arXiv subjects

Raluca Ada Popa

Publications and source records attributed to Raluca Ada Popa.

At least 37 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

arXiv2025

Membrane: A Cryptographic Access Control System for Data Lakes

Organizations use data lakes to store and analyze sensitive data. But hackers may compromise data lake storage to bypass access controls and access sensitive data. To address this, we propose Membrane, a system that (1) cryptographically enforces data-dependent access control views over a data lake, (2) without restricting the analytical queries data scientists can run. We observe that data lakes, unlike DBMSes, disaggregate computation and storage into separate trust domains, making at-rest encryption sufficient to defend against remote attackers targeting data lake storage, even when running analytical queries in plaintext. This leads to a new system design for Membrane that combines encryption at rest with SQL-aware encryption. Using block ciphers, a fast symmetric-key primitive with hardware acceleration in CPUs, we develop a new SQL-aware encryption protocol well-suited to at-rest encryption. Membrane adds overhead only at the start of an interactive session due to decrypting views, delaying the first query result by up to $\approx 20\times$; subsequent queries process decrypted data in plaintext, resulting in low amortized overhead.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2025

Proof of Sampling: A Nash Equilibrium-Based Verification Protocol for Decentralized Systems

This paper introduces the Proof of Sampling (PoSP) protocol, a Nash Equilibrium-based verification mechanism, and its application to decentralized machine learning inference through spML. Our protocol has a pure strategy Nash Equilibrium, compelling rational participants to act honestly. It economically disincentivizes dishonest behavior, making it costly for participants to compromise the network's integrity. In our spML protocol, we apply PoSP to decentralized inference for AI applications via a novel cryptographic protocol. The resulting protocol is much more efficient than zero knowledge proof based approaches. Moreover, we anticipate that the PoSP protocol could be effectively utilized for designing verification mechanisms within Actively Validated Services (AVS) in restaking solutions. We further expect that the PoSP protocol could be applied to a variety of other decentralized applications. Our approach enhances the reliability and efficiency of decentralized systems, paving the way for a new generation of decentralized applications.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2025

A Framework for Evaluating Emerging Cyberattack Capabilities of AI

As frontier AI models become more capable, evaluating their potential to enable cyberattacks is crucial for ensuring the safe development of Artificial General Intelligence (AGI). Current cyber evaluation efforts are often ad-hoc, lacking systematic analysis of attack phases and guidance on targeted defenses. This work introduces a novel evaluation framework that addresses these limitations by: (1) examining the end-to-end attack chain, (2) identifying gaps in AI threat evaluation, and (3) helping defenders prioritize targeted mitigations and conduct AI-enabled adversary emulation for red teaming. Our approach adapts existing cyberattack chain frameworks for AI systems. We analyzed over 12,000 real-world instances of AI involvement in cyber incidents, catalogued by Google's Threat Intelligence Group, to curate seven representative attack chain archetypes. Through a bottleneck analysis on these archetypes, we pinpointed phases most susceptible to AI-driven disruption. We then identified and utilized externally developed cybersecurity model evaluations focused on these critical phases. We report on AI's potential to amplify offensive capabilities across specific attack stages, and offer recommendations for prioritizing defenses. We believe this represents the most comprehensive AI cyber risk evaluation framework published to date.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2025

JudgeBench: A Benchmark for Evaluating LLM-based Judges

LLM-based judges have emerged as a scalable alternative to human evaluation and are increasingly used to assess, compare, and improve models. However, the reliability of LLM-based judges themselves is rarely scrutinized. As LLMs become more advanced, their responses grow more sophisticated, requiring stronger judges to evaluate them. Existing benchmarks primarily focus on a judge's alignment with human preferences, but often fail to account for more challenging tasks where crowdsourced human preference is a poor indicator of factual and logical correctness. To address this, we propose a novel evaluation framework to objectively evaluate LLM-based judges. Based on this framework, we propose JudgeBench, a benchmark for evaluating LLM-based judges on challenging response pairs spanning knowledge, reasoning, math, and coding. JudgeBench leverages a novel pipeline for converting existing difficult datasets into challenging response pairs with preference labels reflecting objective correctness. Our comprehensive evaluation on a collection of prompted judges, fine-tuned judges, multi-agent judges, and reward models shows that JudgeBench poses a significantly greater challenge than previous benchmarks, with many strong models (e.g., GPT-4o) performing just slightly better than random guessing. Overall, JudgeBench offers a reliable platform for assessing increasingly advanced LLM-based judges. Data and code are available at https://github.com/ScalerLab/JudgeBench.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2025

An Approach to Technical AGI Safety and Security

Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) promises transformative benefits but also presents significant risks. We develop an approach to address the risk of harms consequential enough to significantly harm humanity. We identify four areas of risk: misuse, misalignment, mistakes, and structural risks. Of these, we focus on technical approaches to misuse and misalignment. For misuse, our strategy aims to prevent threat actors from accessing dangerous capabilities, by proactively identifying dangerous capabilities, and implementing robust security, access restrictions, monitoring, and model safety mitigations. To address misalignment, we outline two lines of defense. First, model-level mitigations such as amplified oversight and robust training can help to build an aligned model. Second, system-level security measures such as monitoring and access control can mitigate harm even if the model is misaligned. Techniques from interpretability, uncertainty estimation, and safer design patterns can enhance the effectiveness of these mitigations. Finally, we briefly outline how these ingredients could be combined to produce safety cases for AGI systems.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2024

LLoCO: Learning Long Contexts Offline

Processing long contexts remains a challenge for large language models (LLMs) due to the quadratic computational and memory overhead of the self-attention mechanism and the substantial KV cache sizes during generation. We propose LLoCO, a novel approach to address this problem by learning contexts offline through context compression and in-domain parameter-efficient finetuning with LoRA. Our method enables an LLM to create a concise representation of the original context and efficiently retrieve relevant information to answer questions accurately. Our approach extends the effective context window of a 4k token LLaMA2-7B model to handle up to 128k tokens. We evaluate our approach on several long-context question-answering datasets, demonstrating that LLoCO significantly outperforms in-context learning while using $30\times$ fewer tokens during inference. LLoCO achieves up to $7.62\times$ speed-up during inference and $11.52\times$ higher throughput during finetuning, substantially reduces the cost of long document question answering. This makes it a promising solution for efficient long context processing. Our code is publicly available on https://github.com/jeffreysijuntan/lloco.

cs.CL↗

arXiv2024

GoEX: Perspectives and Designs Towards a Runtime for Autonomous LLM Applications

Large Language Models (LLMs) are evolving beyond their classical role of providing information within dialogue systems to actively engaging with tools and performing actions on real-world applications and services. Today, humans verify the correctness and appropriateness of the LLM-generated outputs (e.g., code, functions, or actions) before putting them into real-world execution. This poses significant challenges as code comprehension is well known to be notoriously difficult. In this paper, we study how humans can efficiently collaborate with, delegate to, and supervise autonomous LLMs in the future. We argue that in many cases, "post-facto validation" - verifying the correctness of a proposed action after seeing the output - is much easier than the aforementioned "pre-facto validation" setting. The core concept behind enabling a post-facto validation system is the integration of an intuitive undo feature, and establishing a damage confinement for the LLM-generated actions as effective strategies to mitigate the associated risks. Using this, a human can now either revert the effect of an LLM-generated output or be confident that the potential risk is bounded. We believe this is critical to unlock the potential for LLM agents to interact with applications and services with limited (post-facto) human involvement. We describe the design and implementation of our open-source runtime for executing LLM actions, Gorilla Execution Engine (GoEX), and present open research questions towards realizing the goal of LLMs and applications interacting with each other with minimal human supervision. We release GoEX at https://github.com/ShishirPatil/gorilla/.

cs.CL↗

arXiv2022

Reflections on trusting distributed trust

Many systems today distribute trust across multiple parties such that the system provides certain security properties if a subset of the parties are honest. In the past few years, we have seen an explosion of academic and industrial cryptographic systems built on distributed trust, including secure multi-party computation applications (e.g., private analytics, secure learning, and private key recovery) and blockchains. These systems have great potential for improving security and privacy, but face a significant hurdle on the path to deployment. We initiate study of the following problem: a single organization is, by definition, a single party, and so how can a single organization build a distributed-trust system where corruptions are independent? We instead consider an alternative formulation of the problem: rather than ensuring that a distributed-trust system is set up correctly by design, what if instead, users can audit a distributed-trust deployment? We propose a framework that enables a developer to efficiently and cheaply set up any distributed-trust system in a publicly auditable way. To do this, we identify two application-independent building blocks that we can use to bootstrap arbitrary distributed-trust applications: secure hardware and an append-only log. We show how to leverage existing implementations of these building blocks to deploy distributed-trust systems, and we give recommendations for infrastructure changes that would make it easier to deploy distributed-trust systems in the future.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2022

MAGE: Nearly Zero-Cost Virtual Memory for Secure Computation

Secure Computation (SC) is a family of cryptographic primitives for computing on encrypted data in single-party and multi-party settings. SC is being increasingly adopted by industry for a variety of applications. A significant obstacle to using SC for practical applications is the memory overhead of the underlying cryptography. We develop MAGE, an execution engine for SC that efficiently runs SC computations that do not fit in memory. We observe that, due to their intended security guarantees, SC schemes are inherently oblivious -- their memory access patterns are independent of the input data. Using this property, MAGE calculates the memory access pattern ahead of time and uses it to produce a memory management plan. This formulation of memory management, which we call memory programming, is a generalization of paging that allows MAGE to provide a highly efficient virtual memory abstraction for SC. MAGE outperforms the OS virtual memory system by up to an order of magnitude, and in many cases, runs SC computations that do not fit in memory at nearly the same speed as if the underlying machines had unbounded physical memory to fit the entire computation.

cs.OS↗

arXiv2022

The Sky Above The Clouds

Technology ecosystems often undergo significant transformations as they mature. For example, telephony, the Internet, and PCs all started with a single provider, but in the United States each is now served by a competitive market that uses comprehensive and universal technology standards to provide compatibility. This white paper presents our view on how the cloud ecosystem, barely over fifteen years old, could evolve as it matures.

cs.DC↗

arXiv2020

Senate: A Maliciously-Secure MPC Platform for Collaborative Analytics

Many organizations stand to benefit from pooling their data together in order to draw mutually beneficial insights -- e.g., for fraud detection across banks, better medical studies across hospitals, etc. However, such organizations are often prevented from sharing their data with each other by privacy concerns, regulatory hurdles, or business competition. We present Senate, a system that allows multiple parties to collaboratively run analytical SQL queries without revealing their individual data to each other. Unlike prior works on secure multi-party computation (MPC) that assume that all parties are semi-honest, Senate protects the data even in the presence of malicious adversaries. At the heart of Senate lies a new MPC decomposition protocol that decomposes the cryptographic MPC computation into smaller units, some of which can be executed by subsets of parties and in parallel, while preserving its security guarantees. Senate then provides a new query planning algorithm that decomposes and plans the cryptographic computation effectively, achieving a performance of up to 145$\times$ faster than the state-of-the-art.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2020

Secure Collaborative Training and Inference for XGBoost

In recent years, gradient boosted decision tree learning has proven to be an effective method of training robust models. Moreover, collaborative learning among multiple parties has the potential to greatly benefit all parties involved, but organizations have also encountered obstacles in sharing sensitive data due to business, regulatory, and liability concerns. We propose Secure XGBoost, a privacy-preserving system that enables multiparty training and inference of XGBoost models. Secure XGBoost protects the privacy of each party's data as well as the integrity of the computation with the help of hardware enclaves. Crucially, Secure XGBoost augments the security of the enclaves using novel data-oblivious algorithms that prevent access side-channel attacks on enclaves induced via access pattern leakage.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2020

Practical Volume-Based Attacks on Encrypted Databases

Recent years have seen an increased interest towards strong security primitives for encrypted databases (such as oblivious protocols), that hide the access patterns of query execution, and reveal only the volume of results. However, recent work has shown that even volume leakage can enable the reconstruction of entire columns in the database. Yet, existing attacks rely on a set of assumptions that are unrealistic in practice: for example, they (i) require a large number of queries to be issued by the user, or (ii) assume certain distributions on the queries or underlying data (e.g., that the queries are distributed uniformly at random, or that the database does not contain missing values). In this work, we present new attacks for recovering the content of individual user queries, assuming no leakage from the system except the number of results and avoiding the limiting assumptions above. Unlike prior attacks, our attacks require only a single query to be issued by the user for recovering the keyword. Furthermore, our attacks make no assumptions about the distribution of issued queries or the underlying data. Instead, our key insight is to exploit the behavior of real-world applications. We start by surveying 11 applications to identify two key characteristics that can be exploited by attackers: (i) file injection, and (ii) automatic query replay. We present attacks that leverage these two properties in concert with volume leakage, independent of the details of any encrypted database system. Subsequently, we perform an attack on the real Gmail web client by simulating a server-side adversary. Our attack on Gmail completes within a matter of minutes, demonstrating the feasibility of our techniques. We also present three ancillary attacks for situations when certain mitigation strategies are employed.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2020

Visor: Privacy-Preserving Video Analytics as a Cloud Service

Video-analytics-as-a-service is becoming an important offering for cloud providers. A key concern in such services is privacy of the videos being analyzed. While trusted execution environments (TEEs) are promising options for preventing the direct leakage of private video content, they remain vulnerable to side-channel attacks. We present Visor, a system that provides confidentiality for the user's video stream as well as the ML models in the presence of a compromised cloud platform and untrusted co-tenants. Visor executes video pipelines in a hybrid TEE that spans both the CPU and GPU. It protects the pipeline against side-channel attacks induced by data-dependent access patterns of video modules, and also addresses leakage in the CPU-GPU communication channel. Visor is up to $1000\times$ faster than naïve oblivious solutions, and its overheads relative to a non-oblivious baseline are limited to $2\times$--$6\times$.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2020

JEDI: Many-to-Many End-to-End Encryption and Key Delegation for IoT

As the Internet of Things (IoT) emerges over the next decade, developing secure communication for IoT devices is of paramount importance. Achieving end-to-end encryption for large-scale IoT systems, like smart buildings or smart cities, is challenging because multiple principals typically interact indirectly via intermediaries, meaning that the recipient of a message is not known in advance. This paper proposes JEDI (Joining Encryption and Delegation for IoT), a many-to-many end-to-end encryption protocol for IoT. JEDI encrypts and signs messages end-to-end, while conforming to the decoupled communication model typical of IoT systems. JEDI's keys support expiry and fine-grained access to data, common in IoT. Furthermore, JEDI allows principals to delegate their keys, restricted in expiry or scope, to other principals, thereby granting access to data and managing access control in a scalable, distributed way. Through careful protocol design and implementation, JEDI can run across the spectrum of IoT devices, including ultra low-power deeply embedded sensors severely constrained in CPU, memory, and energy consumption. We apply JEDI to an existing IoT messaging system and demonstrate that its overhead is modest.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2019

An Off-Chip Attack on Hardware Enclaves via the Memory Bus

This paper shows how an attacker can break the confidentiality of a hardware enclave with Membuster, an off-chip attack based on snooping the memory bus. An attacker with physical access can observe an unencrypted address bus and extract fine-grained memory access patterns of the victim. Membuster is qualitatively different from prior on-chip attacks to enclaves and is more difficult to thwart. We highlight several challenges for Membuster. First, DRAM requests are only visible on the memory bus at last-level cache misses. Second, the attack needs to incur minimal interference or overhead to the victim to prevent the detection of the attack. Lastly, the attacker needs to reverse-engineer the translation between virtual, physical, and DRAM addresses to perform a robust attack. We introduce three techniques, critical page whitelisting, cache squeezing, and oracle-based fuzzy matching algorithm to increase cache misses for memory accesses that are useful for the attack, with no detectable interference to the victim, and to convert memory accesses to sensitive data. We demonstrate Membuster on an Intel SGX CPU to leak confidential data from two applications: Hunspell and Memcached. We show that a single uninterrupted run of the victim can leak most of the sensitive data with high accuracy.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2019

Helen: Maliciously Secure Coopetitive Learning for Linear Models

Many organizations wish to collaboratively train machine learning models on their combined datasets for a common benefit (e.g., better medical research, or fraud detection). However, they often cannot share their plaintext datasets due to privacy concerns and/or business competition. In this paper, we design and build Helen, a system that allows multiple parties to train a linear model without revealing their data, a setting we call coopetitive learning. Compared to prior secure training systems, Helen protects against a much stronger adversary who is malicious and can compromise m-1 out of m parties. Our evaluation shows that Helen can achieve up to five orders of magnitude of performance improvement when compared to training using an existing state-of-the-art secure multi-party computation framework.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2019

Cloud Programming Simplified: A Berkeley View on Serverless Computing

Serverless cloud computing handles virtually all the system administration operations needed to make it easier for programmers to use the cloud. It provides an interface that greatly simplifies cloud programming, and represents an evolution that parallels the transition from assembly language to high-level programming languages. This paper gives a quick history of cloud computing, including an accounting of the predictions of the 2009 Berkeley View of Cloud Computing paper, explains the motivation for serverless computing, describes applications that stretch the current limits of serverless, and then lists obstacles and research opportunities required for serverless computing to fulfill its full potential. Just as the 2009 paper identified challenges for the cloud and predicted they would be addressed and that cloud use would accelerate, we predict these issues are solvable and that serverless computing will grow to dominate the future of cloud computing.

cs.OS↗