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Qizhi Fang

Publications and source records attributed to Qizhi Fang.

23 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

A Random Algorithm for Profit Maximization with Multiple Adoptions in Online Social Networks

Online social networks have been one of the most effective platforms for marketing and advertising. Through "word of mouth" effects, information or product adoption could spread from some influential individuals to millions of users in social networks. Given a social network $G$ and a constant $k$, the influence maximization problem seeks for $k$ nodes in $G$ that can influence the largest number of nodes. This problem has found important applications, and a large amount of works have been devoted to identifying the few most influential users. But most of existing works only focus on the diffusion of a single idea or product in social networks. However, in reality, one company may produce multiple kinds of products and one user may also have multiple adoptions. Given multiple kinds of different products with different activation costs and profits, it is crucial for the company to distribute the limited budget among multiple products in order to achieve profit maximization. Profit Maximization with Multiple Adoptions (PM$^{2}$A) problem aims to seek for a seed set within the budget to maximize the overall profit. In this paper, a Randomized Modified Greedy (RMG) algorithm based on the Reverse Influence Sampling (RIS) technique is presented for the PM$^{2}$A problem, which could achieve a $(1-1/e-\varepsilon)$-approximate solution with high probability. Compared with the algorithm proposed in [16] that achieves a $\frac{1}{2}(1-1/e^{2})$-approximate solution, our algorithm provides a better performance ratio which is also the best performance ratio of the PM$^{2}$A problem. Comprehensive experiments on three real-world social networks are conducted, and the results demonstrate that our RMG algorithm outperforms the algorithm proposed in [16] and other heuristics in terms of profit maximization, and could better allocate the budget.

cs.SI↗

On the Convexity of Independent Set Games

Independent set games are cooperative games defined on graphs, where players are edges and the value of a coalition is the maximum cardinality of independent sets in the subgraph defined by the coalition. In this paper, we investigate the convexity of independent set games, as convex games possess many nice properties both economically and computationally. For independent set games introduced by Deng et al. (Math. Oper. Res., 24:751-766, 1999), we provide a necessary and sufficient characterization for the convexity, i.e., every non-pendant edge is incident to a pendant edge in the underlying graph. Our characterization immediately yields a polynomial time algorithm for recognizing convex instances of independent set games. Besides, we introduce a new class of independent set games and provide an efficient characterization for the convexity.

cs.DM↗

Population Monotonic Allocation Schemes for Vertex Cover Games

For vertex cover games (introduced by Deng et al., Math. Oper. Res., 24:751-766, 1999), we investigate population monotonic allocation schemes (introduced by Sprumont, Games Econ. Behav., 2: 378-394, 1990). We show that the existence of a population monotonic allocation scheme (PMAS for short) for vertex cover games can be determined efficiently and that a PMAS, if exists, can be constructed accordingly. We also show that integral PMAS-es for vertex cover games can be characterized with stable matchings and be enumerated by employing Gale-Shapley algorithm (introduced by Gale and Shapley, Amer. Math. Monthly, 69:9-15, 1962).

cs.GT↗

The Least-core and Nucleolus of Path Cooperative Games

Cooperative games provide an appropriate framework for fair and stable profit distribution in multiagent systems. In this paper, we study the algorithmic issues on path cooperative games that arise from the situations where some commodity flows through a network. In these games, a coalition of edges or vertices is successful if it enables a path from the source to the sink in the network, and lose otherwise. Based on dual theory of linear programming and the relationship with flow games, we provide the characterizations on the CS-core, least-core and nucleolus of path cooperative games. Furthermore, we show that the least-core and nucleolus are polynomially solvable for path cooperative games defined on both directed and undirected network.

cs.GT↗

Computing the Least-core and Nucleolus for Threshold Cardinality Matching Games

Cooperative games provide a framework for fair and stable profit allocation in multi-agent systems. \emph{Core}, \emph{least-core} and \emph{nucleolus} are such solution concepts that characterize stability of cooperation. In this paper, we study the algorithmic issues on the least-core and nucleolus of threshold cardinality matching games (TCMG). A TCMG is defined on a graph $G=(V,E)$ and a threshold $T$, in which the player set is $V$ and the profit of a coalition $S\subseteq V$ is 1 if the size of a maximum matching in $G[S]$ meets or exceeds $T$, and 0 otherwise. We first show that for a TCMG, the problems of computing least-core value, finding and verifying least-core payoff are all polynomial time solvable. We also provide a general characterization of the least core for a large class of TCMG. Next, based on Gallai-Edmonds Decomposition in matching theory, we give a concise formulation of the nucleolus for a typical case of TCMG which the threshold $T$ equals $1$. When the threshold $T$ is relevant to the input size, we prove that the nucleolus can be obtained in polynomial time in bipartite graphs and graphs with a perfect matching.

cs.GT↗