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Roberto Rozzi

Publications and source records attributed to Roberto Rozzi.

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Museums as Policy Tools: The Behavioral Impact of Cultural Experiences

Museums can serve as policy tools when their content is purposefully curated. We designed a framed field experiment at the Santa Maria della Scala museum in Siena that leveraged the site's historical role offering care and hospitality.Student visitors randomly assigned to a tour emphasizing this function later donated more to an NGO supporting refugee than those who followed a standard artistic itinerary, with effects concentrated among female participants. These results show that thematically targeted museum experiences can measurably boost charitable behavior toward vulnerable groups, underscoring the untapped potential of cultural institutions in behavioral public policy.

econ.GN

Misspecified beliefs and the evolution of peer pressure

We study the emergence of conformity preferences in an environment in which agents choose effort under heterogeneous, possibly misspecified returns, and social interactions do not directly affect material payoffs. Some agents choose effort by trading off performance and conformity to expected peer behavior. We characterize subjective best responses. For any given beliefs, an optimal and unique level of peer pressure exists and is evolutionarily stable within groups of agents sharing the same misspecification. Such a level is zero for correctly specified agents and may be positive for misspecified ones. When the efficient level of peer pressure is interior, misspecified agents choose effort equal to their true return, resulting in an equilibrium behavior that is both self-confirming and Nash, allowing the persistence of misspecifications. Peer pressure need not generate long-run allocative distortions, but it creates a perceived value of social information. In equilibrium, this value depends only on misspecification, generating scope for informational rents.

econ.TH

An Evolutionary Analysis of Narrative Selection

We study the performance of different methods for processing information, incorporating narrative selection within an evolutionary model. All agents update their beliefs according to Bayes' Rule, but some strategically choose the narrative they use in updating according to heterogeneous criteria. We simulate the endogenous composition of the population, considering different laws of motion for the underlying state of the world. We find that conformists -- that is, agents that choose the narrative to conform to the average belief in the population -- have an evolutionary advantage over other agents across all specifications. The survival chances of the remaining types depend on the uncertainty regarding the state of the world. Agents who tend to develop mild beliefs perform better when the uncertainty is high, whereas agents who tend to develop extreme beliefs perform better when the uncertainty is low.

econ.TH

Criminal Property Rights Suppress Violence in Urban Drug Markets: Theory and Evidence from Merseyside, U.K

In this work, we provide empirical evidence on organized criminal groups' (OCGs) behavior across the Liverpool area in the U.K. (Merseyside). We find that violent crimes concerning OCGs concentrate in the areas yielding the highest revenue, while OGCs primarily control areas yielding middle or low revenue. We explain and generalize these empirical observations with a theoretical model examining how OCGs strategically select which area to exploit based on expected revenue and the presence of other OCGs. We prove our results for three OCGs analytically and extend them to larger numbers of OCGs through numerical simulations. Both approaches suggest that, when the frequency of OCG activity is sufficiently high, each OCG controls one area, while the violence between OCGs remains low across all areas. When the frequency of OCG activity reduces, violent collisions between OCGs occur in the areas yielding the highest revenue, while some OCGs retain control over the medium-revenue areas. Our results suggest important policy recommendations. Firstly, if interventions are only violence-driven, they might miss critical underlying factors. Secondly, police operations might have unintended negative externalities in other areas of a city when they target criminal property rights, like increased violence in the areas yielding the highest revenue.

econ.TH

How manipulable are prediction markets?

In this paper, we conduct a large-scale field experiment to investigate the manipulability of prediction markets. The main experiment involves randomly shocking prices across 817 separate markets; we then collect hourly price data to examine whether the effects of these shocks persist over time. We find that prediction markets can be manipulated: the effects of our trades are visible even 60 days after they have occurred. However, as predicted by our model, the effects of the manipulations somewhat fade over time. Markets with more traders, greater trading volume, and an external source of probability estimates are harder to manipulate.

econ.GN