arXiv subjects

Prabal Banerjee

Publications and source records attributed to Prabal Banerjee.

7 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2023

Chrisimos: A useful Proof-of-Work for finding Minimal Dominating Set of a graph

Hash-based Proof-of-Work (PoW) used in the Bitcoin Blockchain leads to high energy consumption and resource wastage. In this paper, we aim to re-purpose the energy by replacing the hash function with real-life problems having commercial utility. We propose Chrisimos, a useful Proof-of-Work where miners are required to find a minimal dominating set for real-life graph instances. A miner who is able to output the smallest dominating set for the given graph within the block interval time wins the mining game. We also propose a new chain selection rule that ensures the security of the scheme. Thus our protocol also realizes a decentralized minimal dominating set solver for any graph instance. We provide formal proof of correctness and show via experimental results that the block interval time is within feasible bounds of hash-based PoW.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2022

Strategic Analysis of Griefing Attack in Lightning Network

Hashed Timelock Contract (HTLC) in Lightning Network is susceptible to a griefing attack. An attacker can block several channels and stall payments by mounting this attack. A state-of-the-art countermeasure, Hashed Timelock Contract with Griefing-Penalty (HTLC-GP) is found to work under the classical assumption of participants being either honest or malicious but fails for rational participants. To address the gap, we introduce a game-theoretic model for analyzing griefing attacks in HTLC. We use this model to analyze griefing attacks in HTLC-GP and conjecture that it is impossible to design an efficient protocol that will penalize a malicious participant with the current Bitcoin scripting system. We study the impact of the penalty on the cost of mounting the attack and observe that HTLC-GP is weakly effective in disincentivizing the attacker in certain conditions. To further increase the cost of attack, we introduce the concept of \emph{guaranteed minimum compensation}, denoted as $\zeta$, and modify HTLC-GP into $\textrm{HTLC-GP}^{\zeta}$. By experimenting on several instances of Lightning Network, we observe that the total coins locked in the network drops to $28\%$ for $\textrm{HTLC-GP}^{\zeta}$, unlike in HTLC-GP where total coins locked does not drop below $40\%$. These results justify that $\textrm{HTLC-GP}^{\zeta}$ is better than HTLC-GP to counter griefing attacks.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2020

Reliable, Fair and Decentralized Marketplace for Content Sharing Using Blockchain

Content sharing platforms such as Youtube and Vimeo have promoted pay per view models for artists to monetize their content. Yet, artists remain at the mercy of centralized platforms that control content listing and advertisement, with little transparency and fairness in terms of number of views or revenue. On the other hand, consumers are distanced from the publishers and cannot authenticate originality of the content. In this paper, we develop a reliable and fair platform for content sharing without a central facilitator. The platform is built as a decentralized data storage layer to store and share content in a fault-tolerant manner, where the peers also participate in a blockchain network. The blockchain is used to manage content listings and as an auditable and fair marketplace transaction processor that automatically pays out the content creators and the storage facilitators using smart contracts. We demonstrate the system with the blockchain layer built on Hyperledger Fabric and the data layer built on Tahoe-LAFS,and show that our design is practical and scalable with low overheads.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2020

Griefing-Penalty: Countermeasure for Griefing Attack in Lightning Network

Lightning Network can execute unlimited number of off-chain payments, without incurring the cost of recording each of them in the blockchain. However, conditional payments in such networks is susceptible to Griefing Attack. In this attack, an adversary doesn't resolve the payment with the intention of blocking channel capacity of the network. We propose an efficient countermeasure for the attack, known as Griefing-Penalty. If any party in the network mounts a griefing attack, it needs to pay a penalty proportional to the collateral cost of executing a payment. The penalty is used for compensating affected parties in the network. We propose a new payment protocol HTLC-GP or Hashed Timelock Contract with Griefing-Penalty to demonstrate the utility of the countermeasure. Upon comparing our protocol with existing payment protocol Hashed Timelock Contract, we observe that the average revenue earned by the attacker decreases substantially for HTLC-GP as compared to HTLC. We also study the impact of path length for routing a transaction and rate of griefing-penalty on the budget invested by an adversary for mounting the attack. The budget needed for mounting griefing attack in HTLC-GP is 12 times more than the budget needed by attacker in HTLC, given that each payment instance being routed via path length of hop count 20.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2020

Verifiable and Auditable Digital Interchange Framework

We address the problem of fairness and transparency in online marketplaces selling digital content, where all parties are not actively participating in the trade. We present the design, implementation and evaluation of VADER, a highly scalable solution for multi-party fair digital exchange that combines the trusted execution of blockchains with intelligent protocol design and incentivization schemes. We prototype VADER on Hyperledger Fabric and extensively evaluate our system on a realistic testbed spanning five public cloud datacenters, spread across four continents. Our results demonstrate that VADER adds only minimal overhead of 16% in median case compared to a baseline solution, while significantly outperforming a naive blockchain based solution that adds an overhead of 764%.

cs.DC↗

arXiv2019

Cumulus: Blockchain-Enabled Privacy Preserving Data Audit in Cloud

Data owners upload large files to cloud storage servers, but malicious servers may potentially tamper data. To check integrity of remote data, Proof of Retrievability (PoR) schemes were introduced. Existing PoR protocols assume that data owners and third-party auditors are honest and audit only the potentially malicious cloud server to check integrity of stored data. In this paper we consider a system where any party may attempt to cheat others and consider collusion cases. We design a protocol that is secure under such adversarial assumptions and use blockchain smart contracts to act as mediator in case of dispute and payment settlement. We use state channels to reduce blockchain interactions in order to build a practical audit solution. We implement and evaluate a prototype using Ethereum as the blockchain platform and show that our scheme has comparable performance.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2018

Blockchain Enabled Data Marketplace -- Design and Challenges

Data is of unprecedented importance today. The most valuable companies of today treat data as a commodity, which they trade and earn revenues. To facilitate such trading, data marketplaces have emerged. Present data marketplaces are inadequate as they fail to satisfy all the desirable properties - fairness, efficiency, security, privacy and adherence to regulations. In this article, we propose a blockchain enabled data marketplace solution that fulfills all required properties. We outline the design, show how to design such a system and discuss the challenges in building a complete data marketplace.

cs.CR↗