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Pius Onobhayedo

Publications and source records attributed to Pius Onobhayedo.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

How Do VLMs Behave When Blind or Misled? Behavioral Evaluation of VLMs on Scientific Figures

Existing vision-language model (VLM) benchmarks emphasize perception and reasoning accuracy (how well VLMs describe and reason about what they see in an image), with limited attention to behavioral reliability under uncertainty (how they behave when visual evidence is missing or misleading). We introduce SciFigBench, a diagnostic VLM benchmark for scientific figure understanding that jointly evaluates perception, reasoning, and behavioral reliability under uncertainty. It contains 250 figures with high-quality human annotations across three evaluation aspects, totaling 600+ hours of annotation effort. We further extend these figures via image transformations, reasoning questions, resistance probes, caption-bias probes, and confirmed selective-blur targets, producing over 34,000 evaluation setups for stress testing. We further propose the Admittance-Resistance-Inductance (A-R-I) framework to evaluate whether models acknowledge insufficient evidence, resist misleading context, and infer cautiously from partial information. Our results reveal substantial behavioral differences among models. GPT-5.2 achieves the highest description quality (MQM 91.6) with strong reasoning accuracy (78.4%), yet hallucinates unreadable content in 96% of cases, whereas Gemini 3.1 Pro, a comparably capable model (MQM 90.2, reasoning 81.0%), admits uncertainty in 71% of such cases and achieves the strongest resistance score (0.91). These findings show that high perception and reasoning accuracy alone do not guarantee behavioral reliability, a dimension critical for deployment in scientific workflows.

cs.CL

Orchestrating Rewards in the Era of Intelligence-Driven Commerce

Despite their evolution from early copper-token schemes to sophisticated digital solutions, loyalty programs remain predominantly closed ecosystems, with brands retaining full control over all components. Coalition loyalty programs emerged to enable cross-brand interoperability, but approximately 60\% fail within 10 years in spite of theoretical advantages rooted in network economics. This paper demonstrates that coalition failures stem from fundamental architectural limitations in centralized operator models rather than operational deficiencies, and argues further that neither closed nor coalition systems can scale in intelligence-driven paradigms where AI agents mediate commerce and demand trustless, protocol-based coordination that existing architectures cannot provide. We propose a hybrid framework where brands maintain sovereign control over their programs while enabling cross-brand interoperability through trustless exchange mechanisms. Our framework preserves closed system advantages while enabling open system benefits without the structural problems that doom traditional coalitions. We derive a mathematical pricing model accounting for empirically-validated market factors while enabling fair value exchange across interoperable reward systems.

econ.GN

Trustless Federated Learning at Edge-Scale: A Compositional Architecture for Decentralized, Verifiable, and Incentive-Aligned Coordination

Artificial intelligence is retracing the Internet's path from centralized provision to distributed creation. Initially, resource-intensive computation concentrates within institutions capable of training and serving large models.Eventually, as federated learning matures, billions of edge devices holding sensitive data will be able to collectively improve models without surrendering raw information, enabling both contribution and consumption at scale. This democratic vision remains unrealized due to certain compositional gaps; aggregators handle updates without accountability, economic mechanisms are lacking and even when present remain vulnerable to gaming, coordination serializes state modifications limiting scalability, and governance permits retroactive manipulation. This work addresses these gaps by leveraging cryptographic receipts to prove aggregation correctness, geometric novelty measurement to prevent incentive gaming, parallel object ownership to achieve linear scalability, and time-locked policies to check retroactive manipulation.

cs.LG