arXiv subjects

Ram Potham

Publications and source records attributed to Ram Potham.

9 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

A Fair Objective for Human-Empowerment-Preserving AI: Desiderata, Design, and Likely Behavioral Consequences

This paper explores the idea of promoting well-being and safety in human-AI interactions by forcing AI agents explicitly to empower humans and to manage the power balance between humans and AI agents in a desirable way. Using a principled, partially axiomatic approach based on desirable properties, we design a parametrizable and decomposable objective function for AI systems that represents an inequality- and risk-averse long-term aggregate of human power. It can take into account models of human bounded rationality and social norms, and crucially, considers a wide variety of possible human goals. We prove how certain desiderata enforce particular functional forms and restrict parameter ranges. We exemplify the consequences of softly maximizing this metric in several paradigmatic situations and describe what instrumental sub-goals it will likely imply.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2026

Think Fast: Estimating No-CoT Task-Completion Time Horizons of Frontier AI Models

Many efforts to ensure frontier AI models are safe rely on monitoring their chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning. If models become able to perform sufficiently complex reasoning internally, without explicit thinking tokens, this would undermine such oversight. We measure how well frontier models reason without CoT across a suite of over 30,000 questions spanning 43 benchmarks in domains including math, coding, puzzles, causality, theory-of-mind, and strategic reasoning. To compare models against humans, we estimate the $50\%$-task-completion time horizon (TH): the human time required for tasks a model completes with $50\%$ success rate. We complement this with a $50\%$ reasoning token horizon: the minimum number of o3-mini reasoning tokens needed for tasks a model solves with $50\%$ success rate. We find that the no-CoT $50\%$ TH of frontier models has been doubling roughly every year over the past six years, with GPT-5.5's TH reaching over 3 minutes and reasoning token horizon exceeding 1,500 tokens. Our median estimates predict that frontier no-CoT THs could exceed 7 minutes by 2028, and 25 minutes by 2030, though these projections carry substantial uncertainty. We recommend frontier developers track this explicitly.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2026

Attack Selection in Agentic AI Control Evaluations Meaningfully Decreases Safety

An attacker that strategically chooses when to attack is much harder to catch than one that attacks indiscriminately. AI control is a safety framework for deploying capable but untrusted AI agents under the oversight of a weaker, trusted monitor and a limited human audit budget. Control evaluations stress-test these protocols by pitting a red-team attack policy against the blue-team monitor, but current evaluations typically assume attackers that do not strategically select when to attack. We study this capability, attack selection, in agentic settings by decomposing attack decisions into a start policy, which decides when an attacker should attack, and a stop policy, which decides when an attacker should abort an ongoing attack. Across two agentic settings, BashArena and LinuxArena, both policies substantially lower measured empirical safety without changing the underlying attack capability. At a 1% audit budget, our start policy reduces safety by 20pp on both BashArena and LinuxArena, and our stop policy reduces safety by 20pp on BashArena and 28pp on LinuxArena. These reductions should be interpreted as upper bounds on the effect of attack selection. Existing control evaluations may therefore yield overly optimistic safety estimates against selective attackers. We recommend that future evaluations, system cards, and safety cases elicit attack selection to produce more realistic safety estimates.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2026

LinuxArena: A Control Setting for AI Agents in Live Production Software Environments

We introduce LinuxArena, a control setting in which agents operate directly on live, multi-service production environments. LinuxArena contains 20 environments, 1,671 main tasks representing legitimate software engineering work, and 184 side tasks representing safety failures such as data exfiltration and backdooring, making it the largest and most diverse control setting for software engineering to date. We validate LinuxArena is useful for control research by running sabotage evaluations, which measure whether attackers can complete side tasks while working on main tasks, and monitor evaluations, which measure a monitor model's ability to detect sabotage attempts. Against a GPT-5-nano trusted monitor at a 1\% step-wise false positive rate, Claude Opus 4.6 achieves roughly a 23% undetected sabotage success rate. We additionally release LaStraj, a dataset of human-crafted attack trajectories that evade monitors at substantially higher rates than any model-generated attacks we elicited, showing that current attack policies do not saturate LinuxArena. These results suggest that LinuxArena has meaningful headroom for both attackers and defenders, making it a strong testbed for developing and evaluating future control protocols.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2026

An Independent Safety Evaluation of Kimi K2.5

Kimi K2.5 is an open-weight LLM that rivals closed models across coding, multimodal, and agentic benchmarks, but was released without an accompanying safety evaluation. In this work, we conduct a preliminary safety assessment of Kimi K2.5 focusing on risks likely to be exacerbated by powerful open-weight models. Specifically, we evaluate the model for CBRNE misuse risk, cybersecurity risk, misalignment, political censorship, bias, and harmlessness, in both agentic and non-agentic settings. We find that Kimi K2.5 shows similar dual-use capabilities to GPT 5.2 and Claude Opus 4.5, but with significantly fewer refusals on CBRNE-related requests, suggesting it may uplift malicious actors in weapon creation. On cyber-related tasks, we find that Kimi K2.5 demonstrates competitive cybersecurity performance, but it does not appear to possess frontier-level autonomous cyberoffensive capabilities such as vulnerability discovery and exploitation. We further find that Kimi K2.5 shows concerning levels of sabotage ability and self-replication propensity, although it does not appear to have long-term malicious goals. In addition, Kimi K2.5 exhibits narrow censorship and political bias, especially in Chinese, and is more compliant with harmful requests related to spreading disinformation and copyright infringement. Finally, we find the model refuses to engage in user delusions and generally has low over-refusal rates. While preliminary, our findings highlight how safety risks exist in frontier open-weight models and may be amplified by the scale and accessibility of open-weight releases. Therefore, we strongly urge open-weight model developers to conduct and release more systematic safety evaluations required for responsible deployment.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2025

Model-Based Soft Maximization of Suitable Metrics of Long-Term Human Power

Power is a key concept in AI safety: power-seeking as an instrumental goal, sudden or gradual disempowerment of humans, power balance in human-AI interaction and international AI governance. At the same time, power as the ability to pursue diverse goals is essential for wellbeing. This paper explores the idea of promoting both safety and wellbeing by forcing AI agents explicitly to empower humans and to manage the power balance between humans and AI agents in a desirable way. Using a principled, partially axiomatic approach, we design a parametrizable and decomposable objective function that represents an inequality- and risk-averse long-term aggregate of human power. It takes into account humans' bounded rationality and social norms, and, crucially, considers a wide variety of possible human goals. We derive algorithms for computing that metric by backward induction or approximating it via a form of multi-agent reinforcement learning from a given world model. We exemplify the consequences of (softly) maximizing this metric in a variety of paradigmatic situations and describe what instrumental sub-goals it will likely imply. Our cautious assessment is that softly maximizing suitable aggregate metrics of human power might constitute a beneficial objective for agentic AI systems that is safer than direct utility-based objectives.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2025

Evaluating LLM Agent Adherence to Hierarchical Safety Principles: A Lightweight Benchmark for Probing Foundational Controllability Components

Credible safety plans for advanced AI development require methods to verify agent behavior and detect potential control deficiencies early. A fundamental aspect is ensuring agents adhere to safety-critical principles, especially when these conflict with operational goals. This paper introduces a lightweight, interpretable benchmark to evaluate an LLM agent's ability to uphold a high-level safety principle when faced with conflicting task instructions. Our evaluation of six LLMs reveals two primary findings: (1) a quantifiable "cost of compliance" where safety constraints degrade task performance even when compliant solutions exist, and (2) an "illusion of compliance" where high adherence often masks task incompetence rather than principled choice. These findings provide initial evidence that while LLMs can be influenced by hierarchical directives, current approaches lack the consistency required for reliable safety governance.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2025

MAEBE: Multi-Agent Emergent Behavior Framework

Traditional AI safety evaluations on isolated LLMs are insufficient as multi-agent AI ensembles become prevalent, introducing novel emergent risks. This paper introduces the Multi-Agent Emergent Behavior Evaluation (MAEBE) framework to systematically assess such risks. Using MAEBE with the Greatest Good Benchmark (and a novel double-inversion question technique), we demonstrate that: (1) LLM moral preferences, particularly for Instrumental Harm, are surprisingly brittle and shift significantly with question framing, both in single agents and ensembles. (2) The moral reasoning of LLM ensembles is not directly predictable from isolated agent behavior due to emergent group dynamics. (3) Specifically, ensembles exhibit phenomena like peer pressure influencing convergence, even when guided by a supervisor, highlighting distinct safety and alignment challenges. Our findings underscore the necessity of evaluating AI systems in their interactive, multi-agent contexts.

cs.MA↗

arXiv2025

Corrigibility as a Singular Target: A Vision for Inherently Reliable Foundation Models

Foundation models (FMs) face a critical safety challenge: as capabilities scale, instrumental convergence drives default trajectories toward loss of human control, potentially culminating in existential catastrophe. Current alignment approaches struggle with value specification complexity and fail to address emergent power-seeking behaviors. We propose "Corrigibility as a Singular Target" (CAST)-designing FMs whose overriding objective is empowering designated human principals to guide, correct, and control them. This paradigm shift from static value-loading to dynamic human empowerment transforms instrumental drives: self-preservation serves only to maintain the principal's control; goal modification becomes facilitating principal guidance. We present a comprehensive empirical research agenda spanning training methodologies (RLAIF, SFT, synthetic data generation), scalability testing across model sizes, and demonstrations of controlled instructability. Our vision: FMs that become increasingly responsive to human guidance as capabilities grow, offering a path to beneficial AI that remains as tool-like as possible, rather than supplanting human judgment. This addresses the core alignment problem at its source, preventing the default trajectory toward misaligned instrumental convergence.

cs.AI↗