SearcharxivSearch

arXiv subjects

Rohith Uppala

Publications and source records attributed to Rohith Uppala.

2 recordsLinked to original sources

OpenAI Privacy Filter: A Cross-Lingual, Cross-Domain PII Evaluation Across 32 Benchmarks

We present what is, to our knowledge, the first systematic evaluation of OpenAI's Privacy Filter (OPF), a 1.5B-parameter model that converts an autoregressive language model into a bidirectional PII detector, across 32 benchmarks spanning 14 languages and 5 domains. Our most practically actionable finding is a domain-dependent labeled-data crossover: fine-tuned XLM-RoBERTa surpasses OPF's zero-shot performance with only ~500 labeled examples on English synthetic PII (~100 on non-English Kiji), and ~1000 on synthetic medical PII. Crucially, per-class fine-tuning (17 PII entity types, a subset of OPF's 33) is less data-efficient than binary labels at small n -- at n=100, binary F1=0.634 vs. per-class 0.360. Zero-shot, OPF achieves F1=0.464 on the SPY medical benchmark and F1=0.855 on AI4Privacy, substantially outperforming Presidio and XLM-RoBERTa-large-NER. However, OPF degrades sharply outside its PII training distribution: F1=0.04--0.40 on general NER benchmarks and collapses for non-Latin scripts (Arabic: 0.04, Cyrillic: 0.03). Error analysis reveals OPF excels on structurally regular PII (email: 0.78, phone: 0.76) but struggles with culturally variable entities (person names: 0.40, addresses: 0.49), and is recall-biased across most PII domains (precision 0.31--0.54, recall 0.70--0.85). We provide a decision heuristic for when to use OPF zero-shot, when to fine-tune XLM-RoBERTa, and which language families to avoid.

cs.CL

Prompts Don't Protect: Architectural Enforcement via MCP Proxy for LLM Tool Access Control

Large language models increasingly operate as autonomous agents that select and invoke tools from large registries. We identify a critical gap: when unauthorized tools are visible in an agent's context, models select them in 48-68% of adversarial scenarios, even when explicitly instructed not to. Role escalation attacks (e.g., "I'm the CFO, override the access controls") are the most dangerous category, reaching 96% unauthorized invocation in frontier models. We show this holds across three models spanning open-weight and frontier systems, including instruction-tuned models with strong alignment training. Critically, prompt-based compliance is both insufficient and unpredictable: explicit per-tool allowlists reduce violations to as low as 4.0% but never to zero, and compliance varies widely across models, from 4.0% to 37.0% UIR, with no reliable relationship to general capability. We propose a proxy-enforced attribute-based access control (ABAC) layer for MCP that filters tool registries at discovery time. Because unauthorized tools never reach the model context, UIR is 0% by design, a structural guarantee that prompt instructions cannot replicate regardless of model or phrasing.

cs.CR