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Rong-Da Chen

Publications and source records attributed to Rong-Da Chen.

7 recordsLinked to original sources

Evolutionary dynamics in financial markets with heterogeneities in strategies and risk tolerance

In nature and human societies, the effects of homogeneous and heterogeneous characteristics on the evolution of collective behaviors are quite different from each other. It is of great importance to understand the underlying mechanisms of the occurrence of such differences. By incorporating pair pattern strategies and reference point strategies into an agent-based model, we have investigated the coupled effects of heterogeneous investment strategies and heterogeneous risk tolerance on price fluctuations. In the market flooded with the investors with homogeneous investment strategies or homogeneous risk tolerance, large price fluctuations are easy to occur. In the market flooded with the investors with heterogeneous investment strategies or heterogeneous risk tolerance, the price fluctuations are suppressed. For a heterogeneous population, the coexistence of investors with pair pattern strategies and reference point strategies causes the price to have a slow fluctuation around a typical equilibrium point and both a large price fluctuation and a no-trading state are avoided, in which the pair pattern strategies push the system far away from the equilibrium while the reference point strategies pull the system back to the equilibrium. A theoretical analysis indicates that the evolutionary dynamics in the present model is governed by the competition between different strategies. The strategy that causes large price fluctuations loses more while the strategy that pulls the system back to the equilibrium gains more. Overfrequent trading does harm to one's pursuit for more wealth.

q-fin.GN

Coupled effects of epidemic information and risk awareness on contagion

By incorporating delayed epidemic information and self-restricted travel behavior into the SIS model, we have investigated the coupled effects of timely and accurate epidemic information and people's sensitivity to the epidemic information on contagion. In the population with only local random movement, whether the epidemic information is delayed or not has no effect on the spread of the epidemic. People's high sensitivity to the epidemic information leads to their risk aversion behavior and the spread of the epidemic is suppressed. In the population with only global person-to-person movement, timely and accurate epidemic information helps an individual cut off the connections with the infected in time and the epidemic is brought under control in no time. A delay in the epidemic information leads to an individual's misjudgment of who has been infected and who has not, which in turn leads to rapid progress and a higher peak of the epidemic. In the population with coexistence of local and global movement, timely and accurate epidemic information and people's high sensitivity to the epidemic information play an important role in curbing the epidemic. A theoretical analysis indicates that people's misjudgment caused by the delayed epidemic information leads to a higher encounter probability between the susceptible and the infected and people's self-restricted travel behavior helps reduce such an encounter probability. A functional relation between the ratio of infected individuals and the susceptible-infected encounter probability has been found.

physics.soc-ph

Multiple learning mechanisms promote cooperation in public goods games with project selection

How evolution favors cooperation is a fundamental issue in social and economic systems. In the business world, actively selecting a suitable project is usually helpful for a businessman to be in an advantageous position. By incorporating project selection mechanism into the threshold public goods game, we have investigated the coupling effect of mutation and imitation in updating one's preferred project scale on the evolution of cooperation. Compared with the situation where there is no project selection mechanism, the existence of project selection may suppress or promote cooperation depending upon different updating rules. There exists a critical ratio of the imitators in the population, below which cooperation is suppressed while above which cooperation is promoted. With the coevolving of individual strategies and preferred project scales, a higher level of cooperation corresponds to a larger average value of the preferred project scales. A theoretical analysis indicates that, as most of the individuals are mutants, the coevolving process is governed by the mutation process, which leads to a smaller average value of the preferred project scales and a lower level of cooperation. As most of the individuals are imitators, the coevolving process is governed by the coupling of the mutation and imitation processes, which leads to a larger average value of the preferred project scales and a higher level of cooperation. As all the individuals are imitators, the coevolving process is governed by the imitation process, which leads to an intermediate average value of the preferred project scales and an intermediate level of cooperation.

physics.soc-ph

Self-reinforcing feedback loop in financial markets with coupling of market impact and momentum traders

By incorporating market impact and momentum traders into an agent-based model, we investigate the conditions for the occurrence of self-reinforcing feedback loops and the coevolutionary mechanism of prices and strategies. For low market impact, the price fluctuations are originally large. The existence of momentum traders has little impact on the change of price fluctuations but destroys the equilibrium between the trend-following and trend-rejecting strategies. The trend-following herd behaviors become dominant. A self-reinforcing feedback loop exists. For high market impact, the existence of momentum traders leads to an increase in price fluctuations. The trend-following strategies of rational individuals are suppressed while the trend-following strategies of momentum traders are promoted. The crowd-anticrowd behaviors become dominant. A negative feedback loop exists. A theoretical analysis indicates that, for low market impact, the majority effect is beneficial for the trend-followers to earn more, which in turn promotes the trend-following strategies. For high market impact, the minority effect causes the trend-followers to suffer great losses, which in turn suppresses the trend-following strategies.

physics.soc-ph

A generalized public goods game with coupling of individual ability and project benefit

Facing a heavy task, any single person can only make a limited contribution and team cooperation is needed. As one enjoys the benefit of the public goods, the potential benefits of the project are not always maximized and may be partly wasted. By incorporating individual ability and project benefit into the original public goods game, we study the coupling effect of the four parameters, the upper limit of individual contribution, the upper limit of individual benefit, the needed project cost and the upper limit of project benefit on the evolution of cooperation. Coevolving with the individual-level group size preferences, an increase in the upper limit of individual benefit promotes cooperation while an increase in the upper limit of individual contribution inhibits cooperation. The coupling of the upper limit of individual contribution and the needed project cost determines the critical point of the upper limit of project benefit, where the equilibrium frequency of cooperators reaches its highest level. Above the critical point, an increase in the upper limit of project benefit inhibits cooperation. The evolution of cooperation is closely related to the preferred group-size distribution. A functional relation between the frequency of cooperators and the dominant group size is found.

physics.soc-ph

A generalized voter model with time-decaying memory on a multilayer network

By incorporating a multilayer network and time-decaying memory into the original voter model, the coupled effects of spatial and temporal cumulation of peer pressure on consensus are investigated. Heterogeneity in peer pressure and time-decaying mechanism are both found to be detrimental to consensus. The transition points, below which a consensus can always be reached and above which two opposed opinions are more likely to coexist, are found. A mean-field analysis indicates that the phase transitions in the present model are governed by the cumulative influence of peer pressure and the updating threshold. A functional relation between the consensus threshold and the decaying rate of the influence of peer pressure is found. As to the time to reach a consensus, it is governed by the coupling of the memory length and the decaying rate. An intermediate decaying rate may lead to much lower time to reach a consensus.

physics.soc-ph

Coupled effects of local movement and global interaction on contagion

By incorporating segregated spatial domain and individual-based linkage into the SIS (susceptible-infected-susceptible) model, we investigate the coupled effects of random walk and intragroup interaction on contagion. Compared with the situation where only local movement or individual-based linkage exists, the coexistence of them leads to a wider spread of infectious disease. The roles of narrowing segregated spatial domain and reducing mobility in epidemic control are checked, these two measures are found to be conducive to curbing the spread of infectious disease. Considering heterogeneous time scales between local movement and global interaction, a log-log relation between the change in the number of infected individuals and the timescale $τ$ is found. A theoretical analysis indicates that the evolutionary dynamics in the present model is related to the encounter probability and the encounter time. A functional relation between the epidemic threshold and the ratio of shortcuts, and a functional relation between the encounter time and the timescale $τ$ are found.

physics.soc-ph