arXiv subjects

Roberto Cominetti

Publications and source records attributed to Roberto Cominetti.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Krasnosel'skii-Mann iterations beyond asymptotics: a combinatorial analysis

We revisit the classical Krasnosel'skii-Mann fixed point iteration for contractions and nonexpansive maps in general normed spaces. This iteration is ubiquitous across a wide range of areas, including convex optimization, monotone inclusions, Markov decision processes, under-relaxed methods for nonlinear PDEs, and more. Drawing on a remarkable connection with a Markov chain on $\mathbb{Z}^2$, and using counting arguments from enumerative combinatorics of lattice paths, we derive explicit estimates for the distance between iterates, as well as non-asymptotic error bounds for the fixed point residuals. As the contraction parameter approaches one, these bounds smoothly recover the known estimates for nonexpansive maps. Building upon these estimates, we further derive error bounds for inexact Krasnosel'skii-Mann iterations.

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arXiv2026

The Increasing Gap Dynamics in a General Spatial Matching Model

We study a representation of a problem that appears in numerous transport systems: $N$ servers distributed over a given space (e.g., cars on an urban network), receive random requests from arriving users who get assigned to the closest server, after which this server is replaced by a new one at a random location. We show that this creates a negative feedback loop, which we call \textit{Increasing Gap Dynamics} (IGD): when a server is assigned a spatial gap forms, which is more likely to attract new users that further widen the gap. The simplest version of our model is a one-dimensional circle, for which we derive analytical results showing that the system converges to an inefficient equilibrium, worse than both balanced and fully random distributions of servers. We prove that an optimal assignment policy always matches the user to one of its two neighbouring servers so that long gaps tend to widen. Hence, the IGD persists even when assigning optimally rather than greedily. In two dimensions, the appearance of the IGD is illustrated through simulations on a square region. Finally, simulations of a proper ride-hailing system using real data from Manhattan confirms that the IGD arises and that it is responsible for the appearance of the well-known Wild Goose Chase.

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arXiv2026

Minimax-optimal Halpern iterations for Lipschitz maps

This paper investigates the minimax-optimality of Halpern fixed-point iterations for Lipschitz maps in general normed spaces. Starting from an a priori bound on the orbit of iterates, we derive non-asymptotic estimates for the fixed-point residuals. These bounds are tight, meaning that they are attained by a suitable Lipschitz map and an associated Halpern sequence. By minimizing these tight bounds we identify the minimax-optimal Halpern scheme. For contractions, the optimal iteration exhibits a transition from an initial Halpern phase to the classical Banach-Picard iteration and, as the Lipschitz constant approaches one, we recover the known convergence rate for nonexpansive maps. For expansive maps, the algorithm is purely Halpern with no Banach-Picard phase; moreover, on bounded domains, the residual estimates converge to the minimal displacement bound. Inspired by the minimax-optimal iteration, we design an adaptive scheme whose residuals are uniformly smaller than the minimax-optimal bounds, and can be significantly sharper in practice. Finally, we extend the analysis by introducing alternative bounds based on the distance to a fixed point, which allow us to handle mappings on unbounded domains; including the case of affine maps for which we also identify the minimax-optimal iteration.

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arXiv2025

Near-Optimal Sample Complexity for MDPs via Anchoring

We study a new model-free algorithm to compute $\varepsilon$-optimal policies for average reward Markov decision processes, in the weakly communicating case. Given a generative model, our procedure combines a recursive sampling technique with Halpern's anchored iteration, and computes an $\varepsilon$-optimal policy with sample and time complexity $\widetilde{O}(|\mathcal{S}||\mathcal{A}|\|h^*\|_{\text{sp}}^{2}/\varepsilon^{2})$ both in high probability and in expectation. To our knowledge, this is the best complexity among model-free algorithms, matching the known lower bound up to a factor $\|h^*\|_{\text{sp}}$. Although the complexity bound involves the span seminorm $\|h^*\|_{\text{sp}}$ of the unknown bias vector, the algorithm requires no prior knowledge and implements a stopping rule which guarantees with probability 1 that the procedure terminates in finite time. We also analyze how these techniques can be adapted for discounted MDPs.

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arXiv2023

Monotonicity of Equilibria in Nonatomic Congestion Games

This paper studies the monotonicity of equilibrium costs and equilibrium loads in nonatomic congestion games, in response to variations of the demands. The main goal is to identify conditions under which a paradoxical non-monotone behavior can be excluded. In contrast to routing games with a single commodity, where the network topology is the sole determinant factor for monotonicity, for general congestion games with multiple commodities the structure of the strategy sets plays a crucial role. We frame our study in the general setting of congestion games, with a special focus on singleton congestion games, for which we establish the monotonicity of equilibrium loads with respect to every demand. We then provide conditions for comonotonicity of the equilibrium loads, i.e., we investigate when they jointly increase or decrease after variations of the demands. We finally extend our study from singleton congestion games to the larger class of constrained series-parallel congestion games, whose structure is reminiscent of the concept of a series-parallel network.

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arXiv2023

The interdependence between hospital choice and waiting time -- with a case study in urban China

Hospital choice models often employ random utility theory and include waiting time as a choice determinant. When applied to evaluate health system improvement interventions, these models disregard that hospital choice in turn is a determinant of waiting time. We present a novel, general model capturing the endogeneous relationship between waiting time and hospital choice, including the choice to opt out, and characterize the unique equilibrium solution of the resulting convex problem. We apply the general model in a case study on the urban Chinese health system, specifying that patient choice follows a multinomial logit (MNL) model and waiting times are determined by M/M/1 queues. The results reveal that analyses which solely rely on MNL models overestimate the effectiveness of present policy interventions and that this effectiveness is limited. We explore alternative, more effective, improvement interventions.

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arXiv2023

Phase Transitions of the Price-of-Anarchy Function in Multi-Commodity Routing Games

We consider the behavior of the price of anarchy and equilibrium flows in nonatomic multi-commodity routing games as a function of the traffic demand. We analyze their smoothness with a special attention to specific values of the demand at which the support of the Wardrop equilibrium exhibits a phase transition with an abrupt change in the set of optimal routes. Typically, when such a phase transition occurs, the price of anarchy function has a breakpoint, \ie is not differentiable. We prove that, if the demand varies proportionally across all commodities, then, at a breakpoint, the largest left or right derivatives of the price of anarchy and of the social cost at equilibrium, are associated with the smaller equilibrium support. This proves -- under the assumption of proportional demand -- a conjecture of O'Hare et al. (2016), who observed this behavior in simulations. We also provide counterexamples showing that this monotonicity of the one-sided derivatives may fail when the demand does not vary proportionally, even if it moves along a straight line not passing through the origin.

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arXiv2022

Stochastic fixed-point iterations for nonexpansive maps: Convergence and error bounds

We study a stochastically perturbed version of the well-known Krasnoselski--Mann iteration for computing fixed points of nonexpansive maps in finite dimensional normed spaces. We discuss sufficient conditions on the stochastic noise and stepsizes that guarantee almost sure convergence of the iterates towards a fixed point, and derive non-asymptotic error bounds and convergence rates for the fixed-point residuals. Our main results concern the case of a martingale difference noise with variances that can possibly grow unbounded. This supports an application to reinforcement learning for average reward Markov decision processes, for which we establish convergence and asymptotic rates. We also analyze in depth the case where the noise has uniformly bounded variance, obtaining error bounds with explicit computable constants.

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arXiv2021

Long term behavior of dynamic equilibria in fluid queuing networks

A fluid queuing network constitutes one of the simplest models in which to study flow dynamics over a network. In this model we have a single source-sink pair and each link has a per-time-unit capacity and a transit time. A dynamic equilibrium (or equilibrium flow over time) is a flow pattern over time such that no flow particle has incentives to unilaterally change its path. Although the model has been around for almost fifty years, only recently results regarding existence and characterization of equilibria have been obtained. In particular the long term behavior remains poorly understood. Our main result in this paper is to show that, under a natural (and obviously necessary) condition on the queuing capacity, a dynamic equilibrium reaches a steady state (after which queue lengths remain constant) in finite time. Previously, it was not even known that queue lengths would remain bounded. The proof is based on the analysis of a rather non-obvious potential function that turns out to be monotone along the evolution of the equilibrium. Furthermore, we show that the steady state is characterized as an optimal solution of a certain linear program. When this program has a unique solution, which occurs generically, the long term behavior is completely predictable. On the contrary, if the linear program has multiple solutions the steady state is more difficult to identify as it depends on the whole temporal evolution of the equilibrium.

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arXiv2021

Optimal error bounds for nonexpansive fixed-point iterations in normed spaces

This paper investigates optimal error bounds and convergence rates for general Mann iterations for computing fixed-points of non-expansive maps. We look for iterations that achieve the smallest fixed-point residual after $n$ steps, by minimizing a worst-case bound $\|x^n-Tx^n\|\le R_n$ derived from a nested family of optimal transport problems. We prove that this bound is tight so that minimizing $R_n$ yields optimal iterations. Inspired from numerical results we identify iterations that attain the rate $R_n=O(1/n)$, which we also show to be the best possible. In particular, we prove that the classical Halpern iteration achieves this optimal rate for several alternative stepsizes, and we determine analytically the optimal stepsizes that attain the smallest worst-case residuals at every step $n$, with a tight bound $R_n\approx\frac{4}{n+4}$. We also determine the optimal Halpern stepsizes for affine non-expansive maps, for which we get exactly $R_n=\frac{1}{n+1}$. Finally, we show that the best rate for the classical Krasnosel'ski\u{\i}-Mann iteration is $\Omega(1/\sqrt{n})$, and present numerical evidence suggesting that even extended variants cannot reach a faster rate.

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arXiv2021

Universal bounds for fixed point iterations via optimal transport metrics

We present a self-contained analysis of a particular family of metrics over the set of non-negative integers. We show that these metrics, which are defined through a nested sequence of optimal transport problems, provide tight estimates for general Krasnosel'skii-Mann fixed point iterations for non-expansive maps. We also describe some of their very special properties, including their monotonicity and the so-called "convex quadrangle inequality" that yields a greedy algorithm to compute them efficiently.

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arXiv2020

The Buck-Passing Game

We consider a game in which players are the vertices of a directed graph. Initially, Nature chooses one player according to some fixed distribution and gives her a buck, which represents the request to perform a chore. After completing the task, the player passes the buck to one of her out-neighbors in the graph. The procedure is repeated indefinitely and each player's cost is the asymptotic expected frequency of times that she receives the buck. We consider a deterministic and a stochastic version of the game depending on how players select the neighbor to pass the buck. In both cases we prove the existence of pure equilibria that do not depend on the initial distribution; this is achieved by showing the existence of a generalized ordinal potential. We then use the price of anarchy and price of stability to measure fairness of these equilibria. We also study a buck-holding variant of the game in which players want to maximize the frequency of times they hold the buck, which includes the PageRank game as a special case.

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arXiv2020

Approximation and Convergence of Large Atomic Congestion Games

We consider the question of whether, and in what sense, Wardrop equilibria provide a good approximation for Nash equilibria in atomic unsplittable congestion games with a large number of small players. We examine two different definitions of small players. In the first setting, we consider games where each player's weight is small. We prove that when the number of players goes to infinity and their weights to zero, the random flows in all (mixed) Nash equilibria for the finite games converge in distribution to the set of Wardrop equilibria of the corresponding nonatomic limit game. In the second setting, we consider an increasing number of players with a unit weight that participate in the game with a decreasingly small probability. In this case, the Nash equilibrium flows converge in total variation towards Poisson random variables whose expected values are Wardrop equilibria of a different nonatomic game with suitably-defined costs. The latter can be viewed as symmetric equilibria in a Poisson game in the sense of Myerson, establishing a plausible connection between the Wardrop model for routing games and the stochastic fluctuations observed in real traffic. In both settings we provide explicit approximation bounds, and we study the convergence of the price of anarchy. Beyond the case of congestion games, we prove a general result on the convergence of large games with random players towards Poisson games.

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arXiv2019

The Price of Anarchy in Routing Games as a Function of the Demand

The price of anarchy has become a standard measure of the efficiency of equilibria in games. Most of the literature in this area has focused on establishing worst-case bounds for specific classes of games, such as routing games or more general congestion games. Recently, the price of anarchy in routing games has been studied as a function of the traffic demand, providing asymptotic results in light and heavy traffic. The aim of this paper is to study the price of anarchy in nonatomic routing games in the intermediate region of the demand. To achieve this goal, we begin by establishing some smoothness properties of Wardrop equilibria and social optima for general smooth costs. In the case of affine costs we show that the equilibrium is piecewise linear, with break points at the demand levels at which the set of active paths changes. We prove that the number of such break points is finite, although it can be exponential in the size of the network. Exploiting a scaling law between the equilibrium and the social optimum, we derive a similar behavior for the optimal flows. We then prove that in any interval between break points the price of anarchy is smooth and it is either monotone (decreasing or increasing) over the full interval, or it decreases up to a certain minimum point in the interior of the interval and increases afterwards. We deduce that for affine costs the maximum of the price of anarchy can only occur at the break points. For general costs we provide counterexamples showing that the set of break points is not always finite.

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arXiv2019

Ordinary and Prophet Planning under Uncertainty in Bernoulli Congestion Games

We consider an atomic congestion game in which each player $i$ participates in the game with an exogenous and known probability $p_{i}\in(0,1]$, independently of everybody else, or stays out and incurs no cost. We compute the parameterized Price of Anarchy (PoA) to characterize the impact of demand uncertainty on the efficiency of selfish behavior, considering two different notions of a social planner. A prophet planner knows the realization of the random participation in the game; the ordinary planner does not. As a consequence, a prophet planner can compute an adaptive social optimum that selects different solutions depending on the players that turn out to be active, whereas an ordinary planner faces the same uncertainty as the players and can only minimize the expected social cost according to the player participation distribution. For both type of planners we obtain tight bounds for the PoA, by solving suitable optimization problems parameterized by the maximum participation probability $q=\max_{i} p_{i}$. In the case of affine costs, we find an analytic expression for the corresponding bounds.

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arXiv2018

On the stability of an adaptive learning dynamics in traffic games

This paper investigates the dynamic stability of an adaptive learning procedure in a traffic game. Using the Routh-Hurwitz criterion we study the stability of the rest points of the corresponding mean field dynamics. In the special case with two routes and two players we provide a full description of the number and nature of these rest points as well as the global asymptotic behavior of the dynamics. Depending on the parameters of the model, we find that there are either one, two or three equilibria and we show that in all cases the mean field trajectories converge towards a rest point for almost all initial conditions.

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arXiv2018

A counterexample to De Pierro's conjecture on the convergence of under-relaxed cyclic projections

The convex feasibility problem consists in finding a point in the intersection of a finite family of closed convex sets. When the intersection is empty, a best compromise is to search for a point that minimizes the sum of the squared distances to the sets. In 2001, de Pierro conjectured that the limit cycles generated by the $\varepsilon$-under-relaxed cyclic projection method converge when $\varepsilon\downarrow 0$ towards a least squares solution. While the conjecture has been confirmed under fairly general conditions, we show that it is false in general by constructing a system of three compact convex sets in $\mathbb{R}^3$ for which the $\varepsilon$-under-relaxed cycles do not converge.

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arXiv2018

When is selfish routing bad? The price of anarchy in light and heavy traffic

This paper examines the behavior of the price of anarchy as a function of the traffic inflow in nonatomic congestion games with multiple origin-destination (O/D) pairs. Empirical studies in real-world networks show that the price of anarchy is close to 1 in both light and heavy traffic, thus raising the question: can these observations be justified theoretically? We first show that this is not always the case: the price of anarchy may remain a positive distance away from 1 for all values of the traffic inflow, even in simple three-link networks with a single O/D pair and smooth, convex costs. On the other hand, for a large class of cost functions (including all polynomials), the price of anarchy does converge to 1 in both heavy and light traffic, irrespective of the network topology and the number of O/D pairs in the network. We also examine the rate of convergence of the price of anarchy, and we show that it follows a power law whose degree can be computed explicitly when the network's cost functions are polynomials.

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