SearcharxivSearch

arXiv subjects

Robert M. Townsend

Publications and source records attributed to Robert M. Townsend.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

TradeMech: A Method to Multilaterally Net Trades Without Altering Counterparty Exposure

Financial markets such as bond, derivatives, and repo markets form networks of interdependent obligations. Existing multilateral netting methods typically trade off the extent of netting against preservation of counterparty exposure: central clearing reallocates exposure to a central counterparty, while trade compression may alter bilateral counterparty relationships. TradeMech is a mechanism for markets in which one or two homogeneous fungible objects are traded. The mechanism transforms a network of initial bilateral contracts into chains and cycles, nets the designated object multilaterally on those chains and cycles, and replaces initial contracts with multiparty contracts whose assigned trades remain fractions of the original bilateral trades. The construction achieves maximal multilateral netting of the designated object while preserving each agent's contractual profit and preserving the location of counterparty risk. When a party fails to pre-commit a required object, the affected assigned trade is recovered as a bilateral contract between the same original counterparties and the remaining assigned trades are re-netted on residual chains, so no new counterparty exposure is created.

q-fin.TR

A Smart-Contract to Resolve Multiple Equilibrium in Intermediated Trade

We construct an empirically founded model of a repo trade intermediated by two broker-dealers and prove multiple equilibrium and the existence of equilibrium at the joint profit maximizing volume of trade. We then present a smart contract that resolves multiple equilibrium by requiring each broker-dealer to report its client schedule and its minimum hurdle spread, and implementing a selection rule that filters out hurdle-infeasible outcomes. Whenever there exists an equilibrium that exceeds both hurdle spreads, the protocol selects the joint profit maximizing feasible trade and thereby avoids a collapse to no trade. The smart contract is a machine executed algorithm which eliminates the need for trust. Hardware and cryptography are used to prevent leakage of broker-dealer client trade schedules, and to enable privacy-protected auditing with zero-knowledge proofs of the integrity of computations. The outcome can be implemented by a myopic strategy where a broker-dealer truthfully reports its own variables without anticipating its counterparty's reports. This minimizes cognitive and computational complexity, thereby making our smart contract suitable for real-world deployment.

econ.TH

RepoMech: A Method to Reduce the Balance-Sheet Impact of Repo Intermediation

A repo trade involves the sale of a security coupled with a contract to repurchase at a later time. Following the 2008 financial crisis, accounting standards were updated to require repo intermediaries, who are mostly banks, to increase recorded assets at the time of the first transaction. Concurrently, US bank regulators implemented a supplementary leverage ratio constraint that reduces the volume of assets a bank is allowed record. The interaction of the new accounting rules and bank regulations limits the volume of repo trades that banks can intermediate. To reduce the balance-sheet impact of repo, the SEC has mandated banks to centrally clear all Treasuries trades. This achieves multilateral netting but shifts counterparty risk onto the clearinghouse, which can distort monitoring incentives and raise trading cost through the imposition of fees. We present RepoMech, a method that avoids these pitfalls by multilaterally netting repo trades without altering counterparty risk.

econ.GN