arXiv subjects

Pratyush Chakraborty

Publications and source records attributed to Pratyush Chakraborty.

28 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

arXiv2023

Identification of Forced Oscillation Sources in Wind Farms using E-SINDy

The rapid growth of wind power generation has led to increased interest in understanding and mitigating the adverse effects of wind turbine wakes and forced oscillations in wind farms. In this paper, we model a wind farm consisting of three wind turbines connected to a distribution system. Forced oscillations due to wind shear and tower shadow are injected into the system. If these oscillations are unchecked, they could pose a severe threat to the operation of the system and damage to the equipment. Identifying the source and frequency of forced oscillations in wind farms from measurement data is challenging. Thus, we propose a data-driven approach that discovers the underlying equations governing a nonlinear dynamical system from measured data using the Ensemble-Sparse Identification of Nonlinear Dynamics (E-SINDy) method. The results suggest that E-SINDy is a valuable tool for identifying sources of forced oscillations in wind farms and could facilitate the development of suitable control strategies to mitigate their negative impacts.

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arXiv2022

Optimal Storage and Solar Capacity of a Residential Household under Net Metering and Time-of-Use Pricing

Incentive programs and ongoing reduction in costs are driving joint installation of solar PV panels and storage systems in residential households. There is a need for optimal investment decisions to reduce the electricity consumption costs of the households further. In this paper, we first develop analytical expression of storage investment decision and then of solar investment decision for a household which is under net metering billing mechanism with time of use pricing condition. Using real data of a residential household in Austin, TX, USA, we study how the investment decisions would provide benefit for a period of one year. Results show significant profit when using storage devices and solar panels optimally for the system. It is important to note that though our approach can help significantly to take investment decisions, the solution will still be sub-optimal for somebody who needs optimal investment jointly on both storage and solar systems.

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arXiv2022

Evaluation of Energy Resilience and Cost Benefit in Microgrid with Peer-to-Peer Energy Trading

Integration of distributed energy resources (DERs) at a residential level has given way to the development of a self-sufficient energy-resilient system and peer-to-peer (P2P) energy trading at a community level. Several researchers have developed models to implement energy trading in the P2P network with DERs that enables prosumers to avail cost benefits. However, the impact of DERs and P2P energy network on the system's resilience is not evaluated with a quantifiable measure. In this work, we use the percolation threshold as a measure to quantify energy resilience, which can be computed using complex network. We consider a standard IEEE-123 node test feeder integrated with renewable energy sources and partitioned into microgrids. The microgrid with the highest percolation threshold value is considered for P2P energy trading analysis. We use cooperative game theory to model the P2P energy trading so that all prosumers take part rationally. The simulation is carried out using time series data of houses with varying load profiles, solar generation, and energy storage capacities. The results show 5.81\% of total cost benefit in a year and 10.67\% improvement in the resilience of the system due to P2P energy trading.

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arXiv2022

Peer-to-Peer Sharing of Energy Storage Systems under Net Metering and Time-of-Use Pricing

Sharing economy has become a socio-economic trend in transportation and housing sectors. It develops business models leveraging underutilized resources. Like those sectors, power grid is also becoming smarter with many flexible resources, and researchers are investigating the impact of sharing resources here as well that can help to reduce cost and extract value. In this work, we investigate sharing of energy storage devices among individual households in a cooperative fashion. Coalitional game theory is used to model the scenario where utility company imposes time-of-use (ToU) price and net metering billing mechanism. The resulting game has a non-empty core and we can develop a cost allocation mechanism with easy to compute analytical formula. Allocation is fair and cost effective for every household. We design the price for peer to peer network (P2P) and an algorithm for sharing that keeps the grand coalition always stable. Thus sharing electricity of storage devices among consumers can be effective in this set-up. Our mechanism is implemented in a community of 80 households in Texas using real data of demand and solar irradiance and the results show significant cost savings for our method.

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arXiv2021

Hierarchical Power Flow Control in Smart Grids: Enhancing Rotor Angle and Frequency Stability with Demand-Side Flexibility

Large-scale integration of renewables in power systems gives rise to new challenges for keeping synchronization and frequency stability in volatile and uncertain power flow states. To ensure the safety of operation, the system must maintain adequate disturbance rejection capability at the time scales of both rotor angle and system frequency dynamics. This calls for flexibility to be exploited on both the generation and demand sides, compensating volatility and ensuring stability at the two separate time scales. This article proposes a hierarchical power flow control architecture that involves both transmission and distribution networks as well as individual buildings to enhance both small-signal rotor angle stability and frequency stability of the transmission network. The proposed architecture consists of a transmission-level optimizer enhancing system damping ratios, a distribution-level controller following transmission commands and providing frequency support, and a building-level scheduler accounting for quality of service and following the distribution-level targets. We validate the feasibility and performance of the whole control architecture through real-time hardware-in-loop tests involving real-world transmission and distribution network models along with real devices at the Stone Edge Farm Microgrid.

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arXiv2021

Practical Challenges in Real-time Demand Response

We report on a real-time demand response experiment with 100 controllable devices. The experiment reveals several key challenges in the deployment of a real-time demand response program, including time delays, uncertainties, characterization errors, multiple timescales, and nonlinearity, which have been largely ignored in previous studies. To resolve these practical issues, we develop and implement a two-level multi-loop control structure integrating feed-forward proportional-integral controllers and optimization solvers in closed loops, which eliminates steady-state errors and improves the dynamical performance of the overall building response. The proposed methods are validated by Hardware-in-the-Loop (HiL) tests.

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arXiv2020

Incentive Design in a Distributed Problem with Strategic Agents

In this paper, we consider a general distributed system with multiple agents who select and then implement actions in the system. The system has an operator with a centralized objective. The agents, on the other hand, are selfinterested and strategic in the sense that each agent optimizes its own individual objective. The operator aims to mitigate this misalignment by designing an incentive scheme for the agents. The problem is difficult due to the cost functions of the agents being coupled, the objective of the operator not being social welfare, and the operator having no direct control over actions being implemented by the agents. This problem has been studied in many fields, particularly in mechanism design and cost allocation. However, mechanism design typically assumes that the operator has knowledge of the cost functions of the agents and the actions being implemented by the operator. On the other hand, cost allocation classically assumes that agents do not anticipate the effect of their actions on the incentive that they obtain. We remove these assumptions and present an incentive rule for this setup by bridging the gap between mechanism design and classical cost allocation. We analyze whether the proposed design satisfies various desirable properties such as social optimality, budget balance, participation constraint, and so on. We also analyze which of these properties can be satisfied if the assumptions of cost functions of the agents being private and the agents being anticipatory are relaxed.

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arXiv2019

A Minimal Incentive-based Demand Response Program With Self Reported Baseline Mechanism

In this paper, we propose a novel incentive based Demand Response (DR) program with a self reported baseline mechanism. The System Operator (SO) managing the DR program recruits consumers or aggregators of DR resources. The recruited consumers are required to only report their baseline, which is the minimal information necessary for any DR program. During a DR event, a set of consumers, from this pool of recruited consumers, are randomly selected. The consumers are selected such that the required load reduction is delivered. The selected consumers, who reduce their load, are rewarded for their services and other recruited consumers, who deviate from their reported baseline, are penalized. The randomization in selection and penalty ensure that the baseline inflation is controlled. We also justify that the selection probability can be simultaneously used to control SO's cost. This allows the SO to design the mechanism such that its cost is almost optimal when there are no recruitment costs or at least significantly reduced otherwise. Finally, we also show that the proposed method of self-reported baseline outperforms other baseline estimation methods commonly used in practice.

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arXiv2018

Analysis of Solar Energy Aggregation under Various Billing Mechanisms

Ongoing reductions in the cost of solar photovoltaic (PV) systems are driving their increased installations by residential households. Various incentive programs such as feed-in tariff, net metering, net purchase and sale that allow the prosumers to sell their generated electricity to the grid are also powering this trend. In this paper, we investigate sharing of PV systems among a community of households, who can also benefit further by pooling their production. Using cooperative game theory, we find conditions under which such sharing decreases their net total cost. We also develop allocation rules such that the joint net electricity consumption cost is allocated to the participants. These cost allocations are based on the cost causation principle. The allocations also satisfy the standalone cost principle and promote PV solar aggregation. We also perform a comparative analytical study on the benefit of sharing under the mechanisms favorable for sharing, namely net metering, and net purchase and sale. The results are illustrated in a case study using real consumption data from a residential community in Austin, Texas.

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arXiv2017

Sharing Storage in a Smart Grid: A Coalitional Game Approach

Sharing economy is a transformative socio-economic phenomenon built around the idea of sharing underused resources and services, e.g. transportation and housing, thereby reducing costs and extracting value. Anticipating continued reduction in the cost of electricity storage, we look into the potential opportunity in electrical power system where consumers share storage with each other. We consider two different scenarios. In the first scenario, consumers are assumed to already have individual storage devices and they explore cooperation to minimize the realized electricity consumption cost. In the second scenario, a group of consumers is interested to invest in joint storage capacity and operate it cooperatively. The resulting system problems are modeled using cooperative game theory. In both cases, the cooperative games are shown to have non-empty cores and we develop efficient cost allocations in the core with analytical expressions. Thus, sharing of storage in cooperative manner is shown to be very effective for the electric power system.

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