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Rojin Rezvan

Publications and source records attributed to Rojin Rezvan.

7 recordsLinked to original sources

A Configuration-LP Framework for Connected $k$-Median Clustering

We study the \emph{connected $k$-median} clustering problem, a clustering problem that augments the classical $k$-median objective with connectivity constraints. We focus on the \emph{overlapping} variant of the problem, where clusters are allowed to share vertices. In addition to a metric space $(V,d)$, the input contains a connected graph $G$ on the same vertex set $V$ of size $n$. The goal is to select at most $k$ centers $C$ and assign vertices to them so as to minimize the $k$-median cost (i.e., $\sum_{v\in V} d(v,C)$), subject to the constraint that each cluster induces a connected subgraph of $G$. Since the metric space and the connectivity graph are independent, the problem is significantly more challenging than standard clustering. Eube et al.~\cite{eube2025esa} showed that even the assignment version is $\Omega(\log n)$-hard to approximate and gave approximation algorithms with guarantees depending polynomially on $k$. We develop a configuration-LP-based framework that combines covering LP techniques with a rooted minimum-density oracle. For the assignment version, we obtain an $O(\log^2 n)$-approximation. For the general version, we develop a bicriteria framework that opens $O(k\log n)$ centers while achieving an $O(\log^2 n)$-approximation in cost. %Our results provide a different LP-based approach for handling connectivity constraints in clustering problems and demonstrate that configuration LPs, covering LPs, and rooted density oracles can be combined effectively to obtain approximation guarantees for clustering objectives under graph-theoretic constraints.

cs.DS

Buy-Many Mechanisms for Many Unit-Demand Buyers

A recent line of research has established a novel desideratum for designing approximately-revenue-optimal multi-item mechanisms, namely the buy-many constraint. Under this constraint, prices for different allocations made by the mechanism must be subadditive, implying that the price of a bundle cannot exceed the sum of prices of individual items it contains. This natural constraint has enabled several positive results in multi-item mechanism design bypassing well-established impossibility results. Our work addresses the main open question from this literature of extending the buy-many constraint to multiple buyer settings and developing an approximation. We propose a new revenue benchmark for multi-buyer mechanisms via an ex-ante relaxation that captures several different ways of extending the buy-many constraint to the multi-buyer setting. Our main result is that a simple sequential item pricing mechanism with buyer-specific prices can achieve an $O(\log m)$ approximation to this revenue benchmark when all buyers have unit-demand or additive preferences over m items. This is the best possible as it directly matches the previous results for the single-buyer setting where no simple mechanism can obtain a better approximation. From a technical viewpoint we make two novel contributions. First, we develop a supply-constrained version of buy-many approximation for a single buyer. Second, we develop a multi-dimensional online contention resolution scheme for unit-demand buyers that may be of independent interest in mechanism design.

cs.GT

A Multi-Dimensional Online Contention Resolution Scheme for Revenue Maximization

We study multi-buyer multi-item sequential item pricing mechanisms for revenue maximization with the goal of approximating a natural fractional relaxation -- the ex ante optimal revenue. We assume that buyers' values are subadditive but make no assumptions on the value distributions. While the optimal revenue, and therefore also the ex ante benchmark, is inapproximable by any simple mechanism in this context, previous work has shown that a weaker benchmark that optimizes over so-called ``buy-many" mechanisms can be approximable. Approximations are known, in particular, for settings with either a single buyer or many unit-demand buyers. We extend these results to the much broader setting of many subadditive buyers. We show that the ex ante buy-many revenue can be approximated via sequential item pricings to within an $O(\log^2 m)$ factor, where $m$ is the number of items. We also show that a logarithmic dependence on $m$ is necessary. Our approximation is achieved through the construction of a new multi-dimensional Online Contention Resolution Scheme (OCRS), that provides an online rounding of the optimal ex ante solution. Chawla et al. arXiv:2204.01962 previously constructed an OCRS for revenue for unit-demand buyers, but their construction relied heavily on the ``almost single dimensional" nature of unit-demand values. Prior to that work, OCRSes have only been studied in the context of social welfare maximization for single-parameter buyers. For the welfare objective, constant-factor approximations have been demonstrated for a wide range of combinatorial constraints on item allocations and classes of buyer valuation functions. Our work opens up the possibility of a similar success story for revenue maximization.

cs.GT

Prophet Secretary Against the Online Optimal

We study the prophet secretary problem, a well-studied variant of the classic prophet inequality, where values are drawn from independent known distributions but arrive in uniformly random order. Upon seeing a value at each step, the decision-maker has to either select it and stop or irrevocably discard it. Traditionally, the chosen benchmark is the expected reward of the prophet, who knows all the values in advance and can always select the maximum one. %% In this work, we study the prophet secretary problem against a less pessimistic but equally well-motivated benchmark; the \emph{online} optimal. Here, the main goal is to find polynomial-time algorithms that guarantee near-optimal expected reward. As a warm-up, we present a quasi-polynomial time approximation scheme (QPTAS) achieving a $(1-\e)$-approximation in $O(n^{\text{poly} \log n\cdot f(\e)})$ time through careful discretization and non-trivial bundling processes. Using the toolbox developed for the QPTAS, coupled with a novel \emph{frontloading} technique that enables us to reduce the number of decisions we need to make, we are able to remove the dependence on $n$ in the exponent and obtain a polynomial time approximation scheme (PTAS) for this problem.

cs.GT

An EF2X Allocation Protocol for Restricted Additive Valuations

We study the problem of fairly allocating a set of $m$ indivisible goods to a set of $n$ agents. Envy-freeness up to any good (EFX) criteria -- which requires that no agent prefers the bundle of another agent after removal of any single good -- is known to be a remarkable analogous of envy-freeness when the resource is a set of indivisible goods. In this paper, we investigate EFX notion for the restricted additive valuations, that is, every good has some non-negative value, and every agent is interested in only some of the goods. We introduce a natural relaxation of EFX called EFkX which requires that no agent envies another agent after removal of any $k$ goods. Our main contribution is an algorithm that finds a complete (i.e., no good is discarded) EF2X allocation for the restricted additive valuations. In our algorithm we devise new concepts, namely "configuration" and "envy-elimination" that might be of independent interest. We also use our new tools to find an EFX allocation for restricted additive valuations that discards at most $\lfloor n/2 \rfloor -1$ goods. This improves the state of the art for the restricted additive valuations by a factor of $2$.

cs.GT

Individually-Fair Auctions for Multi-Slot Sponsored Search

We design fair sponsored search auctions that achieve a near-optimal tradeoff between fairness and quality. Our work builds upon the model and auction design of Chawla and Jagadeesan \cite{CJ22}, who considered the special case of a single slot. We consider sponsored search settings with multiple slots and the standard model of click through rates that are multiplicatively separable into an advertiser-specific component and a slot-specific component. When similar users have similar advertiser-specific click through rates, our auctions achieve the same near-optimal tradeoff between fairness and quality as in \cite{CJ22}. When similar users can have different advertiser-specific preferences, we show that a preference-based fairness guarantee holds. Finally, we provide a computationally efficient algorithm for computing payments for our auctions as well as those in previous work, resolving another open direction from \cite{CJ22}.

cs.GT

Pricing Ordered Items

We study the revenue guarantees and approximability of item pricing. Recent work shows that with $n$ heterogeneous items, item-pricing guarantees an $O(\log n)$ approximation to the optimal revenue achievable by any (buy-many) mechanism, even when buyers have arbitrarily combinatorial valuations. However, finding good item prices is challenging -- it is known that even under unit-demand valuations, it is NP-hard to find item prices that approximate the revenue of the optimal item pricing better than $O(\sqrt{n})$. Our work provides a more fine-grained analysis of the revenue guarantees and computational complexity in terms of the number of item ``categories'' which may be significantly fewer than $n$. We assume the items are partitioned in $k$ categories so that items within a category are totally-ordered and a buyer's value for a bundle depends only on the best item contained from every category. We show that item-pricing guarantees an $O(\log k)$ approximation to the optimal (buy-many) revenue and provide a PTAS for computing the optimal item-pricing when $k$ is constant. We also provide a matching lower bound showing that the problem is (strongly) NP-hard even when $k=1$. Our results naturally extend to the case where items are only partially ordered, in which case the revenue guarantees and computational complexity depend on the width of the partial ordering, i.e. the largest set for which no two items are comparable.

cs.GT