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Raoni Arroyo

Publications and source records attributed to Raoni Arroyo.

13 recordsLinked to original sources
arXiv2025

Incomplete yet existent objects: a Nuclear Meinongian approach to quantum metaphysical indeterminacy

This article proposes a reading of quantum metaphysical indeterminacy from the perspective of Parsons' Nuclear Meinongianism. In doing so, we identify a fundamental incompatibility between a key feature of Parsons' theory and standard quantum mechanics. Our approach interprets quantum indeterminacy as property incompleteness. However, this move, when combined with Parsons' framework, leads to what we term the ``Incompleteness-Entails-Nonexistence Principle'' (IENP), which implausibly entails the nonexistence of quantum objects. For Meinongianism to be a suitable tool for the metaphysics of quantum mechanics, this principle must be addressed. We argue for dropping the IENP and discuss the resulting metaphysical and metametaphysical consequences.

quant-ph↗
arXiv2025

Antirealism in sheep's clothing: Wave function realism and scientific realism

Scientific realism is the philosophical stance that science tracks truth, in particular in its depiction of the world's ontology. Ontologically, this involves a commitment to the existence of entities posited by our best scientific theories; metaontologically, it includes the claim that the theoretical framework itself is true. In this article, we examine wave function realism as a case study within this broader methodological debate. Wave function realism holds that the wave function, as described by quantum mechanics, corresponds to a real physical entity. We focus on a recent formulation of this view that commits to the ontology of the wave function while deliberately avoiding the metaontological question of the framework's truth. Instead, the view is defended on pragmatic, non-truth-conductive grounds. This, we argue, raises tensions for the purported realism of wave function realism and its compatibility with scientific realism more broadly.

physics.hist-ph↗
arXiv2025

Disentangling scientific realism from anti-exceptionalism

Scientific realism is, currently, one of the most well-entrenched background assumptions of some relevant versions of anti-exceptionalism about logic. We argue that this is a sort of sociological contingency rather than a metaphilosophical necessity. Drawing parallels with the metaphysics of science (as applied to quantum foundations), we try to bring the realist assumptions of anti-exceptionalism to light, to demotivate the necessary connection between realism and anti-exceptionalism, briefly exploring the possibility of adopting antirealism as the background default view of science instead.

physics.hist-ph↗
arXiv2025

Non-individuality and experience

This chapter acknowledges a gap between the ``non-individuals'' interpretation of quantum mechanics and our world of experience, and begins to bridge it. Section 1 states the problem with Abner Shimony's ``Phenomenological principle''; section 2 briefly presents the interpretation with connection to standard quantum mechanics; section 3 presents the measurement problem in connection with the Phenomenological principle, the standard way out of it, and why the ``non-individuals'' interpretation of quantum mechanics should not follow it; section 4 finally shows two closed venues for such an interpretation (Bohmian mechanics and the Modal-Hamiltonian Interpretation), and two alternatives for such it (Everettian quantum mechanics and spontaneous collapse theories).

physics.hist-ph↗
arXiv2025

Naturalistic Metaphysics and the Parity Thesis: Why Scientific Realism Doesn't Lead to Realism about Metaphysics

In recent work, Nina Emery has defended the view that, in the context of naturalistic metaphysics, one should maintain the same epistemic attitude towards science and metaphysics. That is, naturalists who are scientific realists ought to be realists about metaphysics as well; and naturalists who are antirealists about science should also be antirealists about metaphysics. We call this the `parity thesis'. This paper suggests that the parity thesis is widely, albeit often implicitly, accepted among naturalistically inclined philosophers, and essentially for reasons similar to Emery's. Then, reasons are provided for resisting Emery's specific inference from scientific realism to realism about metaphysics. The resulting picture is a more nuanced view of the relationship between science and metaphysics within the naturalistic setting than the one which is currently most popular.

physics.hist-ph↗
arXiv2025

Quest\~oes \`a "Interpreta\c{c}\~ao da Consci\^encia Processual" da Mec\^anica Qu\^antica

The processual consciousness interpretation (PCI), as developed in Arroyo (2024, chap. 5) and Arroyo, Nunes Filho, and Moreira dos Santos (2024), proposes a process ontology as a solution to the measurement problem. This article presents the standard interpretation taken to its ultimate ontological consequences; introduces the PCI; and offers reflections based on the questions raised about the PCI during the XX ANPOF Meeting, in the session of the WG on Philosophy of the Physical Sciences.

quant-ph↗
arXiv2024

The game of metaphysics

Metaphysics is traditionally conceived as aiming at the truth -- indeed, the most fundamental truths about the most general features of reality. Philosophical naturalists, urging that philosophical claims be grounded on science, have often assumed an eliminativist attitude towards metaphysics, consequently paying little attention to such a definition. In the more recent literature, however, naturalism has instead been taken to entail that the traditional conception of metaphysics can be accepted if and only if one is a scientific realist (and puts the right constraints on acceptable metaphysical claims). Here, we want to suggest that naturalists can, and perhaps should, pick a third option, based on a significant yet acceptable revision of the established understanding of metaphysics. More particularly, we will claim that a fictionalist approach to metaphysics is compatible with both the idea that the discipline inquires into the fundamental features of reality and naturalistic methodology; at the same time, it meshes well with both scientific realism and instrumentalism

physics.hist-ph↗
arXiv2024

Quantum ontology de-naturalized: What we can't learn from quantum mechanics

Philosophers of science commonly connect ontology and science, stating that these disciplines maintain a two-way relationship: on the one hand, we can extract ontology from scientific theories; on the other hand, ontology provides the realistic content of our scientific theories. In this article, we will critically examine the process of naturalizing ontology, i.e., confining the work of ontologists merely to the task of pointing out which entities certain theories commit themselves to. We will use non-relativistic quantum mechanics as a case study. We begin by distinguishing two roles for ontology: the first would be characterized by cataloging existing entities according to quantum mechanics; the second would be characterized by establishing more general ontological categories in which existing entities must be classified. We argue that only the first step is available for a naturalistic approach; the second step not being open for determination or anchoring in science. Finally, we also argue that metaphysics is still a step beyond ontology, not contained in either of the two tasks of ontology, being thus even farther from science.

physics.hist-ph↗
arXiv2024

Towards a process-based approach to consciousness and collapse in quantum mechanics

According to a particular interpretation of quantum mechanics, the causal role of human consciousness in the measuring process is called upon to solve a foundational problem called the "measurement problem". Traditionally, this interpretation is tied up with the metaphysics of substance dualism. As such, this interpretation of quantum mechanics inherits the dualist's mind-body problem. Our working hypothesis is that a process-based approach to the consciousness causes collapse interpretation (CCCI) -- leaning on Whitehead's solution to the mind-body problem -- offers a better metaphysical understanding of consciousness and its role in interpreting quantum mechanics. This article is the kickoff for such a research program in the metaphysics of science.

physics.hist-ph↗
arXiv2023

The elimination of metaphysics through the epistemological analysis: lessons (un)learned from metaphysical underdetermination

This chapter argues that the general philosophy of science should learn metaphilosophical lessons from the case of metaphysical underdetermination, as it occurs in non-relativistic quantum mechanics. Section 2 presents the traditional discussion of metaphysical underdetermination regarding the individuality and non-individuality of quantum particles. Section 3 discusses three reactions to it found in the literature: eliminativism about individuality; conservatism about individuality; eliminativism about objects. Section 4 wraps it all up with metametaphysical considerations regarding the epistemology of metaphysics of science.

physics.hist-ph↗
arXiv2022

Realistic From Far But Far From Realism: Withering Scientific Realism in the Quantum Case

Much has been discussed in the philosophy of science about how we should understand the scientific enterprise. On the one hand, scientific realists believe that empirically adequate theories can be supplemented by interpretations that can mirror reality-as-it-is; on the other hand, anti-realists argue that this is not the case, as long as scientific theories make sufficiently accurate experimental predictions the addition of narratives is irrelevant for the scientific enterprise, and regarding narratives, it is preferable to remain agnostic. In this paper, we argue that realism was never really at stake in this debate.

physics.hist-ph↗