arXiv subjects

Qingmin Liu

Publications and source records attributed to Qingmin Liu.

2 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Self-Confirming Mechanisms

This paper studies mechanism design environments in which the designer does not know the distribution of agents' private information a priori and instead learns from agents' behavior induced by the mechanism itself. We formalize a notion of self-confirming mechanisms and a refinement thereof, capturing the idea that an equilibrium mechanism is optimal given the designer's belief and that this belief is consistent with the information produced by the mechanism. We establish a fictitious revelation principle, showing that any incentive-compatible mechanism can be represented as a direct mechanism with filtered type reports that preserve the original mechanism's informational content. Applying the framework to a monopoly problem, we show that, subject to an equilibrium refinement, dominant-strategy self-confirming mechanisms are exactly posted-price mechanisms with locally revenue-maximizing prices.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2025

Strategic Learning with Asymmetric Rationality

This paper analyzes a dynamic interaction between a fully rational, privately informed sender and a boundedly rational, uninformed receiver with memory constraints. The sender controls the flow of information, while the receiver designs a decision-making protocol that uses a finite state space to learn and to provide incentives. We characterize optimal protocols and quantify the scope for manipulation and the incentive cost of guarding against it. We show that distinctive behavioral patterns that might otherwise appear erratic or psychologically driven -- such as information disengagement, opinion polarization conditional on the same information, and indecision near the decision point -- emerge as systematic equilibrium responses to asymmetric rationality and information. The model provides an expressive framework for procedural rationality in strategic settings.

econ.TH↗