arXiv subjects

Richard Healey

Publications and source records attributed to Richard Healey.

15 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Quantum Measurement without Ontology

Measurement is an important scientific activity. In most of science, including classical physics, is may be understood as a way of finding out about the physical world and representing the results numerically. No-go theorems show that measurement of quantum observables is not like that: the recorded outcome is typically created rather than revealed in a quantum measurement, in which case there is no objective fact about the observable's prior value. Other no-go theorems show that unitary quantum theory can generally neither explain nor even represent a unique recorded outcome, thereby threatening that outcome's objectivity. Methodological norms inherent in quantum physical practice nevertheless institute the objectivity, not only of unique recorded outcomes of quantum measurements, but also of non-quantum features of the world that physicists and other scientists take their models to represent.

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arXiv2026

A Pragmatist Understanding of Quantum Mechanics

Applications of quantum mechanics have led to many successful predictions and explanations of puzzling phenomena, and we now apply quantum mechanics to gain, process, and communicate information in novel ways. We can understand quantum mechanics by understanding how we have applied it. We should not seek agreement on the nature of the world it represents, because this theory does not itself represent the physical world (though its applications do help us to represent it better). When applied to a quantum state, quantum mechanics yields probabiities for physical events: both state and probability are objective--not because they represent elements of phyiscal reality, but because each exerts norrmative authority over the beliefs of anyone who accepts quantum mechanics and applies it relative to a physical situation they may (but need not) occupy. These events may be described by statements that are meaningful in an appropriate environmental context, and quantum mechanics can help one to say when that is. Measurement creates an appropriate context, so here the Born rule indirectly yields probabilities of measurement outcomes. The quantum state of a system does not "collapse" on measurement: a new state must be assigned relative to a physical situation in which information about the outcome is accessible. Understood this way, there is no measurement problem, and violations of Bell inequalities does not demonstrate "spooky" non-local action. Quantum field theories have no physical ontology of their own: a quantum field is a mathematical object in a model whose application helps us to improve and extend our descriptions of the world in other terms. We cannot realise the scenario of Wigner's friend and its recent extensions: but the data that provide overwhelming evidence for quantum mechanics are objective in the same sense as the relative measurement outcomes described in those scenarios.

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arXiv2026

Perspectives in and on Quantum Theory

I take a pragmatist perspective on quantum theory. This is not a view of the world described by quantum theory. In this view quantum theory itself does not describe the physical world, nor our observatons, experiences or opinions of it. Instead, the theory offers reliable advice on when to expect an event of one kind or another, and on how strongly to expect each possible outcome of that event. The actual outcome is a perspectival fact: a fact relative to a physical context of assessment. Measurement outcomes and quantum states are both perspectival. By noticing that each must be relativized to an appropriate physical context one can resolve the measurement problem and the problem of nonlocal action. But if the outcome of a quantum measurement is not an absolute fact, then why shoud the statistics of such outcomes give us any objective reason to accept quantum theory? One can describe extensions of the scenario of Wigner's friend in which a statement expressing the outcome of a quantum measurement would be true relative to one such context but not relative to another. However, physical conditions in our world prevent us from realizing such scenarios. Since the outcome of every actual quantum measurement is certified at what is essentially a single context of assessment, the outcome relative to that context is an objective fact in the only sense that matters for science. We should accept quantum theory because the statistics these outcomes display are just those it leads us to expect.

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arXiv2022

Securing the Objectivity of Relative Facts in the Quantum World

This paper compares and contrasts relational quantum mechanics (RQM) with a pragmatist view of quantum theory (DP). I'll first explain important points of agreement. Then I'll point to two problems faced by RQM and sketch DP's solutions to analogous problems. Since both RQM and DP have taken the Born rule to require relative facts I next say what these might be. This brings me to my main objection to RQM as originally conceived -- that its ontology of relative facts is incompatible with scientific objectivity and undercuts the evidential base of quantum theory. In contrast DP's relative facts have all the objectivity we need to accept quantum theory as scientific knowledge. But a very recent modification to RQM has successfully addressed my main objection, bringing the two views into even closer alignment.

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arXiv2020

Scientific Objectivity and its Limits

Measurement outcomes provide data for a physical theory. Unless they are objective they support no objective scientific knowledge. So the outcome of a quantum measurement must be an objective physical fact. But recent arguments purport to show that if quantum theory is universally applicable then there is no such fact. This calls for a reappraisal of the notions of fact and objectivity. If quantum theory is universally applicable the facts about the physical world include a fact about each quantum measurement outcome. These physical facts lack an ideal kind of objectivity but their more modest objectivity is all that science needs.

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arXiv2019

Reply to a comment on "Quantum theory and the limits of objectivity"

In this short note I reply to criticisms of an argument in my paper [1] that appear in comment [2]. I refer the reader to section 4 of [1] in which I described the scenario of a Gedankenexperiment on which is based the argument criticized in [2]. The authors of [2] raise one "main criticism" then go on to claim that the argument of [1] contains a series of problems. But their "main criticism" is not an objection to the argument and the problems are of their own making. In replying to what they call their main criticism I will take this opportunity to exhibit the structure of the argument and so make clear why this is not an objection to that argument.

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arXiv2016

Quantum States as Objective Informational Bridges

A quantum state represents neither properties of a physical system nor anyone's knowledge of its properties. The important question is not what quantum states represent but how they are used---as informational bridges. Knowing about some physical situations (its backing conditions), an agent may assign a quantum state to form expectations about other possible physical situations (its advice conditions). Quantum states are objective: only expectations based on correct state assignments are generally reliable. If a quantum state represents anything, it is the objective probabilistic relations between its backing conditions and its advice conditions. This paper offers an account of quantum states and their function as informational bridges, in quantum teleportation and elsewhere.

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arXiv2014

Causality and chance in relativistic quantum field theories

Bell appealed to the theory of relativity in formulating his principle of local causality. But he maintained that quantum field theories do not conform to that principle, even when their field equations are relativistically covariant and their observable algebras satisfy a relativistically motivated microcausality condition. A pragmatist view of quantum theory and an interventionist approach to causation prompt the reevaluation of local causality and microcausality. Local causality cannot be understood as a reasonable requirement on relativistic quantum field theories: it is unmotivated even if applicable to them. But microcausality emerges as a sufficient condition for the consistent application of a relativistic quantum field theory.

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arXiv2012

Quantum decoherence in a pragmatist view: Resolving the measurement problem

This paper aims to show how adoption of a pragmatist interpretation permits a satisfactory resolution of the quantum measurement problem. The classic measurement problem dissolves once one recognizes that it is not the function of the quantum state to describe or represent the behavior of a quantum system. The residual problem of when, and to what, to apply the Born Rule may then be resolved by judicious appeal to decoherence. This can give sense to talk of measurements of photons and other particles even though quantum field theory does not describe particles.

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arXiv2012

Observation and Quantum Objectivity

The paradox of Wigner's friend challenges the objectivity of description in quantum theory. A pragmatist interpretation can meet this challenge by judicious appeal to decoherence. On this interpretation, quantum theory provides situated agents with resources for predicting and explaining what happens in the physical world---not conscious observations of it. Even in Wigner's friend scenarios, differently situated agents agree on the objective content of statements about the values of physical magnitudes. In more realistic circumstances quantum Darwinism also permits differently situated agents equal observational access to evaluate their truth. In this view, quantum theory has nothing to say about consciousness or conscious experiences of observers. But it does prompt us to reexamine the significance even of everyday claims about the physical world.

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arXiv2012

Quantum decoherence in a pragmatist view: Part I

The quantum theory of decoherence plays an important role in a pragmatist interpretation of quantum theory. It governs the descriptive content of claims about values of physical magnitudes and offers advice on when to use quantum probabilities as a guide to their truth. The content of a claim is to be understood in terms of its role in inferences. This promises a better treatment of meaning than that of Bohr. Quantum theory models physical systems with no mention of measurement: it is decoherence, not measurement, that licenses application of Born's probability rule. So quantum theory also offers advice on its own application. I show how this works in a simple model of decoherence, and then in applications to both laboratory experiments and natural systems. Applications to quantum field theory and the measurement problem will be discussed elsewhere.

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arXiv2012

How to use quantum theory locally to explain "non-local" correlations

J.S. Bell's work has convinced many that correlations in violation of CHSH inequalities show that the world itself is non-local, and that there is an apparently essential conflict between any sharp formulation of quantum theory and relativity. Against this consensus, this paper argues that there is no conflict between quantum theory and relativity. Quantum theory itself helps us explain such (otherwise) puzzling correlations in a way that contradicts neither Bell's intuitive locality principle nor his local causality condition. The argument depends on understanding quantum theory along pragmatist lines, and on a more general view of how that theory helps us explain. Quantum theory is compatible with Bell's intuitive locality principle and with his local causality condition not because it conforms to them, but because they are simply inapplicable to quantum theory, as so understood.

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arXiv2011

How Quantum Theory Helps us Explain

I offer an account of how the quantum theory we have helps us explain so much. The account depends on a pragmatist interpretation of the theory: This takes a quantum state to serve solely as a source of sound advice to physically situated agents on the content and appropriate degree of belief about matters concerning which they are currently inevitably ignorant. The general account of how to use quantum states and probabilities to explain otherwise puzzling regularities is then illustrated by showing how we can explain single particle interference phenomena, the stability of matter, and interference of Bose-Einstein condensates. Finally I note some open problems and relate this account to alternative approaches to explanation that emphasize the importance of causation, of unification, and of structure.

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arXiv2010

Quantum Theory: a Pragmatist Approach

While its applications have made quantum theory arguably the most successful theory in physics, its interpretation continues to be the subject of lively debate within the community of physicists and philosophers concerned with conceptual foundations. This situation poses a problem for a pragmatist for whom meaning derives from use. While disputes about how to use quantum theory have arisen from time to time, they have typically been quickly resolved, and consensus reached, within the relevant scientific sub-community. Yet rival accounts of the meaning of quantum theory continue to proliferate . In this article I offer a diagnosis of this situation and outline a pragmatist solution to the problem it poses, leaving further details for subsequent articles.

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arXiv2009

Reduction and Emergence in Bose-Einstein Condensates

A closer look at some proposed Gedanken-experiments on BECs promises to shed light on several aspects of reduction and emergence in physics. These include the relations between classical descriptions and different quantum treatments of macroscopic systems, and the emergence of new properties and even new objects as a result of spontaneous symmetry breaking.

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