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Pouria Ramazi

Publications and source records attributed to Pouria Ramazi.

28 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

Evolutionary Matrix-Game Dynamics Under Imitation in Heterogeneous Populations

Decision-making individuals often imitate their highest-earning fellows rather than optimize their own utilities, due to bounded rationality and incomplete information. Perpetual fluctuations between decisions have been reported as the dominant asymptotic outcome of imitative behaviors, yet little attempt has been made to characterize them, particularly in heterogeneous populations. We study a finite well-mixed heterogeneous population of individuals choosing between the two strategies, cooperation and defection, and earning based on their payoff matrices that can be unique to each individual. At each time step, an arbitrary individual becomes active to update her decision by imitating the highest earner in the population. We show that almost surely the dynamics reach either an equilibrium state or a minimal positively invariant set, a fluctuation set, in the long run. In addition to finding all equilibria, for the first time, we characterize the fluctuation sets, provide necessary and sufficient conditions for their existence, and approximate their basins of attraction. We also find that exclusive populations of individuals playing coordination or prisoner's dilemma games always equilibrate, implying that cycles and non-convergence in imitative populations are due to individuals playing anticoordination games. Moreover, we show that except for the two extreme equilibria where all individuals play the same strategy, almost all other equilibria are unstable as long as the population is heterogeneous. Our results theoretically explain earlier reported simulation results and shed new light on the boundedly rational nature of imitation behaviors.

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Modeling and Forecasting COVID-19 Cases using Latent Subpopulations

Classical epidemiological models assume homogeneous populations. There have been important extensions to model heterogeneous populations, when the identity of the sub-populations is known, such as age group or geographical location. Here, we propose two new methods to model the number of people infected with COVID-19 over time, each as a linear combination of latent sub-populations -- i.e., when we do not know which person is in which sub-population, and the only available observations are the aggregates across all sub-populations. Method #1 is a dictionary-based approach, which begins with a large number of pre-defined sub-population models (each with its own starting time, shape, etc), then determines the (positive) weight of small (learned) number of sub-populations. Method #2 is a mixture-of-$M$ fittable curves, where $M$, the number of sub-populations to use, is given by the user. Both methods are compatible with any parametric model; here we demonstrate their use with first (a)~Gaussian curves and then (b)~SIR trajectories. We empirically show the performance of the proposed methods, first in (i) modeling the observed data and then in (ii) forecasting the number of infected people 1 to 4 weeks in advance. Across 187 countries, we show that the dictionary approach had the lowest mean absolute percentage error and also the lowest variance when compared with classical SIR models and moreover, it was a strong baseline that outperforms many of the models developed for COVID-19 forecasting.

cs.LG↗

Boosting propagule transport models with individual-specific data from mobile apps

Management of invasive species and pathogens requires information about the traffic of potential vectors. Such information is often taken from vector traffic models fitted to survey data. Here, user-specific data collected via mobile apps offer new opportunities to obtain more accurate estimates and to analyze how vectors' individual preferences affect propagule flows. However, data voluntarily reported via apps may lack some trip records, adding a significant layer of uncertainty. We show how the benefits of app-based data can be exploited despite this drawback. Based on data collected via an angler app, we built a stochastic model for angler traffic in the Canadian province Alberta. There, anglers facilitate the spread of whirling disease, a parasite-induced fish disease. The model is temporally and spatially explicit and accounts for individual preferences and repeating behaviour of anglers, helping to address the problem of missing trip records. We obtained estimates of angler traffic between all subbasins in Alberta. The model's accuracy exceeds that of direct empirical estimates even when fewer data were used to fit the model. The results indicate that anglers' local preferences and their tendency to revisit previous destinations reduce the number of long inter-waterbody trips potentially dispersing whirling disease. According to our model, anglers revisit their previous destination in 64% of their trips, making these trips irrelevant for the spread of whirling disease. Furthermore, 54% of fishing trips end in individual-specific spatially contained areas with mean radius of 54.7km. Finally, although the fraction of trips that anglers report was unknown, we were able to estimate the total yearly number of fishing trips in Alberta, matching an independent empirical estimate.

q-bio.QM↗

A hypothesis-free bridging of disease dynamics and non-pharmaceutical policies

Accurate prediction of the number of daily or weekly confirmed cases of COVID-19 is critical to the control of the pandemic. Existing mechanistic models nicely capture the disease dynamics. However, to forecast the future, they require the transmission rate to be known, limiting their prediction power. Typically, a hypothesis is made on the form of the transmission rate with respect to time. Yet the real form is too complex to be mechanistically modeled due to the unknown dynamics of many influential factors. We tackle this problem by using a hypothesis-free machine-learning algorithm to estimate the transmission rate from data on non-pharmaceutical policies, and in turn forecast the confirmed cases using a mechanistic disease model. More specifically, we build a hybrid model consisting of a mechanistic ordinary differential equation (ODE) model and a generalized boosting model (GBM). To calibrate the parameters, we develop an "inverse method" that obtains the transmission rate inversely in time from the other variables in the ODE model and then feed it into the GBM to connect with the policy data. The resulting model forecasted the number of daily confirmed cases up to 35 days in the future in the United States with an averaged mean absolute percentage error of 27%. Being partly data-driven, the method is more accurate than typical mechanistic models and meanwhile more intuitive, and possibly reliable, than purely data-based machine learning models. Moreover, it can identify the most informative predictive variables, which can be helpful in designing improved forecasters as well as informing policymakers.

q-bio.QM↗

Characterizing Oscillations in Heterogeneous Populations of Coordinators and Anticoordinators

Oscillations often take place in populations of decision makers that are either a coordinator, who takes action only if enough others do so, or an anticoordinator, who takes action only if few others do so. Populations consisting of exclusively one of these types are known to reach an equilibrium, where every individual is satisfied with her decision. Yet it remains unknown whether oscillations take place in a population consisting of both types, and if they do, what features they share. We study a well-mixed population of individuals, which are either a coordinator or anticoordinator, each associated with a possibly unique threshold and initialized with the strategy A or B. At each time, an agent becomes active to update her strategy based on her threshold: an active coordinator (resp. anticoordinator) updates her strategy to A (resp. B) if the portion of other agents who have chosen A exceeds (falls short of) her threshold, and updates to B (resp. A) otherwise. We define the state of the population dynamics as the distribution over the thresholds of those who have chosen A. We show that the population can admit several minimally positively invariant sets, where the solution trajectory oscillates. We explicitly characterize a class of positively invariant sets, prove their invariance, and provide a necessary and sufficient condition for their stability. Our results highlight the possibility of non-trivial, complex oscillations in the absence of noise and population structure and shed light on the reported oscillations in nature and human societies.

math.DS↗

Heterogeneous Mixed Populations of Coordinating, Anticoordinating, and Imitating Individuals

Decision-making individuals are typically either an imitator, who mimics the action of the most successful individual(s), a conformist (or coordinating individual), who chooses an action if enough others have done so, or a nonconformist (or anticoordinating individual), who chooses an action if few others have done so. Researchers have studied the asymptotic behavior of populations comprising one or two of these types of decision-makers, but not altogether, which we do for the first time. We consider a population of heterogeneous individuals, each either cooperates or defects, and earns payoffs according to their possibly unique payoff matrix and the total number of cooperators in the population. Over a discrete sequence of time, the individuals revise their choices asynchronously based on the best-response or imitation update rule. Those who update based on the best-response are a conformist (resp. nonconformist) if their payoff matrix is that of a coordination (resp. anticoordination) game. We take the distribution of cooperators over the three types of individuals with the same payoff matrix as the state of the system. First, we provide our simulation results, showing that a population may admit zero, one or more equilibria at the same time, and several non-singleton minimal positively invariant sets. Second, we find the necessary and sufficient condition for equilibrium existence. Third, we perform stability analysis and find that only those equilibria where the imitators either all cooperate or all defect are likely to be stable. Fourth, we proceed to the challenging problem of characterizing the minimal positively invariant sets and find conditions for the existence of such sets. Finally, we study the stochastic stability of the states under the perturbed dynamics, where the agents are allowed to make mistakes in their decisions with a certain small probability.

math.DS↗

From policy to prediction: Forecasting COVID-19 dynamics under imperfect vaccination

Understanding the joint impact of vaccination and non-pharmaceutical interventions on COVID-19 development is important for making public health decisions that control the pandemic. Recently, we created a method in forecasting the daily number of confirmed cases of infectious diseases by combining a mechanistic ordinary differential equation (ODE) model for infectious classes and a generalized boosting machine learning model (GBM) for predicting how public health policies and mobility data affect the transmission rate in the ODE model [WWR+]. In this paper, we extend the method to the post-vaccination period, accordingly obtain a retrospective forecast of COVID-19 daily confirmed cases in the US, and identify the relative influence of the policies used as the predictor variables. In particular, our ODE model contains both partially and fully vaccinated compartments and accounts for the breakthrough cases, that is, vaccinated individuals can still get infected. Our results indicate that the inclusion of data on non-pharmaceutical interventions can significantly improve the accuracy of the predictions. With the use of policy data, the model predicts the number of daily infected cases up to 35 days in the future, with an average mean absolute percentage error of 34%, which is further improved to 21% if combined with human mobility data. Moreover, similar to the pre-vaccination study, the most influential predictor variable remains the policy of restrictions on gatherings. The modeling approach used in this work can help policymakers design control measures as variant strains threaten public health in the future.

q-bio.QM↗

Equilibration Analysis and Control of Coordinating Decision-Making Populations

Whether a population of decision-making individuals will reach a state of satisfactory decisions is a fundamental problem in studying collective behaviors. In the framework of evolutionary game theory and by means of potential functions, researchers have established equilibrium convergence under different update rules, including best-response and imitation, by imposing certain conditions on agents' utility functions. Then by using the proposed potential functions, they have been able to control these populations towards some desired equilibrium. Nevertheless, finding a potential function is often daunting, if not near impossible. We introduce the so-called coordinating agent who tends to switch to a decision only if at least another agent has done so. We prove that any population of coordinating agents, a coordinating population, almost surely equilibrates. Apparently, some binary network games that were proven to equilibrate using potential functions are coordinating, and some coloring problems can be solved using this notion. We additionally show that any mixed network of agents following best-response, imitation, or rational imitation, and associated with coordination payoff matrices is coordinating, and hence, equilibrates. As a second contribution, we provide an incentive-based control algorithm that leads coordinating populations to a desired equilibrium. The algorithm iteratively maximizes the ratio of the number of agents choosing the desired decision to the provided incentive. It performs near optimal and as well as specialized algorithms proposed for best-response and imitation; however, it does not require a potential function. Therefore, this control algorithm can be readily applied in general situations where no potential function is yet found for a given decision-making population.

cs.MA↗

Global Convergence for Replicator Dynamics of Repeated Snowdrift Games

To understand the emergence and sustainment of cooperative behavior in interacting collectives, we perform global convergence analysis for replicator dynamics of a large, well-mixed population of individuals playing a repeated snowdrift game with four typical strategies, which are always cooperate (ALLC), tit-for-tat (TFT), suspicious tit-for-tat (STFT) and always defect (ALLD). The dynamical model is a three-dimensional ODE system that is parameterized by the payoffs of the base game. Instead of routine searches for evolutionarily stable strategies and sets, we expand our analysis to determining the asymptotic behavior of solution trajectories starting from any initial state, and in particular show that for the full range of payoffs, every trajectory of the system converges to an equilibrium point. The convergence results highlight three findings that are of particular importance for understanding the cooperation mechanisms among self-interested agents playing repeated snowdrift games. First, the inclusion of TFT- and STFT-players, the two types of conditional strategy players in the game, increases the share of cooperators of the overall population compared to the situation when the population consists of only ALLC- and ALLD-players. This confirms findings in biology and sociology that reciprocity may promote cooperation in social collective actions, such as reducing traffic jams and division of labor, where each individual may gain more to play the opposite of what her opponent chooses. Second, surprisingly enough, regardless of the payoffs, there always exists a set of initial conditions under which ALLC players do not vanish in the long run, which does not hold for all the other three types of players. So an ALLC-player, although perceived as the one that can be easily taken advantage of in snowdrift games, has certain endurance in the long run.

math.DS↗

Control of Asynchronous Imitation Dynamics on Networks

Imitation is widely observed in populations of decision-making agents. Using our recent convergence results for asynchronous imitation dynamics on networks, we consider how such networks can be efficiently driven to a desired equilibrium state by offering payoff incentives for using a certain strategy, either uniformly or targeted to individuals. In particular, if for each available strategy, agents playing that strategy receive maximum payoff when their neighbors play that same strategy, we show that providing incentives to agents in a network that is at equilibrium will result in convergence to a unique new equilibrium. For the case when a uniform incentive can be offered to all agents, this result allows the computation of the optimal incentive using a binary search algorithm. When incentives can be targeted to individual agents, we propose an algorithm to select which agents should be chosen based on iteratively maximizing a ratio of the number of agents who adopt the desired strategy to the payoff incentive required to get those agents to do so. Simulations demonstrate that the proposed algorithm computes near-optimal targeted payoff incentives for a range of networks and payoff distributions in coordination games.

cs.GT↗