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Priyank Sinha

Publications and source records attributed to Priyank Sinha.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

On Analyzing the Conditions for Stability of Opportunistic Supply Chains Under Network Growth

Even large firms such as Walmart, Apple, and Coca-Cola face persistent fluctuations in costs, demand, and raw material availability. These are not \textit{rare events} and cannot be evaluated using traditional disruption models focused on infrequent events. Instead, sustained volatility induces opportunistic behavior, as firms repeatedly reconfigure partners in absence of long-term contracts, often due to trust deficits. The resulting web of transient relationships forms opportunistic supply chains (OSCs). To capture OSC evolution, we develop an integrated mathematical framework combining a Geometric Brownian Motion (GBM) model to represent stochastic price volatility, a Bayesian learning model to describe adaptive belief updates regarding partner reliability, and a Latent Order Logistic (LOLOG) network model for endogenous changes in network structure. This framework is implemented in an agent-based simulation to examine how volatility, trust, and network structure jointly shape SC resilience. Our modeling approach identifies critical volatility threshold; a tipping point beyond which the network shifts from a stable, link-preserving regime to a fragmented regime marked by rapid relationship dissolution. We analytically establish monotonic effects of volatility on profitability, trust, and link activation; derive formal stability conditions and volatility-driven phase transitions, and show how these mechanisms shape node importance and procurement behavior. These theoretical mechanisms are illustrated through computational experiments reflecting industry behaviors in fast fashion, electronics, and perishables. Overall, our contribution is to develop an integrated GBM-Bayesian-LOLOG framework to analyze OSC stability and our model can be extended to other OSCs including humanitarian, pharmaceutical, and poultry networks.

econ.GN

Price equilibria with positive margins in loyal-strategic markets with discrete prices

In competitive supply chains (SCs), pricing decisions are crucial, as they directly impact market share and profitability. Traditional SC models often assume continuous pricing for mathematical convenience, overlooking the practical reality of discrete price increments driven by currency constraints. Additionally, customer behavior, influenced by loyalty and strategic considerations, plays a significant role in purchasing decisions. To address these gaps, this study examines a SC model involving one supplier and two manufacturers, incorporating realistic factors such as customer demand segmentation and discrete price setting. Our analysis shows that the Nash equilibria (NE) among manufacturers are not unique, we then discuss the focal equilibrium. Our analysis also reveals that low denomination factors can lead to instability as the corresponding game does not have NE. Numerical simulations demonstrate that even small changes in price increments significantly affect the competitive dynamics and market share distribution.

q-fin.GN

Punitive policies to combat misreporting in dynamic supply chains

Wholesale price contracts are known to be associated with double marginalization effects, which prevents supply chains from achieving their true market share. In a dynamic setting under information asymmetry, these inefficiencies manifest in the form of misreporting of the market potential by the manufacturer to the supplier, again leading to the loss of market share. We pose the dynamics of interaction between the supplier and manufacturer as the Stackelberg game and develop theoretical results for optimal punitive strategies that the supplier can implement to ensure that the manufacturer truthfully reveals the market potential in the single-stage setting. Later, we validate these results through the randomly generated, Monte-Carlo simulation based numerical examples.

math.OC