Children Are Not the Enemy: Child-Fit Security as an Alternative to Bans and Surveillance
Digital technologies are now central to children's learning, play, communication, identity formation, and social participation. Yet dominant approaches to children's online safety often rely on containment mechanisms, including bans, age gates, parental controls, monitoring, and screen-time restrictions. These approaches can be useful in specific contexts, but they often frame child protection primarily as a problem of restricting access to systems designed for adults. In this paper, we argue that this framing is inadequate for children's digital lives and insufficient as a security paradigm. We propose Child-fit security, a design paradigm in which technologies likely to be used by children treat a child as legitimate users, not attackers to be excluded, vulnerabilities to be patched, or risks to be managed. In this paradigm, children's wellbeing, development, privacy, safety, agency, and rights become core security requirements. This shifts the focus of protection from apps, accounts, and data to the child-system relationship, which means protecting both the child and their participation. We conceptualise child-fit security, contrast it with containment-oriented approaches, define its core principles, and discuss its implications for security design. We conclude by presenting a research agenda for making child-fit security operational.