arXiv subjects

Robert C. Wilson

Publications and source records attributed to Robert C. Wilson.

11 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Sensorimotor features of a reversal learning task bias decision behavior without disrupting individual difference structure

In computational psychiatry, task-irrelevant factors such as a task's perceptual and motor features are typically assumed not to bias decision behavior, but at most to add noise. Yet growing evidence links sensorimotor processing to decision-making through multiple pathways, challenging this assumption. We tested this directly using a two-choice probabilistic reversal learning task completed by 90 participants under two sensorimotor conditions: a stationary condition requiring only arm movements to respond, and an active condition requiring participants to walk between physically separated computers. Task performance, measured as the propensity to choose the more probable rewarding option, did not differ between conditions. However, stay rate (the tendency to repeat the previous choice) was significantly elevated in the stationary condition, but only among participants who completed the active condition first; those who completed the stationary condition first showed no such difference. Logistic regression weights capturing the influence of recent win history on choice showed the same pattern, with stationary-condition elevation restricted to the active-first group. Cross-condition correlations for both measures were strong, indicating that this order-dependent effect shifted absolute measurements without disrupting individual difference structure. Prior sensorimotor history therefore does not compromise the task's ability to extract stable cognitive variables, but does bias the values it yields - a non-random source of variance that, if it generalizes beyond this experiment, could shift patients across diagnostic thresholds in proposed clinical applications. The finding adds to a growing list of potential methodological contaminants in computational psychiatry's cognitive-task paradigms that must be characterized and mitigated before clinical translation.

q-bio.NC↗

arXiv2026

Thinking Under Uncertainty: Evidence Use and Information-Seeking in Language Models

Inference-time thinking improves the performance of large language models, but aggregate outcomes do not reveal whether models use available evidence more effectively or seek information that could improve future decisions. We distinguish these responses by measuring action preference, thinking length, and reported confidence under matched uncertainty. Ten open-weight models completed matched horizon-style two-armed bandit trials in thinking and non-thinking modes. A cognitive model separated value-guided action and uncertainty-independent choice noise from two behavioral signatures of exploration: a UCB-like preference for the less-known arm and Thompson-like choice variability that increases with total uncertainty. On average, thinking strengthened value-guided action and reduced uncertainty-independent choice noise, without producing UCB-like exploration or strengthening Thompson-like exploration. Outside action, the information-imbalanced history condition, which also displayed more observations than the matched balanced condition, was associated with greater thinking length. Reported confidence became more sensitive to decision difficulty and more strongly associated with chosen task evidence. We interpret these thinking-length and reported-confidence patterns as consistent with metacognitive control and metacognitive monitoring, respectively, without establishing either process. Decoder sweeps, especially temperature, altered choice noise and thinking length but did not reproduce the joint cross-output pattern. In this controlled decision setting, thinking improved how models acted on current evidence, while neither measured signature supported a shift toward a more information-seeking policy.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2026

Large language models reorganize representational geometry during in-context learning

Large language models (LLMs) show remarkable flexibility in adapting to novel tasks without parameter updates, a capacity known as in-context learning (ICL). Prior work has sought to understand ICL by studying the circuits, algorithms, and representations that support it. Yet why some ICL tasks are easy to solve while others are difficult remains unresolved. In this paper, we ask whether LLMs can adapt their representations arbitrarily to solve a simple linear classification task. Specifically, we construct a family of binary classification tasks in which labels are defined by projecting LLMs' own representations onto different axes. Surprisingly, although all tasks are linearly separable by construction, their in-context learnability varies systematically across axes. We find that successful ICL is accompanied by a geometric reorganization of internal representations that increases task-relevant separability. Causal interventions that amplify neural activity along the axis defining the task are insufficient to improve behavioral performance or induce this representational reorganization. We also show that LLM behavior is best described by a prototype-like algorithm operating on representations that are themselves reorganized in context to adapt to the task. Together, these findings offer a geometric account of ICL in LLMs, showing that representations acquired through training constrain what can be exploited through in-context learning.

cs.CL↗

arXiv2026

The Position Curse: LLMs Struggle to Locate the Last Few Items in a List

Modern large language models (LLMs) can find a needle in a haystack (locating a single relevant fact buried among hundreds of thousands of irrelevant tokens) with near-saturated accuracy, yet fail to retrieve the last few items in a short list. We call this failure the Position Curse. For instance, even in a two-line code snippet, Claude Opus 4.6 misidentifies the second-to-last line most of the time. To characterize this failure, we evaluated two complementary queries: given a position in a sequence (of letters or words), retrieve the corresponding item; and given an item, return its position. Each position is specified as a forward or backward offset from an anchor, either an endpoint of the list (its start or end) or another item in the list. Across both open-source and frontier closed-source models, backward retrieval substantially lags forward retrieval. To test whether this capability can be rescued by post-training, we constructed PosBench, a position-focused training dataset. LoRA fine-tuning improves both forward and backward retrieval and generalizes to a held-out code-understanding benchmark (PyIndex), yet absolute performance remains far from saturated. As LLM coding agents increasingly operate over large codebases where precise indexing becomes essential for code understanding and editing, position-based retrieval emerges as a key capability for future pretraining objectives and model design.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2026

Think-Aloud Reshapes Automated Cognitive Model Discovery Beyond Behavior

Computational cognitive models discovered using large language models have so far relied solely on behavioral data. However, it is well-known that models produced from the behavioral trajectory alone are typically under-determined. In this work, we explore the use of Think Aloud traces as an additional form of data constraint during automated model discovery. When applied to the domain of risky decision-making, we find that the models discovered with think-aloud achieve significantly improved predictive performance on held-out data. Additionally, we find that the discovered models belong to different structural classes than those discovered from behavior alone for the majority of participants (69.4\%), specifically, it shifts from Explicit comparator towards Integrated utility. These results suggest that process-level language data not only improve model fit, but also systematically reshape the structure of the discovered cognitive models, enabling the identification of mechanisms that are not recoverable from behavior alone.

q-bio.NC↗

arXiv2026

In-context superposition: human-like working memory interference in large language models

Intelligent systems must maintain and manipulate task-relevant information online to adapt to dynamic environments. This capacity, known as working memory, is fundamental to human reasoning. Yet, human working memory is strikingly limited, maintaining only three to four items in a brain with billions of neurons. Surprisingly, large language models (LLMs), despite different substrates and direct access to prior context through attention, exhibit similar working memory limitations. Why should such different systems face analogous constraints? We propose that working memory limitations reflect a general trade-off of shared representations: representational compression and reuse support efficient learning and generalization, but also cause simultaneously active representations to interfere. We show a two-layer transformer trained on a working memory task can solve it perfectly, but diverse trained LLMs exhibit human-like limitations: performance declines with memory load, while retrieval is biased by recency and stimulus statistics. Mirroring humans, working memory performance in LLMs is also associated with broader model capability. Mechanistically, we show that LLMs encode multiple memories in entangled representations --- a condition we call \emph{in-context superposition} --- and progressively suppress competing content while aligning the target with the readout. Moreover, a causal intervention that suppresses interfering information improves performance. Together, these findings suggest that working memory capacity reflects the ability to select task-relevant information under interference, a computational challenge shared by biological and artificial systems.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2026

Using Reinforcement Learning to Train Large Language Models to Explain Human Decisions

A central goal of cognitive modeling is to develop models that not only predict human behavior but also provide insight into the underlying cognitive mechanisms. While neural network models trained on large-scale behavioral data often achieve strong predictive performance, they typically fall short in offering interpretable explanations of the cognitive processes they capture. In this work, we explore the potential of pretrained large language models (LLMs) to serve as dual-purpose cognitive models--capable of both accurate prediction and interpretable explanation in natural language. Specifically, we employ reinforcement learning with outcome-based rewards to guide LLMs toward generating explicit reasoning traces for explaining human risky choices. Our findings demonstrate that this approach produces high-quality explanations alongside strong quantitative predictions of human decisions.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2025

Language Models Are Capable of Metacognitive Monitoring and Control of Their Internal Activations

Large language models (LLMs) can sometimes report the strategies they actually use to solve tasks, yet at other times seem unable to recognize those strategies that govern their behavior. This suggests a limited degree of metacognition - the capacity to monitor one's own cognitive processes for subsequent reporting and self-control. Metacognition enhances LLMs' capabilities in solving complex tasks but also raises safety concerns, as models may obfuscate their internal processes to evade neural-activation-based oversight (e.g., safety detector). Given society's increased reliance on these models, it is critical that we understand their metacognitive abilities. To address this, we introduce a neuroscience-inspired neurofeedback paradigm that uses in-context learning to quantify metacognitive abilities of LLMs to report and control their activation patterns. We demonstrate that their abilities depend on several factors: the number of in-context examples provided, the semantic interpretability of the neural activation direction (to be reported/controlled), and the variance explained by that direction. These directions span a "metacognitive space" with dimensionality much lower than the model's neural space, suggesting LLMs can monitor only a small subset of their neural activations. Our paradigm provides empirical evidence to quantify metacognition in LLMs, with significant implications for AI safety (e.g., adversarial attack and defense).

cs.AI↗

arXiv2025

Flight masks of the Roman Space Telescope Coronagraph Instrument

Over the past two decades, thousands of confirmed exoplanets have been detected. The next major challenge is to characterize these other worlds and their stellar systems. Much information on the composition and formation of exoplanets and circumstellar debris disks can only be achieved via direct imaging. Direct imaging is challenging because of the small angular separations (< 1 arcsec) and high star-to-planet flux ratios such as ~1e9 for a Jupiter analog or ~1e10 for an Earth analog in the visible. Atmospheric turbulence prohibits reaching such high flux ratios on the ground, so observations must be made above the Earth's atmosphere. The Nancy Grace Roman Space Telescope (Roman), planned to launch in late 2026, will be the first space-based observatory to demonstrate high-contrast imaging with active wavefront control using its Coronagraph Instrument. The instrument's main purpose is to mature the various technologies needed for a future flagship mission to image and characterize Earth-like exoplanets. These technologies include two high-actuator-count deformable mirrors, photon-counting detectors, two complementary wavefront sensing and control loops, and two different coronagraph types. In this paper, we describe the complete set of flight masks in the Roman Coronagraph Instrument, their intended combinations, and how they were laid out, fabricated, and measured.

astro-ph.IM↗

arXiv2025

Large Language Models Think Too Fast To Explore Effectively

Large Language Models (LLMs) have emerged with many intellectual capacities. While numerous benchmarks assess their intelligence, limited attention has been given to their ability to explore--an essential capacity for discovering new information and adapting to novel environments in both natural and artificial systems. The extent to which LLMs can effectively explore, particularly in open-ended tasks, remains unclear. This study investigates whether LLMs can surpass humans in exploration during an open-ended task, using Little Alchemy 2 as a paradigm, where agents combine elements to discover new ones. Results show most LLMs underperform compared to humans, except for the o1 model, with traditional LLMs relying primarily on uncertainty-driven strategies, unlike humans who balance uncertainty and empowerment. Results indicate that traditional reasoning-focused LLMs, such as GPT-4o, exhibit a significantly faster and less detailed reasoning process, limiting their exploratory performance. In contrast, the DeepSeek reasoning model demonstrates prolonged, iterative thought processes marked by repetitive analysis of combinations and past trials, reflecting a more thorough and human-like exploration strategy. Representational analysis of the models with Sparse Autoencoders (SAE) revealed that uncertainty and choices are represented at earlier transformer blocks, while empowerment values are processed later, causing LLMs to think too fast and make premature decisions, hindering effective exploration. These findings shed light on the limitations of LLM exploration and suggest directions for improving their adaptability.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2021

Human Inference in Changing Environments With Temporal Structure

To make informed decisions in natural environments that change over time, humans must update their beliefs as new observations are gathered. Studies exploring human inference as a dynamical process that unfolds in time have focused on situations in which the statistics of observations are history-independent. Yet temporal structure is everywhere in nature, and yields history-dependent observations. Do humans modify their inference processes depending on the latent temporal statistics of their observations? We investigate this question experimentally and theoretically using a change-point inference task. We show that humans adapt their inference process to fine aspects of the temporal structure in the statistics of stimuli. As such, humans behave qualitatively in a Bayesian fashion, but, quantitatively, deviate away from optimality. Perhaps more importantly, humans behave suboptimally in that their responses are not deterministic, but variable. We show that this variability itself is modulated by the temporal statistics of stimuli. To elucidate the cognitive algorithm that yields this behavior, we investigate a broad array of existing and new models that characterize different sources of suboptimal deviations away from Bayesian inference. While models with 'output noise' that corrupts the response-selection process are natural candidates, human behavior is best described by sampling-based inference models, in which the main ingredient is a compressed approximation of the posterior, represented through a modest set of random samples and updated over time. This result comes to complement a growing literature on sample-based representation and learning in humans.

q-bio.NC↗