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Praney Goyal

Publications and source records attributed to Praney Goyal.

2 recordsLinked to original sources

A Layer-wise Study of How Style Rewriting Breaks the Calibration of Zero-Shot LLM Fake-News Detectors

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly asked to judge whether a news article is true, and their stated confidence is often taken at face value. We test what happens to that confidence when an article's writing style, but not its facts, is manipulated, as in recent \emph{style attacks} on fake-news detectors. Tracing how the prediction and its confidence form layer by layer inside the network, we study three model families (LLaMA-3-8B, Qwen2.5-7B, Mistral-7B) on three fake-news benchmarks, and find the same three patterns in every model--dataset pairing. First, on the original articles the models are competent and largely honest judges: they settle on an answer, briefly become overconfident, and then correct their confidence in the final layers. Second, style-rewritten articles break this self-correction: the models become far less accurate, under the strongest attack, worse than random guessing, yet remain just as confident, so they are \emph{confidently wrong} precisely when a warning is most needed. Third, nearly all of the damage comes from rewriting into sensational or emotionally charged styles, while sober, neutral rewrites leave the models' honesty largely intact. The practical implication is that an LLM's confidence about veracity cannot be trusted as a safety signal when an article's style may have been manipulated.

cs.CL↗

LoRA Users Beware: A Few Spurious Tokens Can Manipulate Your Finetuned Model

Large Language Models (LLMs) are commonly finetuned for a variety of use cases and domains. A common approach is to leverage Low-Rank Adaptation (LoRA) -- known to provide strong performance at low resource costs. In this study, we demonstrate that LoRA actually opens the door to short-cut vulnerabilities -- and the more resource efficient is the LoRA setup, the more vulnerable will be the finetuned model to aggressive attacks. To measure that vulnerability, we introduce Seamless Spurious Token Injection (SSTI), where we find that LoRA exclusively focuses on even just a single token that is spuriously correlated with downstream labels. In short, injection of that spurious token during finetuning ensure that the model's prediction at test-time can be manipulated on-demand. We conducted experiments across model families and datasets to evaluate the impact of SSTI during LoRA finetuning while providing possible mitigations. Our experiments conclude that none of the existing checkers and preprocessors can sanitize a dataset raising new concerns for data quality and AI safety.

cs.LG↗