arXiv subjects

Rosario Patanè

Publications and source records attributed to Rosario Patanè.

7 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Reusing Spare Vehicle Computing Capacity: Is It Viable, Profitable and Sustainable?

Vehicular Cloud Computing (VCC) exploits computing hardware already embedded in vehicles for purposes unrelated to offloading and puts its idle cycles to work executing end-users' offloaded tasks, avoiding the deployment of new computation infrastructure. Despite its conceptual appeal, adoption is hindered by the lack of quantitative evidence that sharing spare vehicular capacity is viable, profitable and sustainable. A management scheme for task offloading sustains deadline-constrained execution by decoupling deadline-aware allocation from ex-post incentive design, making the approach viable. A robust coalitional game and a vehicle-selection mechanism keep the network operator and the vehicle owners profitable even under unfavorable outcomes of the random environment, e.g.,mobility, radio conditions, or vehicles overstating their spare capacity. A simulation campaign on realistic urban mobility, using Simulation of Urban MObility (SUMO) traces of Rome,together with a CO2 life-cycle assessment against edge computing infrastructure, whose footprint, is attributed pro rata to the share of its capacity devoted to offloading shows the approach to be sustainable. Vehicles absorb most of the offloaded traffic within tens of milliseconds; participation yields up to 157 km of monthly driving range per vehicle; and life-cycle emissions drop by over 99% when using VCC compared to that edge infrastructure.

cs.DC↗

arXiv2026

Counterexamples to a conjecture of Kamenetsky on OEIS A173419

Define a(n) as the number corresponding to the shortest computation using only addition, subtraction, or multiplication, as A173419 states on the related OEIS page. In a comment to the sequence, D. Kamenetsky conjectured that a(p) $\ge$ a(p -1) for every prime. We show that the conjecture is false through four counterexamples below 5000 that satisfy the condition a(p) < a(p -1). They are exactly 3359, 3623, 4909, and 4943.

math.GM↗

arXiv2026

From Individual to Shared Ownership: A Coalitional Game Approach to Sustainable Co-investment

This paper proposes a cooperative game-theoretic framework for sustainable co-investment in shared infrastructure under regulatory incentives. Multiple heterogeneous operators co-invest in a common infrastructure whose production capability evolves over time and is subject to operational variability. A regulator supports the deployment through incentive mechanisms designed to align individual economic investment objectives with the coalitional one. We formulate the co-investment problem as a transferable-utility (TU) coalitional game in which the value generated by cooperation depends on heterogeneous operational profiles, dynamic resource availability, investment costs, and regulatory incentive level. We show that the proposed coalitional game can be reformulated as a linear production game (LPG), whose dual prices yield a constructive and stable allocation of the cooperative surplus. Finally, we illustrate the proposed framework through a case study on co-investment among data center operators in shared renewable energy infrastructure, supported by government subsidies promoting renewable energy consumption.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2025

A Management Framework for Vehicular Cloudtoward Economic and Environmental Efficiency

Vehicular Cloud Computing (VCC) leverages the idle computing capacity of vehicles to execute end-users' offloaded tasks without requiring new computation infrastructure. Despite its conceptual appeal, VCC adoption is hindered by the lack of quantitative evidence demonstrating its profitability and environmental advantages in real-world scenarios. This paper tackles the fundamental question: Can VCC be both profitable and sustainable? We address this problem by proposing a management scheme for VCC that combines energy-aware task allocation with a game-theoretic revenue-sharing mechanism. Our framework is the first to jointly model latency, energy consumption, monetary incentives, and carbon emissions within urban mobility and 5G communication settings. The task allocation strategy maximizes the aggregate stakeholder utility while satisfying deadlines and minimizing energy costs. The payoffs are distributed via a coalitional game theory adapted to dynamic vehicular environments, to prevent disincentivizing participants with potentially negative contributions. Extensive simulations demonstrate that our approach supports low-latency task execution, enables effective monetization of vehicular resources, and reduces CO2 emissions by more than 99% compared to conventional edge infrastructures, making VCC a practical and sustainable alternative to edge computing.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2025

Vehicular Cloud Computing: A cost-effective alternative to Edge Computing in 5G networks

Edge Computing (EC) is a computational paradigm that involves deploying resources such as CPUs and GPUs near end-users, enabling low-latency applications like augmented reality and real-time gaming. However, deploying and maintaining a vast network of EC nodes is costly, which can explain its limited deployment today. A new paradigm called Vehicular Cloud Computing (VCC) has emerged and inspired interest among researchers and industry. VCC opportunistically utilizes existing and idle vehicular computational resources for external task offloading. This work is the first to systematically address the following question: Can VCC replace EC for low-latency applications? Answering this question is highly relevant for Network Operators (NOs), as VCC could eliminate costs associated with EC given that it requires no infrastructural investment. Despite its potential, no systematic study has yet explored the conditions under which VCC can effectively support low-latency applications without relying on EC. This work aims to fill that gap. Extensive simulations allow for assessing the crucial scenario factors that determine when this EC-to-VCC substitution is feasible. Considered factors are load, vehicles mobility and density, and availability. Potential for substitution is assessed based on multiple criteria, such as latency, task completion success, and cost. Vehicle mobility is simulated in SUMO, and communication in NS3 5G-LENA. The findings show that VCC can effectively replace EC for low-latency applications, except in extreme cases when the EC is still required (latency < 16 ms).

cs.NI↗

arXiv2024

Can vehicular cloud replace edge computing?

Edge computing (EC) consists of deploying computation resources close to the users, thus enabling low-latency applications, such as augmented reality and online gaming. However, large-scale deployment of edge nodes can be highly impractical and expensive. Besides EC, there is a rising concept known as Vehicular Cloud Computing (VCC). VCC is a computing paradigm that amplifies the capabilities of vehicles by exploiting part of their computational resources, enabling them to participate in services similar to those provided by the EC. The advantage of VCC is that it can opportunistically exploit part of the computation resources already present on vehicles, thus relieving a network operator from the deployment and maintenance cost of EC nodes. However, it is still unknown under which circumstances VCC can enable low-latency applications without EC. In this work, we show that VCC has the potential to effectively supplant EC in urban areas, especially given the higher density of vehicles in such environments. The goal of this paper is to analyze, via simulation, the key parameters determining the conditions under which this substitution of EC by VCC is feasible. In addition, we provide a high level cost analysis to show that VCC is much less costly for a network operator than adopting EC.

cs.DC↗

arXiv2022

Coalitional Game-Theoretical Approach to Coinvestment with Application to Edge Computing

We propose in this paper a coinvestment plan between several stakeholders of different types, namely a physical network owner, operating network nodes, e.g. a network operator or a tower company, and a set of service providers willing to use these resources to provide services as video streaming, augmented reality, autonomous driving assistance, etc. One such scenario is that of deployment of Edge Computing resources. Indeed, although the latter technology is ready, the high Capital Expenditure (CAPEX) cost of such resources is the barrier to its deployment. For this reason, a solid economical framework to guide the investment and the returns of the stakeholders is key to solve this issue. We formalize the coinvestment framework using coalitional game theory. We provide a solution to calculate how to divide the profits and costs among the stakeholders, taking into account their characteristics: traffic load, revenues, utility function. We prove that it is always possible to form the grand coalition composed of all the stakeholders, by showing that our game is convex. We derive the payoff of the stakeholders using the Shapley value concept, and elaborate on some properties of our game. We show our solution in simulation.

cs.GT↗