Canceled: A New Reliability Incentive for Energy-Only Electricity Markets
This paper considers the reliability problem in energy-only markets. Following widespread blackouts in 2011, Texas introduced a reliability price incentive to attract two GW of net additional natural gas-generating capacity. The incentive is unusual because energy buyers pay the incentive directly to producers in a real-time spot market. The program has created $13 billion in direct payments to generators annually since 2015 and is now being implemented or considered in several major energy markets in the US and abroad. We assess the incentive's impact on the Texas market from three perspectives: First, we derive the incentive's equilibrium effect on the electricity price in a monopolistic market from first principles using a standard partial equilibrium economic model. We then empirically test whether the incentive encouraged net entry into the market or the generating applicant pool, controlling for market and climatic conditions using monthly capacity data. Finally, we look for direct evidence of an incentive response among active traders using real-time market trading data. The three approaches suggest buyers and producers cancel out the incentive, and the price-only program does not encourage new generation capacity to enter the market.