arXiv subjects

Rad Niazadeh

Publications and source records attributed to Rad Niazadeh.

At least 37 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

arXiv2022

Online Bipartite Matching with Reusable Resources

We study the classic online bipartite matching problem with a twist: offline vertices, called resources, are $\textit{reusable}$. In particular, when a resource is matched to an online vertex it is unavailable for a deterministic time duration $d$ after which it becomes available again for a re-match. Thus, a resource can be matched to many different online vertices over a period of time. While recent work on the problem have resolved the asymptotic case where we have large starting inventory (i.e., many copies) of every resource, we consider the (more general) case of $\textit{unit inventory}$ and give the first algorithms that are provably better than the naive greedy approach which has a competitive ratio of (exactly) 0.5. Our first algorithm, which achieves a competitive ratio of $0.589$, generalizes the classic RANKING algorithm for online bipartite matching of non-reusable resources (Karp et al., 1990), by $\textit{reranking}$ resources independently over time. While reranking resources frequently has the same worst case performance as greedy, we show that reranking intermittently on a periodic schedule succeeds in addressing reusability of resources and performs significantly better than greedy in the worst case. Our second algorithm, which achieves a competitive ratio of $0.505$, is a primal-dual randomized algorithm that works by suggesting up to two resources as candidate matches for every online vertex, and then breaking the tie to make the final matching selection in a randomized correlated fashion over time. As a key component of our algorithm, we suitably adapt and extend the powerful technique of online correlated selection (Fahrbach et al., 2020) to reusable resources, in order to induce negative correlation in our tie breaking step and to beat the competitive ratio of $0.5$. Both of our results also extend to the case where offline vertices have weights.

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arXiv2022

Two-stage Stochastic Matching and Pricing with Applications to Ride Hailing

Matching and pricing are two critical levers in two-sided marketplaces to connect demand and supply. The platform can produce more efficient matching and pricing decisions by batching the demand requests. We initiate the study of the two-stage stochastic matching problem, with or without pricing, to enable the platform to make improved decisions in a batch with an eye toward the imminent future demand requests. This problem is motivated in part by applications in online marketplaces such as ride hailing platforms. We design online competitive algorithms for vertex-weighted (or unweighted) two-stage stochastic matching for maximizing supply efficiency, and two-stage joint matching and pricing for maximizing market efficiency. In the former problem, using a randomized primal-dual algorithm applied to a family of ``balancing'' convex programs, we obtain the optimal $3/4$ competitive ratio against the optimum offline benchmark. Using a factor revealing program and connections to submodular optimization, we improve this ratio against the optimum online benchmark to $(1-1/e+1/e^2)\approx 0.767$ for the unweighted and $0.761$ for the weighted case. In the latter problem, we design optimal $1/2$-competitive joint pricing and matching algorithm by borrowing ideas from the ex-ante prophet inequality literature. We also show an improved $(1-1/e)$-competitive algorithm for the special case of demand efficiency objective using the correlation gap of submodular functions. Finally, we complement our theoretical study by using DiDi's ride-sharing dataset for Chengdu city and numerically evaluating the performance of our proposed algorithms in practical instances of this problem.

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arXiv2022

Sequential Submodular Maximization and Applications to Ranking an Assortment of Products

We study a submodular maximization problem motivated by applications in online retail. A platform displays a list of products to a user in response to a search query. The user inspects the first $k$ items in the list for a $k$ chosen at random from a given distribution, and decides whether to purchase an item from that set based on a choice model. The goal of the platform is to maximize the engagement of the shopper defined as the probability of purchase. This problem gives rise to a less-studied variation of submodular maximization in which we are asked to choose an $\textit{ordering}$ of a set of elements to maximize a linear combination of different submodular functions. First, using a reduction to maximizing submodular functions over matroids, we give an optimal $\left(1-1/e\right)$-approximation for this problem. We then consider a variant in which the platform cares not only about user engagement, but also about diversification across various groups of users, that is, guaranteeing a certain probability of purchase in each group. We characterize the polytope of feasible solutions and give a bi-criteria $((1-1/e)^2,(1-1/e)^2)$-approximation for this problem by rounding an approximate solution of a linear programming relaxation. For rounding, we rely on our reduction and the particular rounding techniques for matroid polytopes. For the special case in which underlying submodular functions are coverage functions -- which is practically relevant in online retail -- we propose an alternative LP relaxation and a simpler randomized rounding for the problem. This approach yields to an optimal bi-criteria $(1-1/e,1-1/e)$-approximation algorithm for the special case of the problem with coverage functions.

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arXiv2022

Bernoulli Factories for Flow-Based Polytopes

We construct explicit combinatorial Bernoulli factories for the class of \emph{flow-based polytopes}; integral 0/1-polytopes defined by a set of network flow constraints. This generalizes the results of Niazadeh et al. (who constructed an explicit factory for the specific case of bipartite perfect matchings) and provides novel exact sampling procedures for sampling paths, circulations, and $k$-flows. In the process, we uncover new connections to algebraic combinatorics.

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arXiv2022

Descending Price Auctions with Bounded Number of Price Levels and Batched Prophet Inequality

We consider descending price auctions for selling $m$ units of a good to unit demand i.i.d. buyers where there is an exogenous bound of $k$ on the number of price levels the auction clock can take. The auctioneer's problem is to choose price levels $p_1 > p_2 > \cdots > p_{k}$ for the auction clock such that auction expected revenue is maximized. The prices levels are announced prior to the auction. We reduce this problem to a new variant of prophet inequality, which we call \emph{batched prophet inequality}, where a decision-maker chooses $k$ (decreasing) thresholds and then sequentially collects rewards (up to $m$) that are above the thresholds with ties broken uniformly at random. For the special case of $m=1$ (i.e., selling a single item), we show that the resulting descending auction with $k$ price levels achieves $1- 1/e^k$ of the unrestricted (without the bound of $k$) optimal revenue. That means a descending auction with just 4 price levels can achieve more than 98\% of the optimal revenue. We then extend our results for $m>1$ and provide a closed-form bound on the competitive ratio of our auction as a function of the number of units $m$ and the number of price levels $k$.

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arXiv2022

Fair Dynamic Rationing

We study the allocative challenges that governmental and nonprofit organizations face when tasked with equitable and efficient rationing of a social good among agents whose needs (demands) realize sequentially and are possibly correlated. As one example, early in the COVID-19 pandemic, the Federal Emergency Management Agency faced overwhelming, temporally scattered, a priori uncertain, and correlated demands for medical supplies from different states. In such contexts, social planners aim to maximize the minimum fill rate across sequentially arriving agents, where each agent's fill rate is determined by an irrevocable, one-time allocation. For an arbitrarily correlated sequence of demands, we establish upper bounds on the expected minimum fill rate (ex-post fairness) and the minimum expected fill rate (ex-ante fairness) achievable by any policy. Our upper bounds are parameterized by the number of agents and the expected demand-to-supply ratio, yet we design a simple adaptive policy called projected proportional allocation (PPA) that simultaneously achieves matching lower bounds for both objectives (ex-post and ex-ante fairness), for any set of parameters. Our PPA policy is transparent and easy to implement, as it does not rely on distributional information beyond the first conditional moments. Despite its simplicity, we demonstrate that the PPA policy provides significant improvement over the canonical class of non-adaptive target-fill-rate policies. We complement our theoretical developments with a numerical study motivated by the rationing of COVID-19 medical supplies based on a standard SEIR modeling approach that is commonly used to forecast pandemic trajectories. In such a setting, our PPA policy significantly outperforms its theoretical guarantee as well as the optimal target-fill-rate policy.

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arXiv2020

Fast Core Pricing for Rich Advertising Auctions

Standard ad auction formats do not immediately extend to settings where multiple size configurations and layouts are available to advertisers. In these settings, the sale of web advertising space increasingly resembles a combinatorial auction with complementarities, where truthful auctions such as the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) can yield unacceptably low revenue. We therefore study core selecting auctions, which boost revenue by setting payments so that no group of agents, including the auctioneer, can jointly improve their utilities by switching to a different outcome. Our main result is a combinatorial algorithm that finds an approximate bidder optimal core point with almost linear number of calls to the welfare maximization oracle. Our algorithm is faster than previously-proposed heuristics in the literature and has theoretical guarantees. We conclude that core pricing is implementable even for very time sensitive practical use cases such as realtime auctions for online advertising and can yield more revenue. We justify this claim experimentally using the Microsoft Bing Ad Auction data, through which we show our core pricing algorithm generates almost 26% more revenue than VCG on average, about 9% more revenue than other core pricing rules known in the literature, and almost matches the revenue of the standard Generalized Second Price (GSP) auction.

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arXiv2020

Bernoulli Factories and Black-Box Reductions in Mechanism Design

We provide a polynomial time reduction from Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism design to Bayesian algorithm design for welfare maximization problems. Unlike prior results, our reduction achieves exact incentive compatibility for problems with multi-dimensional and continuous type spaces. The key technical barrier preventing exact incentive compatibility in prior black-box reductions is that repairing violations of incentive constraints requires understanding the distribution of the mechanism's output, which is typically #P-hard to compute. Reductions that instead estimate the output distribution by sampling inevitably suffer from sampling error, which typically precludes exact incentive compatibility. We overcome this barrier by employing and generalizing the computational model in the literature on $\textit{Bernoulli factories}$. In a Bernoulli factory problem, one is given a function mapping the bias of an "input coin" to that of an "output coin", and the challenge is to efficiently simulate the output coin given only sample access to the input coin. This is the key ingredient in designing an incentive compatible mechanism for bipartite matching, which can be used to make the approximately incentive compatible reduction of Hartline et al. (2015) exactly incentive compatible.

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arXiv2020

Stateful Posted Pricing with Vanishing Regret via Dynamic Deterministic Markov Decision Processes

In this paper, a rather general online problem called dynamic resource allocation with capacity constraints (DRACC) is introduced and studied in the realm of posted price mechanisms. This problem subsumes several applications of stateful pricing, including but not limited to posted prices for online job scheduling and matching over a dynamic bipartite graph. As the existing online learning techniques do not yield vanishing-regret mechanisms for this problem, we develop a novel online learning framework defined over deterministic Markov decision processes with dynamic state transition and reward functions. We then prove that if the Markov decision process is guaranteed to admit an oracle that can simulate any given policy from any initial state with bounded loss -- a condition that is satisfied in the DRACC problem -- then the online learning problem can be solved with vanishing regret. Our proof technique is based on a reduction to online learning with switching cost, in which an online decision maker incurs an extra cost every time she switches from one arm to another. We formally demonstrate this connection and further show how DRACC can be used in our proposed applications of stateful pricing.

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arXiv2019

Persuasion and Incentives Through the Lens of Duality

Lagrangian duality underlies both classical and modern mechanism design. In particular, the dual perspective often permits simple and detail-free characterizations of optimal and approximately optimal mechanisms. This paper applies this same methodology to a close cousin of traditional mechanism design, one which shares conceptual and technical elements with its more mature relative: the burgeoning field of persuasion. The dual perspective permits us to analyze optimal persuasion schemes both in settings which have been analyzed in prior work, as well as for natural generalizations which we are the first to explore in depth. Most notably, we permit combining persuasion policies with payments, which serve to augment the persuasion power of the scheme. In both single and multi-receiver settings, as well as under a variety of constraints on payments, we employ duality to obtain structural insights, as well as tractable and simple characterizations of optimal policies.

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arXiv2018

Hierarchical Clustering for Euclidean Data

Recent works on Hierarchical Clustering (HC), a well-studied problem in exploratory data analysis, have focused on optimizing various objective functions for this problem under arbitrary similarity measures. In this paper we take the first step and give novel scalable algorithms for this problem tailored to Euclidean data in R^d and under vector-based similarity measures, a prevalent model in several typical machine learning applications. We focus primarily on the popular Gaussian kernel and other related measures, presenting our results through the lens of the objective introduced recently by Moseley and Wang [2017]. We show that the approximation factor in Moseley and Wang [2017] can be improved for Euclidean data. We further demonstrate both theoretically and experimentally that our algorithms scale to very high dimension d, while outperforming average-linkage and showing competitive results against other less scalable approaches.

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arXiv2018

Multi-scale Online Learning and its Applications to Online Auctions

We consider revenue maximization in online auction/pricing problems. A seller sells an identical item in each period to a new buyer, or a new set of buyers. For the online posted pricing problem, we show regret bounds that scale with the best fixed price, rather than the range of the values. We also show regret bounds that are almost scale free, and match the offline sample complexity, when comparing to a benchmark that requires a lower bound on the market share. These results are obtained by generalizing the classical learning from experts and multi-armed bandit problems to their multi-scale versions. In this version, the reward of each action is in a different range, and the regret w.r.t. a given action scales with its own range, rather than the maximum range.

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arXiv2018

Hierarchical Clustering better than Average-Linkage

Hierarchical Clustering (HC) is a widely studied problem in exploratory data analysis, usually tackled by simple agglomerative procedures like average-linkage, single-linkage or complete-linkage. In this paper we focus on two objectives, introduced recently to give insight into the performance of average-linkage clustering: a similarity based HC objective proposed by [Moseley and Wang, 2017] and a dissimilarity based HC objective proposed by [Cohen-Addad et al., 2018]. In both cases, we present tight counterexamples showing that average-linkage cannot obtain better than 1/3 and 2/3 approximations respectively (in the worst-case), settling an open question raised in [Moseley and Wang, 2017]. This matches the approximation ratio of a random solution, raising a natural question: can we beat average-linkage for these objectives? We answer this in the affirmative, giving two new algorithms based on semidefinite programming with provably better guarantees.

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arXiv2018

Mechanism Design for Value Maximizers

In many settings, money is a tool of exchange with minimal inherent utility --- agents will spend it in a way that maximizes the value of goods received subject to reasonable constraints, giving only second-order consideration to the trade-off between value and price. While this perspective is commonly captured in consumer choice theory, market equilibrium theory, and other fields, it is markedly absent from the mechanism design literature --- agents strategizing in a mechanism with money are almost always assumed to incorporate money as an objective through quasilinear valuations. We study a simple model of value maximizers that captures online advertisers and other agents who may view money solely as a constraint, and study general questions of mechanism design for such agents. We show that the feasible and optimal points faced by a mechanism designer change dramatically from the quasilinear realm and lay a foundation for a broader study of value maximization in mechanism design. Along the way, we offer new insight into the generalized second price (GSP) auction commonly used in Internet advertising. Through the lens of value maximization, GSP metamorphosizes into a truthful auction, sound in its principles and elegant in its simplicity.

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arXiv2018

Hierarchical Clustering with Structural Constraints

Hierarchical clustering is a popular unsupervised data analysis method. For many real-world applications, we would like to exploit prior information about the data that imposes constraints on the clustering hierarchy, and is not captured by the set of features available to the algorithm. This gives rise to the problem of "hierarchical clustering with structural constraints". Structural constraints pose major challenges for bottom-up approaches like average/single linkage and even though they can be naturally incorporated into top-down divisive algorithms, no formal guarantees exist on the quality of their output. In this paper, we provide provable approximation guarantees for two simple top-down algorithms, using a recently introduced optimization viewpoint of hierarchical clustering with pairwise similarity information [Dasgupta, 2016]. We show how to find good solutions even in the presence of conflicting prior information, by formulating a constraint-based regularization of the objective. We further explore a variation of this objective for dissimilarity information [Cohen-Addad et al., 2018] and improve upon current techniques. Finally, we demonstrate our approach on a real dataset for the taxonomy application.

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arXiv2018

Optimal Algorithms for Continuous Non-monotone Submodular and DR-Submodular Maximization

In this paper we study the fundamental problems of maximizing a continuous non-monotone submodular function over the hypercube, both with and without coordinate-wise concavity. This family of optimization problems has several applications in machine learning, economics, and communication systems. Our main result is the first $\frac{1}{2}$-approximation algorithm for continuous submodular function maximization; this approximation factor of $\frac{1}{2}$ is the best possible for algorithms that only query the objective function at polynomially many points. For the special case of DR-submodular maximization, i.e. when the submodular functions is also coordinate wise concave along all coordinates, we provide a different $\frac{1}{2}$-approximation algorithm that runs in quasilinear time. Both of these results improve upon prior work [Bian et al, 2017, Soma and Yoshida, 2017]. Our first algorithm uses novel ideas such as reducing the guaranteed approximation problem to analyzing a zero-sum game for each coordinate, and incorporates the geometry of this zero-sum game to fix the value at this coordinate. Our second algorithm exploits coordinate-wise concavity to identify a monotone equilibrium condition sufficient for getting the required approximation guarantee, and hunts for the equilibrium point using binary search. We further run experiments to verify the performance of our proposed algorithms in related machine learning applications.

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arXiv2017

Truth and Regret in Online Scheduling

We consider a scheduling problem where a cloud service provider has multiple units of a resource available over time. Selfish clients submit jobs, each with an arrival time, deadline, length, and value. The service provider's goal is to implement a truthful online mechanism for scheduling jobs so as to maximize the social welfare of the schedule. Recent work shows that under a stochastic assumption on job arrivals, there is a single-parameter family of mechanisms that achieves near-optimal social welfare. We show that given any such family of near-optimal online mechanisms, there exists an online mechanism that in the worst case performs nearly as well as the best of the given mechanisms. Our mechanism is truthful whenever the mechanisms in the given family are truthful and prompt, and achieves optimal (within constant factors) regret. We model the problem of competing against a family of online scheduling mechanisms as one of learning from expert advice. A primary challenge is that any scheduling decisions we make affect not only the payoff at the current step, but also the resource availability and payoffs in future steps. Furthermore, switching from one algorithm (a.k.a. expert) to another in an online fashion is challenging both because it requires synchronization with the state of the latter algorithm as well as because it affects the incentive structure of the algorithms. We further show how to adapt our algorithm to a non-clairvoyant setting where job lengths are unknown until jobs are run to completion. Once again, in this setting, we obtain truthfulness along with asymptotically optimal regret (within poly-logarithmic factors).

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arXiv2017

GSP - The Cinderella of Mechanism Design

Nearly fifteen years ago, Google unveiled the generalized second price (GSP) auction. By all theoretical accounts including their own [Varian 14], this was the wrong auction --- the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction would have been the proper choice --- yet GSP has succeeded spectacularly. We give a deep justification for GSP's success: advertisers' preferences map to a model we call value maximization, they do not maximize profit as the standard theory would believe. For value maximizers, GSP is the truthful auction [Aggarwal 09]. Moreover, this implies an axiomatization of GSP --- it is an auction whose prices are truthful for value maximizers --- that can be applied much more broadly than the simple model for which GSP was originally designed. In particular, applying it to arbitrary single-parameter domains recovers the folklore definition of GSP. Through the lens of value maximization, GSP metamorphosizes into a powerful auction, sound in its principles and elegant in its simplicity.

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