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Rajgopal Kannan

Publications and source records attributed to Rajgopal Kannan.

92 records · Page 6Linked to original sources

The KR-Benes Network: A Control-Optimal Rearrangeable Permutation Network

The Benes network has been used as a rearrangeable network for over 40 years, yet the uniform $N(2 \log N-1)$ control complexity of the $N \times N$ Benes is not optimal for many permutations. In this paper, we present a novel $O(\log N)$ depth rearrangeable network called KR-Benes that is {\it permutation-specific control-optimal}. The KR-Benes routes {\it every} permutation with the minimal control complexity {\it specific} to that permutation and its worst-case complexity for arbitrary permutations is bounded by the Benes; thus it replaces the Benes when considering control complexity/latency. We design the KR-Benes by first constructing a restricted $2 \log K +2$ depth rearrangeable network called $K$-Benes for routing $K$-bounded permutations with control $2N \log K$, $0 \leq K \leq N/4$. We then show that the $N \times N$ Benes network itself (with one additional stage) contains every $K$-Benes network as a subgraph and use this property to construct the KR-Benes network. With regard to the control-optimality of the KR-Benes, we show that any optimal network for rearrangeably routing $K$-bounded permutations must have depth $2 \log K + 2$, and therefore the $K$-Benes (and hence the KR-Benes) is optimal.

cs.NI↗

Security-Performance Tradeoffs of Inheritance based Key Predistribution for Wireless Sensor Networks

Key predistribution is a well-known technique for ensuring secure communication via encryption among sensors deployed in an ad-hoc manner to form a sensor network. In this paper, we propose a novel 2-Phase technique for key predistribution based on a combination of inherited and random key assignments from the given key pool to individual sensor nodes. We also develop an analytical framework for measuring security-performance tradeoffs of different key distribution schemes by providing metrics for measuring sensornet connectivity and resiliency to enemy attacks. In particular, we show analytically that the 2-Phase scheme provides better average connectivity and superior $q$-composite connectivity than the random scheme. We then prove that the invulnerability of a communication link under arbitrary number of node captures by an adversary is higher under the 2-Phase scheme. The probability of a communicating node pair having an exclusive key also scales better with network size under the 2-Phase scheme. We also show analytically that the vulnerability of an arbitrary communication link in the sensornet to single node capture is lower under 2-Phase assuming both network-wide as well as localized capture. Simulation results also show that the number of exclusive keys shared between any two nodes is higher while the number of $q$-composite links compromised when a given number of nodes are captured by the enemy is smaller under the 2-Phase scheme as compared to the random one.

cs.NI↗