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Preetjot Singh

Publications and source records attributed to Preetjot Singh.

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Manipulation and Control Complexity of Schulze Voting

Schulze voting is a recently introduced voting system enjoying unusual popularity and a high degree of real-world use, with users including the Wikimedia foundation, several branches of the Pirate Party, and MTV. It is a Condorcet voting system that determines the winners of an election using information about paths in a graph representation of the election. We resolve the complexity of many electoral control cases for Schulze voting. We find that it falls short of the best known voting systems in terms of control resistance, demonstrating vulnerabilities of concern to some prospective users of the system.

cs.GT

Manipulation Can Be Hard in Tractable Voting Systems Even for Constant-Sized Coalitions

Voting theory has become increasingly integrated with computational social choice and multiagent systems. Computational complexity has been extensively used as a shield against manipulation of voting systems, however for several voting schemes this complexity may cause calculating the winner to be computationally difficult. Of the many voting systems that have been studied with regard to election manipulation, a few have been found to have an unweighted coalitional manipulation problem that is NP-hard for a constant number of manipulators despite having a winner problem that is in P. We survey this interesting class of voting systems and the work that has analyzed their complexity.

cs.GT