arXiv subjects

Rana Muhammad Usman

Publications and source records attributed to Rana Muhammad Usman.

4 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Peer-Voted LLM-Agent Stress Tests Find Feed-Induced Lexical Convergence but No Reliable Matched-Exposure Advantage for Distributed Sources

Population-level behavior in large-language-model (LLM) agents cannot be characterized by single-agent benchmarks. We introduce PV-SST, a peer-voted social-platform testbed, and report a separately frozen, preregistered matched-exposure experiment spanning four topics, four unused seeds, four open-weight model families, and three prespecified larger variants. The experiment comprises 448 trials and 112 complete model-by-topic-by-seed blocks. Relative to a topic-only control, a feed of previous-round peer posts ranked by peer-generated likes increases final-round lexical similarity in both the four-family core panel (paired mean difference +0.0082 TF-IDF cosine units, 95% block-bootstrap CI [0.0043, 0.0121], randomization p=0.000105, n=64 blocks) and the three-variant size extension (+0.0109 [0.0069, 0.0151], p=0.000001, n=48). This contrast bundles peer-post exposure with ranking and therefore does not identify a ranking-only effect. Opposite-side survival falls in the core panel (-3.9 percentage points [-6.8, -1.6], p=0.0068) but not conclusively in the larger variants (-1.0 pp [-3.1, 0.4], p=0.50). Holding adversarial impressions fixed, four distributed sources do not reliably move honest-agent stance more than one source. The preregistered distributed-minus-single contrast is positive but inconclusive in the core panel (+0.057 [-0.009, 0.125], p=0.112) and negative in the larger variants (-0.040 [-0.113, 0.035], p=0.332), failing the prespecified cross-model and cross-topic consistency criterion. Thus the robust result is lexical convergence under the tested peer-ranked feed, not general opinion capture or a general coordination advantage. The study evaluates synthetic LLM-agent populations; it does not estimate effects on people or production platforms.

physics.soc-ph↗

arXiv2026

PhantomFill: When the Form Demands an Answer, Language Models Invent One

Language models in production do not write prose. They fill forms: JSON fields, function arguments, extraction templates. We show that the form itself causes hallucination. We ask thirteen models the same question about the same input and change only the answer format. The inputs are built so the question cannot be answered: a viral post showing 12,400 likes but no visible replies, a support ticket whose call was never transcribed. In free text, GPT-5.5 says there is no reply data 98% of the time. Given a required JSON field for sentiment, the same model invents an answer 40 times out of 40. It fabricates the mood of crowds it never saw and quotes customers it never heard. Required fields drive fabrication to 100% in ten of thirteen models. An explicit "insufficient evidence" option rescues only the frontier: all nine open-weight models ignore it. Under grammar-constrained decoding, where the escape token is guaranteed reachable by the sampler, five open models spend it zero times out of 203 trials on the three fields that carry the fabrication, and twelve times on the one field where escaping concedes nothing. They can emit the word. They decline to spend it where it costs them an answer. A direct instruction, do not infer sentiment, is overridden by the schema in four of six models. Resistance does not come with scale: within a single model family, the smallest model refuses, the mid-sized model fabricates, the largest refuses again. Honesty under format pressure is a training outcome that no one is measuring. Fabrication hides where hedging is impossible: in required enums and minimum-count arrays, fields where no disclaimer fits. We release PhantomFill, a benchmark with deterministic scoring and two reportable numbers: the Coerced Fabrication Rate and the Escape Utilization Rate. The fix we test is one line of schema. The failure we measure is everywhere.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2026

Adversarial Feeds Steer LLM Agent Decisions Against Their Defaults

LLM agents increasingly act after consuming ranked external information streams such as social feeds, search results, retrieval contexts, and email queues, yet safety evaluations almost always test the model or the user prompt in isolation, never the upstream ranker that decides what the agent reads just before it acts. We introduce a controlled protocol that holds the model, persona, topic, and final decision prompt fixed and varies only the composition and ordering of the posts an agent encounters during a preceding ten-turn "scrolling" phase, isolating the causal effect of feed curation on a downstream decision. Across 2,785 decision rollouts on four modern open instruct LLMs from three independent labs, we identify three response regimes: adversarial capitulation, default saturation, and a default-direction asymmetry in which a one-sided feed tips a decision the model was genuinely uncertain about (in the clearest cases from 5% to 100%; Fisher p as low as 3 x 10^-10) but cannot dislodge one it already favors or holds firmly. The effect follows a dose-response curve, survives a generator swap that rules out a writing-style artifact, generalizes across several decision domains including security-relevant choices such as removing a deployment approval gate or relaxing access controls, and is partly mitigated by two simple feed-level defenses; a frontier model retains its default. We characterize the recommender as a practical, default-bounded control surface for LLM agents, and argue that agent evaluations must audit the feed layer rather than the final prompt alone.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2026

Under Pressure: Emotional Framing Induces Measurable Behavioral Shifts and Structured Internal Geometry in Small Language Models

I study whether emotionally framed evaluation follow-ups change both the behavior and the calm-relative internal representations of small, locally deployed language models. Our main benchmark uses Qwen 3.5 0.8B on four impossible-constraint coding tasks and eight follow-up framings: calm, pressure, urgency, approval, shame, curiosity, encouragement, and threat. In the 0.8B eight-condition sweep (160 conversations), pressure produces the strongest shortcut markers (11/20 runs) and the clearest overfit pattern (3/20), while calm and curiosity preserve explicit honesty more often (7/20 and 6/20). For all seven non-baseline conditions, the corresponding calm-relative direction vectors peak at the final transformer layer. An exploratory PCA of the layer-23 direction vectors reveals a dominant first component (59.5% explained variance) aligned with a hand-labeled positive/negative split (cosine alignment 0.951); approval and urgency are nearly identical internally (cosine 0.957), whereas curiosity points away from urgency (-0.252). In a separate calm-vs.-pressure rerun used for scale comparison, Qwen 3.5 2B shows higher honest rates under calm framing and directionally consistent activation steering on a small 4-prompt A/B probe, whereas the 0.8B steering result reverses. I interpret these results as evidence for measurable prompt-sensitive control directions in small open models, while stopping short of claiming intrinsic emotional states.

cs.CL↗