arXiv subjects

Ruyi Ding

Publications and source records attributed to Ruyi Ding.

16 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Groundhog Bit-Flip Attack: Seeding Infinite Generation Loops in Mixture-of-Experts LLMs through Bit Flips

Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) architectures enable scalable and efficient large language models (LLMs) by selectively activating expert sub-networks through a routing mechanism. However, this adaptive design introduces a new attack surface: specific experts become disproportionately correlated with certain tokens (e.g., end-of-sequence), allowing adversaries to manipulate model behavior via lightweight perturbations. In this work, we present \textbf{Groundhog Bit-Flip Attack (GBFA)}, the first bit-flip-based \textit{ Denial-of-Wallet availability attack} against MoE-based LLMs. By identifying and flipping routing-layer bits associated with related expert activations, we demonstrate that GBFA substantially extends the decoding token usage across three different LLM modes: conversational, reasoning, and agentic tasks, while largely preserving semantic fidelity. Across four main real-world MoE-based LLMs, manually deactivating on average fewer than \textbf{4 experts} drives average output inflation to $\mathbf{5912\%}$, with the majority of test samples reaching max tokens. These results reveal a robustness vulnerability of MoE architectures to bit flip, and highlight the potential of GBFA as an availability attack against LLMs.

cs.CL↗

arXiv2026

Capacity Overflow: A Blind Spot for Backdoor Attacks in Vision MoE

Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) has become a prevalent paradigm for scaling Vision Transformers efficiently. To ensure computational scalability and prevent expert overload, Vision MoE architectures employ a capacity-bounded token dispatch mechanism, where each expert's processing budget depends on the inference batch size. This work identifies this batch-dependent behavior as an overlooked attack surface, and proposes a stealthy supply-chain backdoor attack that exploits this property through a three-phase framework. First, we inject a backdoor into an early MoE layer. Second, we train a neutralizer in a deeper MoE layer that suppresses the backdoor under normal capacity. Third, we configure a batch-adaptive capacity factor that preserves high capacity for small batches while reducing it for large batches, naturally disabling the neutralizer via token overflow at deployment-scale batch sizes. The attack remains in dormant mode during small-batch security audits and enters activation mode during large-batch deployment. Experiments on V-MoE and Swin-MoE across ImageNet-100 and GTSRB demonstrate activation-mode attack success rates of 76-87% with dormant-mode ASR below 9%, while evading Neural Cleanse, STRIP, Fine-Pruning, and Activation Clustering. Our findings reveal a fundamental security risk arising from batch-dependent execution in scalable Vision MoE architectures.

cs.CV↗

arXiv2026

SLAC: Access-Driven CPU-to-GPU Side-channel Attacks via System-Level Cache on Apple Silicon

Modern heterogeneous System-on-Chip designs integrate CPU cores and a GPU that share a last-level cache (LLC) or system-level cache (SLC). This sharing exposes a new cross-domain attack surface, and existing attacks on integrated platforms either exploit coarse-grained cache-occupancy contention or require the adversary to co-reside on the GPU with the victim to obtain accurate timing measurements. In this work, we target Apple Silicon heterogeneous SoCs and discover that GPU memory accesses leave set-level footprints in the shared SLC, observable to an unprivileged CPU process. This keen observation enables the first fine-grained, access-driven, Prime+Probe-style CPU-to-GPU cache side-channel attacks against GPU workloads. We first reverse-engineer the Apple M1 SLC set-indexing functions and the interactions between local private caches and the SLC. Building on these findings, we construct the CPrime+CProbe SLC side-channel technique, which monitors GPU victim activity from the CPU at cache-set granularity. We then introduce an accelerated variant, GPrime+CProbe, in which an adversary leverages the GPU for faster SLC priming, yielding a 6.4x increase in the covert-channel throughput. Lastly, we demonstrate two end-to-end privacy attacks using the new side-channels: a graph-edge reconstruction attack on Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) that achieves 90% edge accuracy across five datasets, and an LLM privacy attack that recovers input keywords with up to 94.8% accuracy and model responses with up to 88.9% accuracy across TinyLlama and GPT-2 Medium models. Our results reveal a new class of microarchitectural vulnerabilities in Apple Silicon and call for secure system cache designs for heterogeneous SoCs.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2026

RouteScan: A Non-Intrusive Approach to Auditing MoE LLMs Safety via Expert Routing Telemetry

As Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) architectures are increasingly adopted for scaling Large Language Models (LLMs), safety auditing becomes necessary to verify whether these models produce or facilitate harmful behaviors during operation. However, existing content-based auditing methods typically require access to user prompts, model internals, or outputs, potentially exposing sensitive user information and creating a tension between LLM safety and user privacy. On the other hand, we observe that, in MoE models, different inputs induce different sparse expert-routing patterns, which produce measurable footprints in low-level GPU execution telemetry. We refer to these hardware-observable signals induced by expert-routing decisions as expert routing telemetry; they are derived from GPU execution rather than from router logits or token-level routing assignments. Inspired by this observation, we propose RouteScan, a non-intrusive auditing framework for detecting harmful behaviors through such routing-induced GPU telemetry. Specifically, RouteScan utilizes the number of active GPU threads allocated to expert modules during the prefilling phase as a discriminative micro-architectural fingerprint, and builds a lightweight detection pipeline that isolates cross-domain invariant risk indicators for the precise identification of malicious prompts. Comprehensive evaluations on four open-source MoE LLMs with distinct routing designs demonstrate that RouteScan achieves strong generalization, with an AUROC exceeding 0.91 on unseen harmful domains. Moreover, privacy stress tests show that, although aggregated execution telemetry retains input-related attribute information, full prompts and exact sensitive fields cannot be reliably recovered under the evaluated attacks.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2026

Spatiotemporal-Aware Bit-Flip Injection on DNN-based Advanced Driver Assistance Systems (extended version)

Modern advanced driver assistance systems (ADAS) rely on deep neural networks (DNNs) for perception and planning. Since DNNs' parameters reside in DRAM during inference, bit flips caused by cosmic radiation or low-voltage operation may corrupt DNN computations, distort driving decisions, and lead to real-world incidents. This paper presents a SpatioTemporal-Aware Fault Injection (STAFI) framework to locate critical fault sites in DNNs for ADAS efficiently. Spatially, we propose a Progressive Metric-guided Bit Search (PMBS) that efficiently identifies critical network weight bits whose corruption causes the largest deviations in driving behavior (e.g., unintended acceleration or steering). Furthermore, we develop a Critical Fault Time Identification (CFTI) mechanism that determines when to trigger these faults, taking into account the context of real-time systems and environmental states, to maximize the safety impact. Experiments on DNNs for a production ADAS demonstrate that STAFI uncovers 29.56x more hazard-inducing critical faults than the strongest baseline.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2025

MetaSeal: Defending Against Image Attribution Forgery Through Content-Dependent Cryptographic Watermarks

The rapid growth of digital and AI-generated images has amplified the need for secure and verifiable methods of image attribution. While digital watermarking offers more robust protection than metadata-based approaches--which can be easily stripped--current watermarking techniques remain vulnerable to forgery, creating risks of misattribution that can damage the reputations of AI model developers and the rights of digital artists. The vulnerabilities of digital watermarking arise from two key issues: (1) content-agnostic watermarks, which, once learned or leaked, can be transferred across images to fake attribution, and (2) reliance on detector-based verification, which is unreliable since detectors can be tricked. We present MetaSeal, a novel framework for content-dependent watermarking with cryptographic security guarantees to safeguard image attribution. Our design provides (1) \textbf{forgery resistance}, preventing unauthorized replication and enforcing cryptographic verification; (2) \textbf{robust self-contained protection}, embedding attribution directly into images while maintaining robustness against benign transformations; and (3) \textbf{evidence of tampering}, making malicious alterations visually detectable. Experiments demonstrate that MetaSeal effectively mitigates forgery attempts and applies to both natural and AI-generated images, establishing a new standard for secure image attribution. Code is available at: https://github.com/Tongzhou0101/MetaSeal.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2025

MoEcho: Exploiting Side-Channel Attacks to Compromise User Privacy in Mixture-of-Experts LLMs

The transformer architecture has become a cornerstone of modern AI, fueling remarkable progress across applications in natural language processing, computer vision, and multimodal learning. As these models continue to scale explosively for performance, implementation efficiency remains a critical challenge. Mixture of Experts (MoE) architectures, selectively activating specialized subnetworks (experts), offer a unique balance between model accuracy and computational cost. However, the adaptive routing in MoE architectures, where input tokens are dynamically directed to specialized experts based on their semantic meaning inadvertently opens up a new attack surface for privacy breaches. These input-dependent activation patterns leave distinctive temporal and spatial traces in hardware execution, which adversaries could exploit to deduce sensitive user data. In this work, we propose MoEcho, discovering a side channel analysis based attack surface that compromises user privacy on MoE based systems. Specifically, in MoEcho, we introduce four novel architectural side channels on different computing platforms, including Cache Occupancy Channels and Pageout+Reload on CPUs, and Performance Counter and TLB Evict+Reload on GPUs, respectively. Exploiting these vulnerabilities, we propose four attacks that effectively breach user privacy in large language models (LLMs) and vision language models (VLMs) based on MoE architectures: Prompt Inference Attack, Response Reconstruction Attack, Visual Inference Attack, and Visual Reconstruction Attack. MoEcho is the first runtime architecture level security analysis of the popular MoE structure common in modern transformers, highlighting a serious security and privacy threat and calling for effective and timely safeguards when harnessing MoE based models for developing efficient large scale AI services.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2025

Graph in the Vault: Protecting Edge GNN Inference with Trusted Execution Environment

Wide deployment of machine learning models on edge devices has rendered the model intellectual property (IP) and data privacy vulnerable. We propose GNNVault, the first secure Graph Neural Network (GNN) deployment strategy based on Trusted Execution Environment (TEE). GNNVault follows the design of 'partition-before-training' and includes a private GNN rectifier to complement with a public backbone model. This way, both critical GNN model parameters and the private graph used during inference are protected within secure TEE compartments. Real-world implementations with Intel SGX demonstrate that GNNVault safeguards GNN inference against state-of-the-art link stealing attacks with negligible accuracy degradation (<2%).

cs.CR↗

arXiv2025

MACPruning: Dynamic Operation Pruning to Mitigate Side-Channel DNN Model Extraction

As deep learning gains popularity, edge IoT devices have seen proliferating deployment of pre-trained Deep Neural Network (DNN) models. These DNNs represent valuable intellectual property and face significant confidentiality threats from side-channel analysis (SCA), particularly non-invasive Differential Electromagnetic (EM) Analysis (DEMA), which retrieves individual model parameters from EM traces collected during model inference. Traditional SCA mitigation methods, such as masking and shuffling, can still be applied to DNN inference, but will incur significant performance degradation due to the large volume of operations and parameters. Based on the insight that DNN models have high redundancy and are robust to input variation, we introduce MACPruning, a novel lightweight defense against DEMA-based parameter extraction attacks, exploiting specific characteristics of DNN execution. The design principle of MACPruning is to randomly deactivate input pixels and prune the operations (typically multiply-accumulate-MAC) on those pixels. The technique removes certain leakages and overall redistributes weight-dependent EM leakages temporally, and thus effectively mitigates DEMA. To maintain DNN performance, we propose an importance-aware pixel map that preserves critical input pixels, keeping randomness in the defense while minimizing its impact on DNN performance due to operation pruning. We conduct a comprehensive security analysis of MACPruning on various datasets for DNNs on edge devices. Our evaluations demonstrate that MACPruning effectively reduces EM leakages with minimal impact on the model accuracy and negligible computational overhead.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2024

Probe-Me-Not: Protecting Pre-trained Encoders from Malicious Probing

Adapting pre-trained deep learning models to customized tasks has become a popular choice for developers to cope with limited computational resources and data volume. More specifically, probing--training a downstream head on a pre-trained encoder--has been widely adopted in transfer learning, which helps to prevent overfitting and catastrophic forgetting. However, such generalizability of pre-trained encoders raises concerns about the potential misuse of probing for harmful intentions, such as discriminatory speculation and warfare applications. In this work, we introduce EncoderLock, a novel applicability authorization method designed to protect pre-trained encoders from malicious probing, i.e., yielding poor performance on specified prohibited domains while maintaining their utility in authorized ones. Achieving this balance is challenging because of the opposite optimization objectives and the variety of downstream heads that adversaries can utilize adaptively. To address these challenges, EncoderLock employs two techniques: domain-aware weight selection and updating to restrict applications on prohibited domains/tasks, and self-challenging training scheme that iteratively strengthens resistance against any potential downstream classifiers that adversaries may apply. Moreover, recognizing the potential lack of data from prohibited domains in practical scenarios, we introduce three EncoderLock variants with different levels of data accessibility: supervised (prohibited domain data with labels), unsupervised (prohibited domain data without labels), and zero-shot (no data or labels available). We verify EncoderLock's effectiveness and practicality with a real-world pre-trained Vision Transformer (ViT) encoder from Facebook. These results underscore the valuable contributions EncoderLock brings to the development of responsible AI.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2024

Non-transferable Pruning

Pretrained Deep Neural Networks (DNNs), developed from extensive datasets to integrate multifaceted knowledge, are increasingly recognized as valuable intellectual property (IP). To safeguard these models against IP infringement, strategies for ownership verification and usage authorization have emerged. Unlike most existing IP protection strategies that concentrate on restricting direct access to the model, our study addresses an extended DNN IP issue: applicability authorization, aiming to prevent the misuse of learned knowledge, particularly in unauthorized transfer learning scenarios. We propose Non-Transferable Pruning (NTP), a novel IP protection method that leverages model pruning to control a pretrained DNN's transferability to unauthorized data domains. Selective pruning can deliberately diminish a model's suitability on unauthorized domains, even with full fine-tuning. Specifically, our framework employs the alternating direction method of multipliers (ADMM) for optimizing both the model sparsity and an innovative non-transferable learning loss, augmented with Fisher space discriminative regularization, to constrain the model's generalizability to the target dataset. We also propose a novel effective metric to measure the model non-transferability: Area Under the Sample-wise Learning Curve (SLC-AUC). This metric facilitates consideration of full fine-tuning across various sample sizes. Experimental results demonstrate that NTP significantly surpasses the state-of-the-art non-transferable learning methods, with an average SLC-AUC at $-0.54$ across diverse pairs of source and target domains, indicating that models trained with NTP do not suit for transfer learning to unauthorized target domains. The efficacy of NTP is validated in both supervised and self-supervised learning contexts, confirming its applicability in real-world scenarios.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2024

GraphCroc: Cross-Correlation Autoencoder for Graph Structural Reconstruction

Graph-structured data is integral to many applications, prompting the development of various graph representation methods. Graph autoencoders (GAEs), in particular, reconstruct graph structures from node embeddings. Current GAE models primarily utilize self-correlation to represent graph structures and focus on node-level tasks, often overlooking multi-graph scenarios. Our theoretical analysis indicates that self-correlation generally falls short in accurately representing specific graph features such as islands, symmetrical structures, and directional edges, particularly in smaller or multiple graph contexts. To address these limitations, we introduce a cross-correlation mechanism that significantly enhances the GAE representational capabilities. Additionally, we propose GraphCroc, a new GAE that supports flexible encoder architectures tailored for various downstream tasks and ensures robust structural reconstruction, through a mirrored encoding-decoding process. This model also tackles the challenge of representation bias during optimization by implementing a loss-balancing strategy. Both theoretical analysis and numerical evaluations demonstrate that our methodology significantly outperforms existing self-correlation-based GAEs in graph structure reconstruction.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2023

VertexSerum: Poisoning Graph Neural Networks for Link Inference

Graph neural networks (GNNs) have brought superb performance to various applications utilizing graph structural data, such as social analysis and fraud detection. The graph links, e.g., social relationships and transaction history, are sensitive and valuable information, which raises privacy concerns when using GNNs. To exploit these vulnerabilities, we propose VertexSerum, a novel graph poisoning attack that increases the effectiveness of graph link stealing by amplifying the link connectivity leakage. To infer node adjacency more accurately, we propose an attention mechanism that can be embedded into the link detection network. Our experiments demonstrate that VertexSerum significantly outperforms the SOTA link inference attack, improving the AUC scores by an average of $9.8\%$ across four real-world datasets and three different GNN structures. Furthermore, our experiments reveal the effectiveness of VertexSerum in both black-box and online learning settings, further validating its applicability in real-world scenarios.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2023

EMShepherd: Detecting Adversarial Samples via Side-channel Leakage

Deep Neural Networks (DNN) are vulnerable to adversarial perturbations-small changes crafted deliberately on the input to mislead the model for wrong predictions. Adversarial attacks have disastrous consequences for deep learning-empowered critical applications. Existing defense and detection techniques both require extensive knowledge of the model, testing inputs, and even execution details. They are not viable for general deep learning implementations where the model internal is unknown, a common 'black-box' scenario for model users. Inspired by the fact that electromagnetic (EM) emanations of a model inference are dependent on both operations and data and may contain footprints of different input classes, we propose a framework, EMShepherd, to capture EM traces of model execution, perform processing on traces and exploit them for adversarial detection. Only benign samples and their EM traces are used to train the adversarial detector: a set of EM classifiers and class-specific unsupervised anomaly detectors. When the victim model system is under attack by an adversarial example, the model execution will be different from executions for the known classes, and the EM trace will be different. We demonstrate that our air-gapped EMShepherd can effectively detect different adversarial attacks on a commonly used FPGA deep learning accelerator for both Fashion MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets. It achieves a 100% detection rate on most types of adversarial samples, which is comparable to the state-of-the-art 'white-box' software-based detectors.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2021

Spatio-Temporal Point Processes with Attention for Traffic Congestion Event Modeling

We present a novel framework for modeling traffic congestion events over road networks. Using multi-modal data by combining count data from traffic sensors with police reports that report traffic incidents, we aim to capture two types of triggering effect for congestion events. Current traffic congestion at one location may cause future congestion over the road network, and traffic incidents may cause spread traffic congestion. To model the non-homogeneous temporal dependence of the event on the past, we use a novel attention-based mechanism based on neural networks embedding for point processes. To incorporate the directional spatial dependence induced by the road network, we adapt the "tail-up" model from the context of spatial statistics to the traffic network setting. We demonstrate our approach's superior performance compared to the state-of-the-art methods for both synthetic and real data.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2021

Deep Fourier Kernel for Self-Attentive Point Processes

We present a novel attention-based model for discrete event data to capture complex non-linear temporal dependence structures. We borrow the idea from the attention mechanism and incorporate it into the point processes' conditional intensity function. We further introduce a novel score function using Fourier kernel embedding, whose spectrum is represented using neural networks, which drastically differs from the traditional dot-product kernel and can capture a more complex similarity structure. We establish our approach's theoretical properties and demonstrate our approach's competitive performance compared to the state-of-the-art for synthetic and real data.

stat.ML↗