arXiv subjects

Rohith Reddy Gangam

Publications and source records attributed to Rohith Reddy Gangam.

6 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Robust Stable Matchings: Dealing with Changes in Preferences

We study stable matchings that are robust to preference changes in the two-sided stable matching setting of Gale and Shapley [GS62]. Given two instances $A$ and $B$ on the same set of agents, a matching is said to be robust if it is stable under both instances. This notion captures desirable robustness properties in matching markets where preferences may evolve, be misreported, or be subject to uncertainty. While the classical theory of stable matchings reveals rich lattice, algorithmic, and polyhedral structure for a single instance, it is unclear which of these properties persist when stability is required across multiple instances. Our work initiates a systematic study of the structural and computational behavior of robust stable matchings under increasingly general models of preference changes. We analyze robustness under a hierarchy of perturbation models: 1. a single upward shift in one agent's preference list, 2. an arbitrary permutation change by a single agent, and 3. arbitrary preference changes by multiple agents on both sides. For each regime, we characterize when: 1. the set of robust stable matchings forms a sublattice, 2. the lattice of robust stable matchings admits a succinct Birkhoff partial order enabling efficient enumeration, 3. worker-optimal and firm-optimal robust stable matchings can be computed efficiently, and 4. the robust stable matching polytope is integral (by studying its LP formulation). We provide explicit counterexamples demonstrating where these structural and geometric properties break down, and complement these results with XP-time algorithms running in $O(n^k)$ time, parameterized by $k$, the number of agents whose preferences change. Our results precisely delineate the boundary between tractable and intractable cases for robust stable matchings.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2025

Stable Matching: Dealing with Changes in Preferences

We study stable matchings that are robust to preference changes in the two-sided stable matching setting of Gale and Shapley[GS62]. Given two instances $A$ and $B$ on the same set of agents, a matching is said to be robust if it is stable under both instances. While prior work has considered the case where a single agent changes preferences between $A$ and $B$, we allow multiple agents on both sides to update their preferences and ask whether three central properties of stable matchings extend to robust stable matchings: (i) Can a robust stable matching be found in polynomial time? (ii) Does the set of robust stable matchings form a lattice? (iii) Is the fractional robust stable matching polytope integral? We show that all three properties hold when any number of agents on one side change preferences, as long as at most one agent on the other side does. For the case where two or more agents on both sides change preferences, we construct examples showing that both the lattice structure and polyhedral integrality fail-identifying this setting as a sharp threshold. We also present an XP-time algorithm for the general case, which implies a polynomial-time algorithm when the number of agents with changing preferences is constant. While these results establish the tractability of these regimes, closing the complexity gap in the fully general setting remains an interesting open question.

cs.DM↗

arXiv2025

Robust Popular Matchings

We study popularity for matchings under preferences. This solution concept captures matchings that do not lose against any other matching in a majority vote by the agents. A popular matching is said to be robust if it is popular among multiple instances. We present a polynomial-time algorithm for deciding whether there exists a robust popular matching if instances only differ with respect to the preferences of a single agent. The same method applies also to dominant matchings, a subclass of maximum-size popular matchings. By contrast, we obtain NP-completeness if two instances differ only by two agents of the same side or by a swap of two adjacent alternatives by two agents. The first hardness result applies to dominant matchings as well. Moreover, we find another complexity dichotomy based on preference completeness for the case where instances differ by making some options unavailable. We conclude by discussing related models, such as strong and mixed popularity.

cs.DS↗

arXiv2025

Fair Rent Division: New Budget and Rent Constraints

We study the classical rent division problem, where $n$ agents must allocate $n$ indivisible rooms and split a fixed total rent $R$. The goal is to compute an envy-free (EF) allocation, where no agent prefers another agent's room and rent to their own. This problem has been extensively studied under standard assumptions, where efficient algorithms for computing EF allocations are known. We extend this framework by introducing two practically motivated constraints: (i) lower and upper bounds on room rents, and (ii) room-specific budget for agents. We develop efficient combinatorial algorithms that either compute a feasible EF allocation or certify infeasibility. We further design algorithms to optimize over EF allocations using natural fairness objectives such as maximin utility, leximin utility, and minimum utility spread. Our approach unifies both constraint types within a single algorithmic framework, advancing the applicability of fair division methods in real-world platforms such as Spliddit.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2025

On the Core of the $b$-Matching Game

The core is a quintessential solution concept for profit sharing in cooperative game theory. An imputation allocates the worth of the given game among its agents. The imputation lies in the core of the game if, for each sub-coalition, the amount allocated to its agents is at least the worth of this sub-coalition. Hence, under a core imputation, each of exponentially many sub-coalitions gets satisfied. The following computational question has received much attention: Given an imputation, does it lie in the core? Clearly, this question lies in co-NP, since a co-NP certificate for this problem would be a sub-coalition which is not satisfied under the imputation. This question is in P for the assignment game [SS71] and has been shown to be co-NP-hard for several natural games, including max-flow [FZCD02] and MST [FKFH97]. The one natural game for which this question has remained open is the b-matching game when the number of times an edge can be matched is unconstrained; in case each edge can be matched at most once, it is co-NP-hard [BKPW18]. At the outset, it was not clear which way this open question would resolve: on the one hand, for all but one game, this problem was shown co-NP-hard and on the other hand, proximity to the assignment problem and the deep structural properties of matching could lead to a positive result. In this paper, we show that the problem is indeed co-NP-hard.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2022

A Structural and Algorithmic Study of Stable Matching Lattices of "Nearby" Instances, with Applications

Recently MV18 identified and initiated work on the new problem of understanding structural relationships between the lattices of solutions of two "nearby" instances of stable matching. They also gave an application of their work to finding a robust stable matching. However, the types of changes they allowed in going from instance $A$ to $B$ were very restricted, namely any one agent executes an upward shift. In this paper, we allow any one agent to permute its preference list arbitrarily. Let $M_A$ and $M_B$ be the sets of stable matchings of the resulting pair of instances $A$ and $B$, and let $\mathcal{L}_A$ and $\mathcal{L}_B$ be the corresponding lattices of stable matchings. We prove that the matchings in $M_A \cap M_B$ form a sublattice of both $\mathcal{L}_A$ and $\mathcal{L}_B$ and those in $M_A \setminus M_B$ form a join semi-sublattice of $\mathcal{L}_A$. These properties enable us to obtain a polynomial time algorithm for not only finding a stable matching in $M_A \cap M_B$, but also for obtaining the partial order, as promised by Birkhoff's Representation Theorem, thereby enabling us to generate all matchings in this sublattice. Our algorithm also helps solve a version of the robust stable matching problem. We discuss another potential application, namely obtaining new insights into the incentive compatibility properties of the Gale-Shapley Deferred Acceptance Algorithm.

cs.DM↗