arXiv subjects

Quanyan Zhu

Publications and source records attributed to Quanyan Zhu.

At least 37 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

arXiv2026

The Internet of Agentic AI: Communication, Coordination, and Collective Intelligence at Scale

The rapid emergence of autonomous AI agents is transforming artificial intelligence from isolated model inference into distributed systems of reasoning, communication, and action. This paper develops the vision of the Internet of Agentic AI (IoAI): an open ecosystem in which heterogeneous agents discover one another, negotiate responsibilities, exchange context, invoke tools, and execute workflows across cloud, edge, device, organizational, and cyber-physical environments. We synthesize foundations from single-agent agentic AI, multi-agent systems, distributed computing, communication networks, game theory, and security engineering to characterize the architectures and mechanisms required for scalable agent ecosystems. The paper examines agent deployment models, workflow lifecycles, communication protocols, interoperability layers, resource-management challenges, and trust architectures, with case studies in adaptive manufacturing and distributed operational coordination. The resulting framework highlights the central research challenges of controlled emergence, semantic interoperability, secure identity, incentive-compatible coordination, resource-aware orchestration, and governance for large-scale networks of autonomous agents.

cs.MA↗

arXiv2026

AI Tokenomics: The Economics of Tokens, Computation, and Pricing in Foundation Models

Tokens have become the practical accounting unit for modern foundation model services, linking information processing, computation, memory use, energy expenditure, pricing, and economic value. This paper develops a framework for AI tokenomics: the study of how tokens are generated, consumed, priced, allocated, and optimized across AI systems. We connect token-level technical costs to workflow-level production functions, enterprise resource allocation, measurement and instrumentation methods, and emerging market-design questions. The framework shows that token expenditure and economic value are distinct: value depends on marginal productivity, workflow position, hidden reasoning activity, risk, and downstream propagation effects. The paper concludes by identifying open research directions in hidden-token measurement, empirical calibration, token productivity, dynamic allocation, and token-based markets.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2026

Agentomics: Economic Foundations for the Valuation, Attribution, and Pricing of AI Agents in Human-AI Workflows

Agentic AI systems are increasingly being deployed as productive resources in organizational workflows, yet existing evaluation methods primarily measure isolated technical performance rather than economic contribution. This paper introduces \emph{Agentomics}, a workflow-based framework for valuing, attributing, and pricing human and artificial agents. The framework models a workflow as a configuration of heterogeneous agents whose collective performance determines gross value, deployment cost, reliability, and expected failure loss. Workflow value is treated as a team-level quantity that may include complementarities, substitution effects, bottlenecks, and nonlinear production; additive stage-level value is only a special case. Building on this workflow model, the paper formulates AI deployment as a coalition-formation problem and defines coalition value as the incremental net surplus generated relative to a benchmark human workflow. The Shapley value is then used to attribute economic surplus among participating AI agents, yielding a principled connection among valuation, accountability, and market pricing. The resulting Shapley pricing equilibrium provides a normative benchmark for assessing whether agent prices reflect expected marginal contribution. A security-operations case study illustrates how the framework accounts for productivity gains, deployment costs, reliability losses, and coalition-level complementarities in hybrid human--AI workflows.

econ.EM↗

arXiv2026

Insurance of Agentic AI

Agentic artificial intelligence (AI) systems are transforming the risk landscape by extending beyond information generation to autonomous planning, tool invocation, decision execution, and persistent modification of digital and physical environments. These capabilities introduce novel exposures that do not fit neatly within traditional insurance categories such as cyber, professional liability, product liability, or directors and officers coverage. This paper examines the emerging insurance market for agentic AI and develops a framework for understanding its underwriting, pricing, reinsurance, and product-design implications. We characterize agentic AI as a continuum of autonomy and delegated authority, emphasizing the distinction between informational outputs and systems capable of independently generating insured events through external actions. We analyze major risk pathways, including hallucinations, prompt-injection attacks, autonomous decision errors, model drift, dependency failures, and cyber-physical harms, and evaluate how existing insurance products are adapting to address these exposures. The paper further proposes an actuarial framework based on exposure assessment, scenario analysis, dependency mapping, and accumulation-risk management, drawing parallels to the evolution of cyber insurance. Finally, we present a coordinated insurance architecture that integrates cyber, technology errors and omissions, product liability, performance-warranty, and affirmative AI-liability coverages through explicit allocation mechanisms and dedicated AI aggregates. The analysis suggests that the future of agentic-AI insurance lies not in a single monoline product but in a layered ecosystem of complementary coverages supported by improved governance, transparency, telemetry, and regulatory clarity.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2026

A Unified Variational Design of Predictive Mirror Descent in Convex Games under Stochastic Feedback

Mirror descent provides a geometric framework for learning in games, but its last-iterate behavior can fail in weakly stable regimes, where the dynamics may exhibit rotational or recurrent transients. Predictive mirror methods mitigate this issue by modifying the feedback entering the mirror update, yet standard predictive variants are typically introduced algorithmically and analyzed one at a time. This letter gives a variational route to predictive feedback by constructing a stochastic mirror differential game with an auxiliary memory state. Its stage cost couples two Fenchel terms: a strategic term evaluated at a predicted profile and a corrective term driven by realized feedback. The resulting equilibrium feedback induces two-channel predictive mirror dynamics in general mirror geometry. Under local mirror regularity, a quantitative local Bregman growth condition, and bounded Brownian diffusion, we establish finite-horizon local terminal-time bounds in expectation and with high probability, together with an exit-probability estimate for the localization neighborhood. The result provides a unified variational construction of the induced predictive-memory mirror flow together with a local stochastic certificate for last-iterate performance near stable equilibria.

math.OC↗

arXiv2026

RCSP: Risk-Sensitive Conjectural Scenario Planning for Safe Dynamic Robot Navigation

Mobile robots can fail before they collide: a velocity that is safe now may commit the robot to a passage that moving obstacles will soon close. We study this predictive near-miss commitment problem and propose Risk-Sensitive Conjectural Scenario Planning (RCSP), a planning layer that evaluates candidate commands against plausible short-horizon obstacle futures. RCSP maintains a lightweight belief over local motion conjectures, samples future interactions, penalizes high-risk tails, and executes through a local safety check. In controlled MuJoCo bottleneck tasks, the RCSP planner reaches the goal without collisions and yields higher secondary safety and path-quality point estimates than a non-adaptive predictor, with additional latency. In ROS2/Gazebo, adding the local safety layer to a standard Nav2 stack reduces dynamic near-miss failures. On official DynaBARN/Jackal transfer, tuned DWA and TEB remain stronger on strict benchmark success, revealing the boundary of the approach. These simulation results position RCSP as a predictive-risk module that complements existing navigation stacks in dynamic bottleneck regimes.

cs.RO↗

arXiv2026

Cooperative and Noncooperative Paradigms for Game-Theoretic Control of Socio-Technical Systems

This tutorial presents cooperative and noncooperative game-theoretic frameworks for modeling, learning, and control in socio-technical systems, where human behavior, incentives, institutions, and social interactions are coupled with cyber-physical and networked infrastructures. The paper reviews strategic, dynamic, cooperative, matching, learning, and feedback-control approaches for analyzing how local decision-making, adaptation, and strategic interactions shape collective system outcomes. The tutorial further develops feedback-learning and incentive-design perspectives that connect equilibrium analysis with adaptation, distributed control, and mechanism design under information and coordination constraints. We also examine resilience and security challenges arising from adversarial behavior, misinformation, disruptions, and cascading failures in interconnected socio-technical networks. Finally, we discuss emerging research directions at the intersection of game theory, control, learning, and network science for resilient and adaptive socio-technical systems.

eess.SY↗

arXiv2026

A Theory of Multilevel Interactive Equilibrium in NeuroAI

We propose a game-theoretic framework for adaptive multi-agent intelligent systems. Unlike classical game theory, which often treats strategies as primitive objects chosen by perfectly rational agents, the proposed framework provides a mathematical foundation for studying equilibrium in NeuroAI and can be viewed as an extension of game theory under relaxed assumptions, including partial observability, bounded computation, and uncertainty. At its core, Multilevel Interactive Equilibrium (MIE) generalizes the classical Nash equilibrium to intelligent systems with internal computation. Rather than being defined solely at the level of observable behavior, equilibrium emerges when neural learning dynamics, cognitive representations, and behavioral strategies mutually stabilize between interacting agents. This framework applies uniformly to interactions between two biological brains, two artificial agents, or hybrid human-AI systems. We discuss applications of multilevel game theory to human-autonomous vehicle driving, human-machine interaction, human-large language model (LLM) interaction, and computational psychiatry. We also outline experimental strategies and computational methods for estimating MIE and discuss challenges and prospects for future research.

cs.NE↗

arXiv2026

Toward Reliable Design of LLM-Enabled Agentic Workflows: Optimizing Latency-Reliability-Cost Tradeoffs

Modern AI systems increasingly rely on workflows composed of multiple interacting agents, some powered by large language models (LLMs) and others by conventional computational modules. This paper analyzes the fundamental tradeoffs between latency, reliability, and cost in LLM-enabled agentic workflows. We introduce performance models for both LLM and non-LLM agents that capture the relationship between computational effort and output quality, incorporating the impact of reasoning and output tokens for LLM agents using a parametric exponential reliability function. Then, we study the design of sequential workflows under latency and cost constraints. Main results include a water-filling token allocation policy and characterizations of optimal workflow reliability in terms of shadow prices.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2026

Performative Scenario Optimization

This paper introduces a performative scenario optimization framework for decision-dependent chance-constrained problems. Unlike classical stochastic optimization, we account for the feedback loop where decisions actively shape the underlying data-generating process. We define performative solutions as self-consistent equilibria and establish their existence using Kakutani's fixed-point theorem. To ensure computational tractability without requiring an explicit model of the environment, we propose a model-free, scenario-based approximation that alternates between data generation and optimization. Under mild regularity conditions, we prove that a stochastic fixed-point iteration, equipped with a logarithmic sample size schedule, converges almost surely to the unique performative solution. The effectiveness of the proposed framework is demonstrated through an emerging AI safety application: deploying performative guardrails against Large Language Model (LLM) jailbreaks. Numerical results confirm the co-evolution and convergence of the guardrail classifier and the induced adversarial prompt distribution to a stable equilibrium.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2026

Differential Privacy in Generative AI Agents: Analysis and Optimal Tradeoffs

Large language models (LLMs) and AI agents are increasingly integrated into enterprise systems to access internal databases and generate context-aware responses. While such integration improves productivity and decision support, the model outputs may inadvertently reveal sensitive information. Although many prior efforts focus on protecting the privacy of user prompts, relatively few studies consider privacy risks from the enterprise data perspective. Hence, this paper develops a probabilistic framework for analyzing privacy leakage in AI agents based on differential privacy. We model response generation as a stochastic mechanism that maps prompts and datasets to distributions over token sequences. Within this framework, we introduce token-level and message-level differential privacy and derive privacy bounds that relate privacy leakage to generation parameters such as temperature and message length. We further formulate a privacy-utility design problem that characterizes optimal temperature selection.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2026

Actionable Recourse in Competitive Environments: A Dynamic Game of Endogenous Selection

Actionable recourse studies whether individuals can modify feasible features to overturn unfavorable outcomes produced by AI-assisted decision-support systems. However, many such systems operate in competitive settings, such as admission or hiring, where only a fraction of candidates can succeed. A fundamental question arises: what happens when actionable recourse is available to everyone in a competitive environment? This study proposes a framework that models recourse as a strategic interaction among candidates under a risk-based selection rule. Rejected individuals exert effort to improve actionable features along directions implied by the decision rule, while the success benchmark evolves endogenously as many candidates adjust simultaneously. This creates endogenous selection, in which both the decision rule and the selection threshold are determined by the population's current feature state. This interaction generates a closed-loop dynamical system linking candidate selection and strategic recourse. We show that the initially selected candidates determine both the benchmark of success and the direction of improvement, thereby amplifying initial disparities and producing persistent performance gaps across the population.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2026

Split-Merge Dynamics for Shapley-Fair Coalition Formation

Coalition formation is often modeled as a static equilibrium problem, neglecting the dynamic processes governing how agents self-organize. This paper proposes a dynamic split-and-merge framework that balances two conflicting economic forces: individual fairness and collective efficiency. We introduce a control-theoretic mechanism where topological operations are driven by distinct signals: splits are triggered by fairness violations (specifically, negative Shapley values representing "agent-responsible inefficiency"), while merges are driven by strict surplus improvements (superadditivity). We prove that these dynamics converge in finite time to a specific class of steady states termed Shapley-Fair and Merge-Stable (SFMS) partitions. Convergence is established via a vector Lyapunov function tracking aggregate fairness deficits and system surplus, leveraging a discrete-time LaSalle invariance principle. Numerical case studies on a 10-player game demonstrate the algorithm's ability to resolve fairness tensions and reach stable configurations, providing a rigorous foundation for endogenous coalition formation in dynamic environments.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2026

Learning, Misspecification, and Cognitive Arbitrage in Linear-Quadratic Network Games

We study strategic interaction in linear-quadratic network games where agents act on subjective, misspecified models of their environment. Agents observe noisy aggregate signals generated by local network externalities and interpret them through simplified conjectures, such as constant or mean-field representations. We characterize the long-run behavior using the Berk-Nash equilibrium (BNE) concept, establishing conditions under which BNE diverges from the Nash equilibrium of the perfectly specified game. We quantify this divergence using a Value of Misspecification (VoM) metric. Building on this framework, we introduce "cognitive arbitrage" -- a design paradigm where a system designer strategically shapes agents' conjectures via minimal observation distortions to steer equilibrium outcomes. We formulate the cognitive arbitrage problem as a Stackelberg optimization with closed-form solutions and prove the convergence of a two-time-scale learning algorithm to the optimal BNE. Our results provide a principled framework for influencing behavior in networked systems with bounded rationality, offering a new perspective on mechanism design that operates on agents' representations rather than their incentives.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2026

A Mathematical Programming Approach to Computing and Learning Berk--Nash Equilibria in Infinite-Horizon MDPs

We study sequential decision-making when the agent's internal model class is misspecified. Within the infinite-horizon Berk-Nash framework, stable behavior arises as a fixed point: the agent acts optimally relative to a subjective model, while that model is statistically consistent with the long-run data endogenously generated by the policy itself. We provide a rigorous characterization of this equilibrium via coupled linear programs and a bilevel optimization formulation. To address the intrinsic non-smoothness of standard best-response correspondences, we introduce entropy regularization, establishing the existence of a unique soft Bellman fixed point and a smooth objective. Exploiting this regularity, we develop an online learning scheme that casts model selection as an adversarial bandit problem using an EXP3-type update, augmented by a novel conjecture-set zooming mechanism that adaptively refines the parameter space. Numerical results demonstrate effective exploration-exploitation trade-offs, convergence to the KL-minimizing model, and sublinear regret.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2026

Toward a Dynamic Stackelberg Game-Theoretic Framework for Agentic AI Defense Against LLM Jailbreaking

This paper proposes a game theoretic framework that models the interaction between prompt engineers and large language models (LLMs) as a two player extensive form game coupled with a Rapidly exploring Random Trees (RRT) search over prompt space. The attacker incrementally samples, extends, and tests prompts, while the LLM chooses to accept, reject, or redirect, leading to terminal outcomes of Safe Interaction, Blocked, or Jailbreak. Embedding RRT exploration inside the extensive form game captures both the discovery phase of jailbreak strategies and the strategic responses of the model. Furthermore, we show that the defender behavior can be interpreted through a local Stackelberg equilibrium condition, which explains when the attacker can no longer obtain profitable prompt deviations and provides a theoretical lens for understanding the effectiveness of our Purple Agent defense. The resulting game tree thus offers a principled foundation for evaluating, interpreting, and hardening LLM guardrails.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2026

Toward a Multi-Echelon Cyber Warfare Theory: A Meta-Game-Theoretic Paradigm for Defense and Dominance

Cyber warfare has become a central element of modern conflict, especially within multi-domain operations. As both a distinct and critical domain, cyber warfare requires integrating defensive and offensive technologies into coherent strategies. While prior research has emphasized isolated tactics or fragmented technologies, a holistic understanding is essential for effective resource deployment and risk mitigation. Game theory offers a unifying framework for this purpose. It not only models attacker-defender interactions but also provides quantitative tools for equilibrium analysis, risk assessment, and strategic reasoning. Integrated with modern AI techniques, game-theoretic models enable the design and optimization of strategies across multiple levels of cyber warfare, from policy and strategy to operations, tactics, and technical implementations. These models capture the paradoxical logic of conflict, where more resources do not always translate into greater advantage, and where nonlinear dynamics govern outcomes. To illustrate the approach, this chapter examines RedCyber, a synthetic cyber conflict, demonstrating how game-theoretic methods capture the interdependencies of cyber operations. The chapter concludes with directions for future research on resilience, cros-echelon planning, and the evolving role of AI in cyber warfare.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2026

Internet of Agentic AI: Incentive-Compatible Distributed Teaming and Workflow

Large language models (LLMs) have enabled a new class of agentic AI systems that reason, plan, and act by invoking external tools. However, most existing agentic architectures remain centralized and monolithic, limiting scalability, specialization, and interoperability. This paper proposes a framework for scalable agentic intelligence, termed the Internet of Agentic AI, in which autonomous, heterogeneous agents distributed across cloud and edge infrastructure dynamically form coalitions to execute task-driven workflows. We formalize a network-native model of agentic collaboration and introduce an incentive-compatible workflow-coalition feasibility framework that integrates capability coverage, network locality, and economic implementability. To enable scalable coordination, we formulate a minimum-effort coalition selection problem and propose a decentralized coalition formation algorithm. The proposed framework can operate as a coordination layer above the Model Context Protocol (MCP). A healthcare case study demonstrates how domain specialization, cloud-edge heterogeneity, and dynamic coalition formation enable scalable, resilient, and economically viable agentic workflows. This work lays the foundation for principled coordination and scalability in the emerging era of Internet of Agentic AI.

cs.GT↗