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Ran Gelles

Publications and source records attributed to Ran Gelles.

28 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

Adaptive Protocols for Interactive Communication

How much adversarial noise can protocols for interactive communication tolerate? This question was examined by Braverman and Rao (IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, 2014) for the case of "robust" protocols, where each party sends messages only in fixed and predetermined rounds. We consider a new class of non-robust protocols for Interactive Communication, which we call adaptive protocols. Such protocols adapt structurally to the noise induced by the channel in the sense that both the order of speaking, and the length of the protocol may vary depending on observed noise. We define models that capture adaptive protocols and study upper and lower bounds on the permissible noise rate in these models. When the length of the protocol may adaptively change according to the noise, we demonstrate a protocol that tolerates noise rates up to $1/3$. When the order of speaking may adaptively change as well, we demonstrate a protocol that tolerates noise rates up to $2/3$. Hence, adaptivity circumvents an impossibility result of $1/4$ on the fraction of tolerable noise (Braverman and Rao, 2014).

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Maximal Noise in Interactive Communication over Erasure Channels and Channels with Feedback

We provide tight upper and lower bounds on the noise resilience of interactive communication over noisy channels with feedback. In this setting, we show that the maximal fraction of noise that any robust protocol can resist is 1/3. Additionally, we provide a simple and efficient robust protocol that succeeds as long as the fraction of noise is at most 1/3 - ε. Surprisingly, both bounds hold regardless of whether the parties send bits or symbols from an arbitrarily large alphabet. We also consider interactive communication over erasure channels. We provide a protocol that matches the optimal tolerable erasure rate of 1/2 - εof previous protocols (Franklin et al., CRYPTO '13) but operates in a much simpler and more efficient way. Our protocol works with an alphabet of size 4, in contrast to prior protocols in which the alphabet size grows as epsilon goes to zero. Building on the above algorithm with a fixed alphabet size, we are able to devise a protocol for binary erasure channels that tolerates erasure rates of up to 1/3 - ε.

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Attacks on Fixed Apparatus Quantum Key Distribution Schemes

We consider quantum key distribution implementations in which the receiver's apparatus is fixed and does not depend on his choice of basis at each qubit transmission. We show that, although theoretical quantum key distribution is proven secure, such implementations are totally insecure against a strong eavesdropper that has one-time (single) access to the receiver's equipment. The attack we present here, the "fixed-apparatus attack" causes a potential risk to the usefulness of several recent implementations.

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How to Catch L_2-Heavy-Hitters on Sliding Windows

Finding heavy-elements (heavy-hitters) in streaming data is one of the central, and well-understood tasks. Despite the importance of this problem, when considering the sliding windows model of streaming (where elements eventually expire) the problem of finding L_2-heavy elements has remained completely open despite multiple papers and considerable success in finding L_1-heavy elements. In this paper, we develop the first poly-logarithmic-memory algorithm for finding L_2-heavy elements in sliding window model. Since L_2 heavy elements play a central role for many fundamental streaming problems (such as frequency moments), we believe our method would be extremely useful for many sliding-windows algorithms and applications. For example, our technique allows us not only to find L_2-heavy elements, but also heavy elements with respect to any L_p for 0 2 this task is impossible. Our method may have other applications as well. We demonstrate a broader applicability of our novel yet simple method on two additional examples: we show how to obtain a sliding window approximation of other properties such as the similarity of two streams, or the fraction of elements that appear exactly a specified number of times within the window (the rarity problem). In these two illustrative examples of our method, we replace the current expected memory bounds with worst case bounds.

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Security and Composability of Randomness Expansion from Bell Inequalities

The nonlocal behavior of quantum mechanics can be used to generate guaranteed fresh randomness from an untrusted device that consists of two nonsignalling components; since the generation process requires some initial fresh randomness to act as a catalyst, one also speaks of randomness expansion. Colbeck and Kent proposed the first method for generating randomness from untrusted devices, however, without providing a rigorous analysis. This was addressed subsequently by Pironio et al. [Nature 464 (2010)], who aimed at deriving a lower bound on the min-entropy of the data extracted from an untrusted device, based only on the observed non-local behavior of the device. Although that article succeeded in developing important tools towards the acquired goal, it failed in putting the tools together in a rigorous and correct way, and the given formal claim on the guaranteed amount of min-entropy needs to be revisited. In this paper we show how to combine the tools provided by Pironio et al., as to obtain a meaningful and correct lower bound on the min-entropy of the data produced by an untrusted device, based on the observed non-local behavior of the device. Our main result confirms the essence of the improperly formulated claims of Pironio et al., and puts them on solid ground. We also address the question of composability and show that different untrusted devices can be composed in an alternating manner under the assumption that they are not entangled. This enables for superpolynomial randomness expansion based on two untrusted yet unentangled devices.

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Position-Based Quantum Cryptography: Impossibility and Constructions

In this work, we study position-based cryptography in the quantum setting. The aim is to use the geographical position of a party as its only credential. On the negative side, we show that if adversaries are allowed to share an arbitrarily large entangled quantum state, no secure position-verification is possible at all. We show a distributed protocol for computing any unitary operation on a state shared between the different users, using local operations and one round of classical communication. Using this surprising result, we break any position-verification scheme of a very general form. On the positive side, we show that if adversaries do not share any entangled quantum state but can compute arbitrary quantum operations, secure position-verification is achievable. Jointly, these results suggest the interesting question whether secure position-verification is possible in case of a bounded amount of entanglement. Our positive result can be interpreted as resolving this question in the simplest case, where the bound is set to zero. In models where secure positioning is achievable, it has a number of interesting applications. For example, it enables secure communication over an insecure channel without having any pre-shared key, with the guarantee that only a party at a specific location can learn the content of the conversation. More generally, we show that in settings where secure position-verification is achievable, other position-based cryptographic schemes are possible as well, such as secure position-based authentication and position-based key agreement.

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Potent Tree Codes and their applications: Coding for Interactive Communication, revisited

We study the fundamental problem of reliable interactive communication over a noisy channel. In a breakthrough sequence of papers published in 1992 and 1993, Schulman gave non-constructive proofs of the existence of general methods to emulate any two-party interactive protocol such that: (1) the emulation protocol takes a constant-factor longer than the original protocol, and (2) if the emulation protocol is executed over a noisy channel, then the probability that the emulation protocol fails is exponentially small in the total length of the protocol. Unfortunately, Schulman's emulation procedures either only work in a model with a large amount of shared randomness, or are non-constructive in that they rely on the existence of good tree codes. The only known proofs of the existence of good tree codes are non-constructive, and finding an explicit construction remains an important open problem. Indeed, randomly generated tree codes are not good tree codes with overwhelming probability. In this work, we revisit the problem of reliable interactive communication, and obtain the following results: We introduce a new notion of goodness for a tree code, and define the notion of a potent tree code. We believe that this notion is of independent interest. We prove the correctness of an explicit emulation procedure based on any potent tree code. We show that a randomly generated tree code (with suitable constant alphabet size) is a potent tree code with overwhelming probability. Furthermore we are able to partially derandomize this result using only O(n) random bits, where $n$ is the depth of the tree. These results allow us to obtain the first fully explicit emulation procedure for reliable interactive communication over noisy channels with a constant communication overhead, and exponentially small failure probability.

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Position-Based Quantum Cryptography

This paper is replaced by arXiv:1009.2490. The new paper includes a general impossibility result and restricted possibility results, and it has two additional authors.

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Semi-Quantum Key Distribution

Secure key distribution among two remote parties is impossible when both are classical, unless some unproven (and arguably unrealistic) computation-complexity assumptions are made, such as the difficulty of factorizing large numbers. On the other hand, a secure key distribution is possible when both parties are quantum. What is possible when only one party (Alice) is quantum, yet the other (Bob) has only classical capabilities? Recently, a semi-quantum key distribution protocol was presented (Boyer, Kenigsberg and Mor, Physical Review Letters, 2007), in which one of the parties (Bob) is classical, and yet, the protocol is proven to be completely robust against an eavesdropping attempt. Here we extend that result much further. We present two protocols with this constraint, and prove their robustness against attacks: we prove that any attempt of an adversary to obtain information (and even a tiny amount of information) necessarily induces some errors that the legitimate parties could notice. One protocol presented here is identical to the one referred to above, however, its robustness is proven here in a much more general scenario. The other protocol is very different as it is based on randomization.

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Quantum-Space Attacks

Theoretical quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols commonly rely on the use of qubits (quantum bits). In reality, however, due to practical limitations, the legitimate users are forced to employ a larger quantum (Hilbert) space, say a quhexit (quantum six-dimensional) space, or even a much larger quantum Hilbert space. Various specific attacks exploit of these limitations. Although security can still be proved in some very special cases, a general framework that considers such realistic QKD protocols, as well as} attacks on such protocols, is still missing. We describe a general method of attacking realistic QKD protocols, which we call the `quantum-space attack'. The description is based on assessing the enlarged quantum space actually used by a protocol, the `quantum space of the protocol'. We demonstrate these new methods by classifying various (known) recent attacks against several QKD schemes, and by analyzing a novel attack on interferometry-based QKD.

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