Searcharxiv⌕ Search

arXiv subjects

Rohith Kumar Shanmuganathan

Publications and source records attributed to Rohith Kumar Shanmuganathan.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

Code-Grounded Agentic Explanations for Static Analysis Vulnerability Findings

Static application security testing (SAST) tools surface vulnerabilities early and their verdicts are rule-based and auditable. Yet developers routinely dismiss findings they cannot interpret. Large language models can supply the missing explanation, but designs that also hand the model the detection give up the auditability that makes static analysis defensible. We keep detection with the analyser and give the model only the explaining. A preliminary user study with 20 participants and a workshop with 19 practitioners yielded five requirements. Guided by these we redesigned SAFE, an open-source IntelliJ IDEA plugin that explains findings from any analyser reporting in the Static Analysis Results Interchange Format. It tiers explanations by demand, ties them to the reported data flow, and replaces the single-prompt backend with an agent that must consult the repository and the rule that fired before answering. A within-subjects crossover experiment with 24 participants compared the redesign against its predecessor. Perceived usability rose from 77.3 to 85.0 on the System Usability Scale. Actionability gained most among the explanation-quality items, the aspect both earlier studies flagged as weakest, and the odds of a correct remediation were 2.6 times higher. Triage accuracy and time per finding were indistinguishable, which we read as uninformative rather than as equivalence. Trust was the one measure that did not move, and the closing interviews indicate that grounding made findings easier to understand rather than easier to believe. Participants also drew a boundary no requirement anticipated, wanting the tool to find and explain while they judge and apply.

cs.SE↗

Towards Agentic Proof Harness Engineering

Formal verification of real-world projects requires substantial manual effort, from specifying correctness properties to constructing the infrastructure needed to check them. We envision verification agents that assist developers throughout this process. Among the many tasks involved, one stands out as both foundational and amenable to automation: proof-harness engineering. A proof harness defines an isolated verification environment for a program unit, such as a function or module, by providing symbolic inputs, initialization code, and models of its dependencies. Today, proof-harness engineering remains largely a manual task performed by verification engineers. To explore the potential of coding agents for this task, we propose an agentic proof-harness engineer that automatically constructs verifier-ready harnesses from a software project and a designated verification target. We combine the agent with formal soundness and precision guards to validate generated abstractions and guide their refinement. We evaluate the feasibility of our approach in an exploratory case study on curl and libuv, using three historical assertion violations already embedded in the source code as verification properties. Our results show that the agent successfully constructs proof harnesses that enable CBMC to detect all three violations. We further demonstrate the potential for reusing these harnesses with other verification tools.

cs.SE↗

Explaining Software Vulnerabilities with Large Language Models

The prevalence of security vulnerabilities has prompted companies to adopt static application security testing (SAST) tools for vulnerability detection. Nevertheless, these tools frequently exhibit usability limitations, as their generic warning messages do not sufficiently communicate important information to developers, resulting in misunderstandings or oversight of critical findings. In light of recent developments in Large Language Models (LLMs) and their text generation capabilities, our work investigates a hybrid approach that uses LLMs to tackle the SAST explainability challenges. In this paper, we present SAFE, an Integrated Development Environment (IDE) plugin that leverages GPT-4o to explain the causes, impacts, and mitigation strategies of vulnerabilities detected by SAST tools. Our expert user study findings indicate that the explanations generated by SAFE can significantly assist beginner to intermediate developers in understanding and addressing security vulnerabilities, thereby improving the overall usability of SAST tools.

cs.SE↗