled $1,\ldots, n$ by an adversary, each containing a number chosen from an unknown distribution. We have to choose an order to sequentially open these boxes, and each time we open the next box in this order, we learn its number. If we reject a number in a box, the box cannot be recalled. Our goal is to accept the $k$ largest of these numbers, without necessarily opening all boxes. This is the free order multiple-choice secretary problem. Free order variants were studied extensively for the secretary and prophet problems. Kesselheim, Kleinberg, and Niazadeh KKN (STOC'15) initiated a study of randomness-efficient algorithms (with the cheapest order in terms of used random bits) for the free order secretary problems. We present an algorithm for free order multiple-choice secretary, which is simultaneously optimal for the competitive ratio and used amount of randomness. I.e., we construct a distribution on orders with optimal entropy $Θ(\log\log n)$ such that a deterministic multiple-threshold algorithm is $1-O(\sqrt{\log k/k})$-competitive. This improves in three ways the previous best construction by KKN, whose competitive ratio is $1 - O(1/k^{1/3}) - o(1)$. Our competitive ratio is (near)optimal for the multiple-choice secretary problem; it works for exponentially larger parameter $k$; and our algorithm is a simple deterministic multiple-threshold algorithm, while that in KKN is randomized. We also prove a corresponding lower bound on the entropy of optimal solutions for the multiple-choice secretary problem, matching entropy of our algorithm, where no such previous lower bound was known. We obtain our algorithmic results with a host of new techniques, and with these techniques we also improve significantly the previous results of KKN about constructing entropy-optimal distributions for the classic free order secretary.

cs.DS

Ultimate greedy approximation of independent sets in subcubic graphs

We study the approximability of the maximum size independent set (MIS) problem in bounded degree graphs. This is one of the most classic and widely studied NP-hard optimization problems. We focus on the well known minimum degree greedy algorithm for this problem. This algorithm iteratively chooses a minimum degree vertex in the graph, adds it to the solution and removes its neighbors, until the remaining graph is empty. The approximation ratios of this algorithm have been very widely studied, where it is augmented with an advice that tells the greedy which minimum degree vertex to choose if it is not unique. Our main contribution is a new mathematical theory for the design of such greedy algorithms with efficiently computable advice and for the analysis of their approximation ratios. With this new theory we obtain the ultimate approximation ratio of 5/4 for greedy on graphs with maximum degree 3, which completely solves the open problem from the paper by Halldorsson and Yoshihara (1995). Our algorithm is the fastest currently known algorithm with this approximation ratio on such graphs. We apply our new algorithm to the minimum vertex cover problem on graphs with maximum degree 3 to obtain a substantially faster 6/5-approximation algorithm than the one currently known. We complement our positive, upper bound results with negative, lower bound results which prove that the problem of designing good advice for greedy is computationally hard and even hard to approximate on various classes of graphs. These results significantly improve on such previously known hardness results. Moreover, these results suggest that obtaining the upper bound results on the design and analysis of greedy advice is non-trivial.

cs.DS

Deterministic coloring algorithms in the LOCAL model

We study the problem of bi-chromatic coloring of hypergraphs in the LOCAL distributed model of computation. This problem can easily be solved by a randomized local algorithm with no communication. However, it is not known how to solve it deterministically with only a polylogarithmic number of communication rounds. In this paper we indeed design such a deterministic algorithm that solves this problem with polylogarithmic number of communication rounds. This is an almost exponential improvement on the previously known deterministic local algorithms for this problem. Because the bi-chromatic coloring of hypergraphs problem is known to be complete in the class of all locally checkable graph problems, our result implies deterministic local algorithms with polylogarithmic number of communication rounds for all such problems for which an efficient randomized algorithm exists. This solves one of the fundamental open problems in the area of local distributed graph algorithms. By reductions due to Ghaffari, Kuhn and Maus [STOC 2017] this implies such polylogarithmically efficient deterministic local algorithms for many graph problems.

cs.DS

Size versus truthfulness in the House Allocation problem

We study the House Allocation problem (also known as the Assignment problem), i.e., the problem of allocating a set of objects among a set of agents, where each agent has ordinal preferences (possibly involving ties) over a subset of the objects. We focus on truthful mechanisms without monetary transfers for finding large Pareto optimal matchings. It is straightforward to show that no deterministic truthful mechanism can approximate a maximum cardinality Pareto optimal matching with ratio better than 2. We thus consider randomised mechanisms. We give a natural and explicit extension of the classical Random Serial Dictatorship Mechanism (RSDM) specifically for the House Allocation problem where preference lists can include ties. We thus obtain a universally truthful randomised mechanism for finding a Pareto optimal matching and show that it achieves an approximation ratio of $\frac{e}{e-1}$. The same bound holds even when agents have priorities (weights) and our goal is to find a maximum weight (as opposed to maximum cardinality) Pareto optimal matching. On the other hand we give a lower bound of $\frac{18}{13}$ on the approximation ratio of any universally truthful Pareto optimal mechanism in settings with strict preferences. In the case that the mechanism must additionally be non-bossy with an additional technical assumption, we show by utilising a result of Bade that an improved lower bound of $\frac{e}{e-1}$ holds. This lower bound is tight since RSDM for strict preference lists is non-bossy. We moreover interpret our problem in terms of the classical secretary problem and prove that our mechanism provides the best randomised strategy of the administrator who interviews the applicants.

cs.GT

Learning Powers of Poisson Binomial Distributions

We introduce the problem of simultaneously learning all powers of a Poisson Binomial Distribution (PBD). A PBD of order $n$ is the distribution of a sum of $n$ mutually independent Bernoulli random variables $X_i$, where $\mathbb{E}[X_i] = p_i$. The $k$'th power of this distribution, for $k$ in a range $[m]$, is the distribution of $P_k = \sum_{i=1}^n X_i^{(k)}$, where each Bernoulli random variable $X_i^{(k)}$ has $\mathbb{E}[X_i^{(k)}] = (p_i)^k$. The learning algorithm can query any power $P_k$ several times and succeeds in learning all powers in the range, if with probability at least $1- δ$: given any $k \in [m]$, it returns a probability distribution $Q_k$ with total variation distance from $P_k$ at most $ε$. We provide almost matching lower and upper bounds on query complexity for this problem. We first show a lower bound on the query complexity on PBD powers instances with many distinct parameters $p_i$ which are separated, and we almost match this lower bound by examining the query complexity of simultaneously learning all the powers of a special class of PBD's resembling the PBD's of our lower bound. We study the fundamental setting of a Binomial distribution, and provide an optimal algorithm which uses $O(1/ε^2)$ samples. Diakonikolas, Kane and Stewart [COLT'16] showed a lower bound of $Ω(2^{1/ε})$ samples to learn the $p_i$'s within error $ε$. The question whether sampling from powers of PBDs can reduce this sampling complexity, has a negative answer since we show that the exponential number of samples is inevitable. Having sampling access to the powers of a PBD we then give a nearly optimal algorithm that learns its $p_i$'s. To prove our two last lower bounds we extend the classical minimax risk definition from statistics to estimating functions of sequences of distributions.

cs.DS

Combinatorial Auctions without Money

Algorithmic Mechanism Design attempts to marry computation and incentives, mainly by leveraging monetary transfers between designer and selfish agents involved. This is principally because in absence of money, very little can be done to enforce truthfulness. However, in certain applications, money is unavailable, morally unacceptable or might simply be at odds with the objective of the mechanism. For example, in Combinatorial Auctions (CAs), the paradigmatic problem of the area, we aim at solutions of maximum social welfare but still charge the society to ensure truthfulness. Additionally, truthfulness of CAs is poorly understood already in the case in which bidders happen to be interested in only two different sets of goods. We focus on the design of incentive-compatible CAs without money in the general setting of $k$-minded bidders. We trade monetary transfers with the observation that the mechanism can detect certain lies of the bidders: i.e., we study truthful CAs with verification and without money. We prove a characterization of truthful mechanisms, which makes an interesting parallel with the well-understood case of CAs with money for single-minded bidders. We then give a host of upper bounds on the approximation ratio obtained by either deterministic or randomized truthful mechanisms when the sets and valuations are private knowledge of the bidders. (Most of these mechanisms run in polynomial time and return solutions with (nearly) best possible approximation guarantees.) We complement these positive results with a number of lower bounds (some of which are essentially tight) that hold in the easier case of public sets. We thus provide an almost complete picture of truthfully approximating CAs in this general setting with multi-dimensional bidders.

cs.GT

Ranking Games that have Competitiveness-based Strategies

An extensive literature in economics and social science addresses contests, in which players compete to outperform each other on some measurable criterion, often referred to as a player's score, or output. Players incur costs that are an increasing function of score, but receive prizes for obtaining higher score than their competitors. In this paper we study finite games that are discretized contests, and the problems of computing exact and approximate Nash equilibria. Our motivation is the worst-case hardness of Nash equilibrium computation, and the resulting interest in important classes of games that admit polynomial-time algorithms. For games that have a tie-breaking rule for players' scores, we present a polynomial-time algorithm for computing an exact equilibrium in the 2-player case, and for multiple players, a characterization of Nash equilibria that shows an interesting parallel between these games and unrestricted 2-player games in normal form. When ties are allowed, via a reduction from these games to a subclass of anonymous games, we give approximation schemes for two special cases: constant-sized set of strategies, and constant number of players.

cs.GT

Stackelberg Network Pricing Games

We study a multi-player one-round game termed Stackelberg Network Pricing Game, in which a leader can set prices for a subset of $m$ priceable edges in a graph. The other edges have a fixed cost. Based on the leader's decision one or more followers optimize a polynomial-time solvable combinatorial minimization problem and choose a minimum cost solution satisfying their requirements based on the fixed costs and the leader's prices. The leader receives as revenue the total amount of prices paid by the followers for priceable edges in their solutions, and the problem is to find revenue maximizing prices. Our model extends several known pricing problems, including single-minded and unit-demand pricing, as well as Stackelberg pricing for certain follower problems like shortest path or minimum spanning tree. Our first main result is a tight analysis of a single-price algorithm for the single follower game, which provides a $(1+ε) \log m$-approximation for any $ε>0$. This can be extended to provide a $(1+ε)(\log k + \log m)$-approximation for the general problem and $k$ followers. The latter result is essentially best possible, as the problem is shown to be hard to approximate within $\mathcal{O(\log^εk + \log^εm)$. If followers have demands, the single-price algorithm provides a $(1+ε)m^2$-approximation, and the problem is hard to approximate within $\mathcal{O(m^ε)$ for some $ε>0$. Our second main result is a polynomial time algorithm for revenue maximization in the special case of Stackelberg bipartite vertex cover, which is based on non-trivial max-flow and LP-duality techniques. Our results can be extended to provide constant-factor approximations for any constant number of followers.

cs.DS