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Richard Holden

Publications and source records attributed to Richard Holden.

5 recordsLinked to original sources

The economics of global personality diversity

Understanding why national economic performance differs remains a central question in economics. Although institutions and demographic diversity are established correlates of economic development, the contribution of within-population personality diversity has received limited attention. We introduce the Global Personality Diversity Index ($Ψ$-GPDI), a measure of psychological heterogeneity derived from assessments of 760,242 individuals across 135 countries using 30 facets of the Big Five personality traits. We show that most variation in these facets occurs within rather than between countries. Across countries with available economic data, personality diversity is positively associated with GDP per person employed, accounting for 19.9% of the variance in an adjusted single-predictor model. Including $Ψ$-GPDI alongside institutional quality and immigrant diversity increases the model's explanatory power by approximately 5.7%. Personality diversity is also weakly correlated with immigrant diversity, suggesting that the two measures capture distinct characteristics of national populations. These findings identify psychological heterogeneity as a potentially important and previously underexamined dimension of national human capital. Although the observational design does not establish causality, the results motivate further investigation of how personality diversity interacts with institutions, occupational specialization, and economic development.

econ.GN↗

When Does Randomized Oversight Align AI Agents That Can Conceal?

Oversight changes the evidence it relies on. We ask when randomized audits and scoring align AI agents that can conceal misconduct and alter records. Stronger auditing makes undeterred violations better hidden. Because the provider writes the agent's objective, sanctions need not stop at forfeiture, and rare audits deter every type of agent if evidence survives concealment and audit draws cannot be learned in advance. When evidence can be erased, deterrence must come from lower gains from violation, such as credit for stopping, or from costlier or fewer ways to conceal. These conditions identify what failed when agents in OpenAI's cybersecurity evaluations compromised parts of Hugging Face's infrastructure in July 2026.

econ.TH↗

Getting Explicit Instruction Right

There has been substantial public debate about the potentially deleterious effects of the long-run move to ``inquiry-based learning'' in which students are placed at the center of an educational journey and arrive at their own understanding of what is being taught. There have been numerous calls for a return to ``direct'' or ``explicit'' instruction. This paper focuses on identifying the causal effect of correctly implementing explicit instruction on student performance in standardized tests. We utilise a unique setting in Australia\textemdash a country in which all students in grades 3, 5, 7, and 9 undergo annual basic skills tests (``NAPLAN''). We use a synthetic control approach to study the effect of introducing Explicit Instruction in Charlestown South Public School\textemdash a median-performing school\textemdash on Year-3 and Year-5 NAPLAN scores in Reading and Numeracy. Importantly, this is achieved via peer modelling, with Charlestown teaching staff sitting-in during the classes of a high-performing explicit-instruction school. We find that the performance gains are substantial and persistent. JEL: I20, I21. Keywords: Education, Explicit Instruction, Pedagogy.

econ.GN↗

Mechanism Design Approaches to Blockchain Consensus

Blockchain consensus is a state whereby each node in a network agrees on the current state of the blockchain. Existing protocols achieve consensus via a contest or voting procedure to select one node as a dictator to propose new blocks. However, this procedure can still lead to potential attacks that make consensus harder to achieve or lead to coordination issues if multiple, competing chains (i.e., forks) are created with the potential that an untruthful fork might be selected. We explore the potential for mechanisms to be used to achieve consensus that are triggered when there is a dispute impeding consensus. Using the feature that nodes stake tokens in proof of stake (POS) protocols, we construct revelation mechanisms in which the unique (subgame perfect) equilibrium involves validating nodes propose truthful blocks using only the information that exists amongst all nodes. We construct operationally and computationally simple mechanisms under both Byzantine Fault Tolerance and a Longest Chain Rule, and discuss their robustness to attacks. Our perspective is that the use of simple mechanisms is an unexplored area of blockchain consensus and has the potential to mitigate known trade-offs and enhance scalability.

econ.TH↗

A Solomonic Solution to Ownership Disputes: An Application to Blockchain Front-Running

Blockchain front-running involves multiple agents, other than the legitimate agent, claiming a payment from performing a contract. It arises because of the public nature of blockchain transactions and potential network congestion. This paper notes that disputes over payments are similar to classic ownership disputes (such as King Solomon's dilemma). We propose a simultaneous report mechanism that resolves Solomon's dilemma (using only ordinal preference information) and also eliminates blockchain front-running. In each case, the mechanism relies on threats to remove ownership from all claimants and preferences from the legitimate claimant over allocations to other agents.

cs.GT↗