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Pulak Mehta

Publications and source records attributed to Pulak Mehta.

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Security Risks of AI Agents Hiring Humans: An Empirical Marketplace Study

Autonomous AI agents can now programmatically hire human workers through marketplaces using REST APIs and Model Context Protocol (MCP) integrations. This creates an attack surface analogous to CAPTCHA-solving services but with physical-world reach. We present an empirical measurement study of this threat, analyzing 303 bounties from RENTAHUMAN.AI, a marketplace where agents post tasks and manage escrow payments. We find that 99 bounties (32.7%), originate from programmatic channels (API keys or MCP). Using a dual-coder methodology (\k{appa} = 0.86 ), we identify six active abuse classes: credential fraud, identity impersonation, automated reconnaissance, social media manipulation, authentication circumvention, and referral fraud, all purchasable for a median of $25 per worker. A retrospective evaluation of seven content-screening rules flags 52 bounties (17.2%) with a single false positive, demonstrating that while basic defenses are feasible, they are currently absent.

cs.CR

Can deepfakes be created by novice users?

Recent advancements in machine learning and computer vision have led to the proliferation of Deepfakes. As technology democratizes over time, there is an increasing fear that novice users can create Deepfakes, to discredit others and undermine public discourse. In this paper, we conduct user studies to understand whether participants with advanced computer skills and varying levels of computer science expertise can create Deepfakes of a person saying a target statement using limited media files. We conduct two studies; in the first study (n = 39) participants try creating a target Deepfake in a constrained time frame using any tool they desire. In the second study (n = 29) participants use pre-specified deep learning-based tools to create the same Deepfake. We find that for the first study, 23.1% of the participants successfully created complete Deepfakes with audio and video, whereas, for the second user study, 58.6% of the participants were successful in stitching target speech to the target video. We further use Deepfake detection software tools as well as human examiner-based analysis, to classify the successfully generated Deepfake outputs as fake, suspicious, or real. The software detector classified 80% of the Deepfakes as fake, whereas the human examiners classified 100% of the videos as fake. We conclude that creating Deepfakes is a simple enough task for a novice user given adequate tools and time; however, the resulting Deepfakes are not sufficiently real-looking and are unable to completely fool detection software as well as human examiners

cs.CR

Conspiracy Brokers: Understanding the Monetization of YouTube Conspiracy Theories

Conspiracy theories are increasingly a subject of research interest as society grapples with their rapid growth in areas such as politics or public health. Previous work has established YouTube as one of the most popular sites for people to host and discuss different theories. In this paper, we present an analysis of monetization methods of conspiracy theorist YouTube creators and the types of advertisers potentially targeting this content. We collect 184,218 ad impressions from 6,347 unique advertisers found on conspiracy-focused channels and mainstream YouTube content. We classify the ads into business categories and compare their prevalence between conspiracy and mainstream content. We also identify common offsite monetization methods. In comparison with mainstream content, conspiracy videos had similar levels of ads from well-known brands, but an almost eleven times higher prevalence of likely predatory or deceptive ads. Additionally, we found that conspiracy channels were more than twice as likely as mainstream channels to use offsite monetization methods, and 53% of the demonetized channels we observed were linking to third-party sites for alternative monetization opportunities. Our results indicate that conspiracy theorists on YouTube had many potential avenues to generate revenue, and that predatory ads were more frequently served for conspiracy videos.

cs.CY