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Ruben Brokkelkamp

Publications and source records attributed to Ruben Brokkelkamp.

2 recordsLinked to original sources

PolyLayout: Hierarchical VLM-Guided Layout Generation Beyond Rectangular Rooms

Generating physically plausible 3D room layouts is essential for home furnishing retail, enabling customers to visualize products in their own homes and confidently make purchasing decisions. However, a gap exists between academic research and real-world application: existing solutions primarily focus on algorithmic strategies for furniture placement, largely neglecting the non-rectangular geometries and strict door/window constraints prevalent in real homes. To bridge the gap, we introduce a hybrid, hierarchical framework tailored for retail, specifically designed to support scalable spatial planning applications. Our system decouples generation into three stages: (1) functional furniture clustering and fine-grained intra-zone placement; (2) macro-routing guided by a vision-language model (VLM) to anchor both these clustered zones and any remaining standalone furniture within diverse polygonal boundaries; and (3) rule-based optimization for collision-free micro-arrangements that respect architectural constraints. We evaluate our system on production-scale catalogs and a representative set of irregular real-world topologies. Our results show that our approach attains the highest perceptual plausibility while maintaining good geometric compliance at relatively low latency, and extends to irregular boundaries that existing methods do not natively support.

cs.CV

Corruption in Auctions: Social Welfare Loss in Hybrid Multi-Unit Auctions

We initiate the study of the social welfare loss caused by corrupt auctioneers, both in single-item and multi-unit auctions. In our model, the auctioneer may collude with the winning bidders by letting them lower their bids in exchange for a (possibly bidder-dependent) fraction $γ$ of the surplus. We consider different corruption schemes. In the most basic one, all winning bidders lower their bid to the highest losing bid. We show that this setting is equivalent to a $γ$-hybrid auction in which the payments are a convex combination of first-price and the second-price payments. More generally, we consider corruption schemes that can be related to $γ$-approximate first-price auctions ($γ$-FPA), where the payments recover at least a $γ$-fraction of the first-price payments. Our goal is to obtain a precise understanding of the robust price of anarchy (POA) of such auctions. If no restrictions are imposed on the bids, we prove a bound on the robust POA of $γ$-FPA which is tight (over the entire range of $γ$) for the single-item and the multi-unit auction setting. On the other hand, if the bids satisfy the no-overbidding assumption a more fine-grained landscape of the price of anarchy emerges, depending on the auction setting and the equilibrium notion. Albeit being more challenging, we derive (almost) tight bounds for both auction settings and several equilibrium notions, basically leaving open some (small) gaps for the coarse-correlated price of anarchy only.

cs.GT