SearcharxivSearch

arXiv subjects

Ralf Gundelach

Publications and source records attributed to Ralf Gundelach.

2 recordsLinked to original sources

Detecting Bot Detection: Prevalence, Techniques, and Implications for Web Measurement Research

Browser automation frameworks are essential tools for security and privacy research on the web, yet bot detection scripts increasingly probe their artifacts, threatening measurement validity as automated browsers may be blocked or served different content. Prior work measures detection deployment, while we measure blocking-induced sample loss. Through a literature survey of top-tier security, privacy, and web measurement venues, we find that 83% of papers omit any discussion of bot detection blocking. To address this gap, we conduct a measurement study of 10,000 websites across four browser configurations (40K page visits in total) to quantify detection prevalence and employed techniques. Using custom instrumentation to detect when sites probe for automation, we develop a taxonomy of bot detection techniques and measure how often they appear in practice. Chromium headless encounters a 15% soft block rate compared to 7% for other configurations. Across all conditions, 82% of blocks are attributable to bot detection (59% vendor-confirmed, 23% inferred from condition-dependent blocking), predominantly by providers with integrated bot detection such as Cloudflare (37% block rate) and Akamai (26%). A header spoofing experiment establishes that 75% of Chromium-headless-only blocks are caused by header-level signals alone, yet JavaScript-based environment probing is more extensive than current blocking rates suggest. These findings demonstrate that bot detection creates systematic, provider-correlated sample loss that the web measurement community neither measures nor reports. The downstream effect on specific measurement outcomes remains future work.

cs.CR

Cookiescanner: An Automated Tool for Detecting and Evaluating GDPR Consent Notices on Websites

The enforcement of the GDPR led to the widespread adoption of consent notices, colloquially known as cookie banners. Studies have shown that many website operators do not comply with the law and track users prior to any interaction with the consent notice, or attempt to trick users into giving consent through dark patterns. Previous research has relied on manually curated filter lists or automated detection methods limited to a subset of websites, making research on GDPR compliance of consent notices tedious or limited. We present \emph{cookiescanner}, an automated scanning tool that detects and extracts consent notices via various methods and checks if they offer a decline option or use color diversion. We evaluated cookiescanner on a random sample of the top 10,000 websites listed by Tranco. We found that manually curated filter lists have the highest precision but recall fewer consent notices than our keyword-based methods. Our BERT model achieves high precision for English notices, which is in line with previous work, but suffers from low recall due to insufficient candidate extraction. While the automated detection of decline options proved to be challenging due to the dynamic nature of many sites, detecting instances of different colors of the buttons was successful in most cases. Besides systematically evaluating our various detection techniques, we have manually annotated 1,000 websites to provide a ground-truth baseline, which has not existed previously. Furthermore, we release our code and the annotated dataset in the interest of reproducibility and repeatability.

cs.CY