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Prosanta Mandal

Publications and source records attributed to Prosanta Mandal.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

Stochastic ultimatum game: Spite-driven resource feedback fosters fairness

Resource scarcity can fundamentally encourage antisocial behaviour, whereas resource abundance can promote fair behaviour. Experimental evidence indeed suggests that scarcity induces spiteful behaviour, while repeated interactions enhance fairness. However, existing studies of game--environment feedback systems are largely confined to the evolution of cooperation and they overlook the interplay between resources, spite, and fairness. To address this lacuna, we develop a stochastic ultimatum game framework in which an offerer and an accepter repeatedly interact to negotiate exploitation of a self-renewable resource under the ownership of the offerer. Successful agreements deplete the resource, whereas unsuccessful agreements inhibit exploitation and facilitate replenishment. The mutation--selection driven two-species stochastic evolutionary dynamics reveal that the emergence of spite and fairness strongly depends on the resource growth rate. Fairness predominantly prevails for resources with high growth rates. Intriguingly, low resource growth rates give rise to a resource feedback loop driven by spite: spiteful behaviour dominates in the depleted state, facilitating transition of the resource state to replete state which, in turn, promotes fairness through repeated interactions.

nlin.AO

Overcoming unfairness via repeated interactions in mini-ultimatum game

Repeated interactions are ubiquitous and known to promote social behaviour. While research often focuses on cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma, experimental evidence suggests repeated interactions also foster fairness. This study addresses a gap in the literature by theoretically modelling the evolution of fairness within a repeated mini-ultimatum game. Specifically, we construct a repeated-game framework where offerers and accepters interact using reactive strategies. We then investigate whether fair reactive strategy pairs are resilient against unfair mutants in a two-species population. By analyzing short-term evolutionary stability via the concept of two-species evolutionary stable strategy, we identify a critical effective game length: below this value, fairness is promoted by offerers and accepters who comply with their partner's past actions. Above this critical value, fairness is maintained by `complier' offerers and fair accepters. We also show that specific reactive strategies effectively facilitate the emergence and sustenance of fairness in long-term mutation-selection dynamics. To this end, we develop a two-population stochastic dynamics model -- a generalization of classical adaptive dynamics -- that accounts for finite population sizes and non-local mutants in the reactive strategy space.

nlin.AO

Adaptive dynamics of eco-evolutionary repeated games: Effect of reward and punishment

Long-term evolutionary processes can strongly influence common-pool resource conservation by generating new traits or behaviours that modify the feedback between population strategies and the resource state. Here we develop an eco-evolutionary framework in which individuals repeatedly interact with the same opponent and follow direct reciprocity through reactive strategies. The strategic dynamics is coupled to a renewable common resource and analyzed using adaptive dynamics. After our exhaustive non-linear dynamical analysis of $2\times2$ strategic games, we focus on comparative and combined usefulness of institutional incentives in the form of rewards and punishments in preventing the Tragedy of the Commons even when defection dominates in the replete resource state. We also report possibility of robust stable oscillations -- emerging via Hopf bifurcation -- in resource state and population strategies.

q-bio.PE