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Ryota Kanai

Publications and source records attributed to Ryota Kanai.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

A Control-Theoretic Formulation of Global Workspace Theory

Global workspace theory explains conscious access as the broadcasting of selected information to the rest of the network, but it lacks a formal criterion for identifying the mechanism that enables this access. We propose that a global workspace is a mediator, namely, a subnetwork that receives activity from distributed systems, transforms it through internal modes, and returns differentiated effects to the broader network. We formalize this claim as the Global Mediation Workspace (GMW), a control-theoretic formulation in which a candidate subnetwork is treated as an open system embedded in the remainder of the network. In this framework, reachability characterizes how the remainder can drive the candidate, observability characterizes how candidate states affect the remainder, and a boundary Hankel operator identifies the internal modes linking the two directions. The resulting signature quantifies mediation capacity, input-output alignment, effective dimensionality, and routed source-target breadth, each of which characterizes different components of global workspace. In synthetic benchmarks, we tested whether the signature can distinguish a planted differentiated mediator from dense hubs, one-sided receivers or broadcasters, and a split read/write aggregate with no common internal route. A nonlinear extension characterizes mediation through trajectory-conditioned differential operators, finite-amplitude response profiles, and state-dependent coalitions. As a preliminary application, we estimated the signature from ECoG recordings in four macaques under ketamine anesthesia. We found that input-output alignment was reduced during unconsciousness whereas potential capacity was increased. The GMW thus provides a formal and testable criterion for locating candidate global workspaces in neural recordings and for asking which aspects of mediation is crucial for conscious access.

q-bio.NC

Intrinsic Computational Functionalism and Simulated Consciousness

A common objection to artificial or simulated consciousness is that a simulated brain is no more conscious than simulated water is wet. We address this from the perspective of Intrinsic Computational Functionalism (ICF): if consciousness is computationally constituted, it depends not on externally imposed descriptions but on the computational structures a system physically realizes in virtue of its own causal-dynamical organization. In previous work we developed Canonical Functionalism as a mathematically precise special case of this anti-interpretivist program, identifying functional states by their complete future input-output roles under a fixed interface. Here we argue that this input-output construction, though important, is incomplete: as a behavioral boundary case of ICF, it makes lookup tables and unfolded systems that preserve the same boundary behavior canonically equivalent. A consciousness-relevant canonical representation must instead include internal mechanisms, interventions, and joint readouts belonging to the relevant intrinsic organization. We therefore define a mechanism-enriched canonical structure and use it to formulate Intrinsic Causal-Computational Realization (ICCR), a realization relation preserving physical implementation, intrinsic state individuation, transition structure, intervention profiles, and the relevant agent-body-world boundary. The central result is conditional: if conscious properties are invariants of intrinsic causal-computational organization, then any system satisfying ICCR realizes the same consciousness-relevant properties, whether biological, artificial, or simulated. We discuss objections including biological naturalism and integrated information theory. We conclude that to deny consciousness to a simulation, one must identify a consciousness-relevant intrinsic causal-computational structure that the simulation fails to realize.

q-bio.NC

Intrinsic Computational Functionalism: From Observer-Relative Maps to Observer-Independent Structures

Anti-computational arguments show that externally imposed computational interpretations cannot ground consciousness, but they do not establish that all computational organisations are observer-relative. We develop intrinsic computational functionalism: the view that, if consciousness is computationally constituted, it depends on physically realised computational structures the system has in virtue of itself rather than on labels imposed by an external interpreter. Two criteria operationalise this view. (C1) System-intrinsic instantiation: the relevant property must be specifiable without an observer's labelling, and invariant under structure-preserving relabellings of the system's variables. (C2) Causal-dynamical organisation under intervention: the property must be grounded in a state-space structure whose variables mutually constrain one another, and whose organisation is exhibited in counterfactual response under intervention. Together these criteria specify what any candidate computational account must satisfy to remain observer-independent, without selecting which intrinsic structures bear on experience. The argumentative core is a three-tier decomposition of identification work: interpreter-relative label selection (tier i), theoretically constrained partition selection (tier ii), and dynamics-internal grain selection (tier iii). We argue that any computational property capable of avoiding the observer-relativity objection must be identified, if at all, through tier (iii) dynamics-internal grain selection, conditional on empirically disciplined tier (ii) choices. Syntax-is-not-semantics arguments, mapmaker arguments, and the observer-relativity component of biological-naturalist objections succeed against views that locate the consciousness-relevant property at tier (i); once the tiers are distinguished, intrinsic computational functionalism survives.

q-bio.NC

Canonical Functionalism: Defining Functional Structure without Observer-Relative Semantic Maps

Computational functionalism about consciousness is often criticized for relying on observer-relative interpretations of physical systems. This paper proposes a mathematical refinement of functionalism that avoids this problem. The central idea is that consciousness-relevant functional organization should be identified not with arbitrary input-output mappings, semantic labels, or externally imposed computational descriptions, but with a system's canonical functional structure: the minimal state-transition structure obtained by identifying internal states that have identical future behavior under all possible continuations. On this view, a state is functionally defined by its complete counterfactual role: how the system would evolve and respond from that state under possible future interactions. We call this position canonical functionalism. The framework does not claim to identify which systems are conscious, nor to show that functional organization is sufficient for consciousness. Rather, it identifies the canonical object over which functionalist theories of consciousness should be formulated: the task is to specify consciousness-relevant invariants, measures, or structural conditions over canonical functional structures, rather than over arbitrary semantic interpretations or superficial behavioral profiles. This reframes familiar objections about lookup tables, simulations, unfolding, and observer-relative computation: such cases do not by themselves refute functionalism, but force the functionalist to specify whether the relevant canonical structure is preserved, and if not, which additional structural features are missing.

q-bio.NC

Prior preferences in active inference agents: soft, hard, and goal shaping

Active inference proposes expected free energy as an objective for planning and decision-making to adequately balance exploitative and explorative drives in learning agents. The exploitative drive, or what an agent wants to achieve, is formalised as the Kullback-Leibler divergence between a variational probability distribution, updated at each inference step, and a preference probability distribution that indicates what states or observations are more likely for the agent, hence determining the agent's goal in a certain environment. In the literature, the questions of how the preference distribution should be specified and of how a certain specification impacts inference and learning in an active inference agent have been given hardly any attention. In this work, we consider four possible ways of defining the preference distribution, either providing the agents with hard or soft goals and either involving or not goal shaping (i.e., intermediate goals). We compare the performances of four agents, each given one of the possible preference distributions, in a grid world navigation task. Our results show that goal shaping enables the best performance overall (i.e., it promotes exploitation) while sacrificing learning about the environment's transition dynamics (i.e., it hampers exploration).

cs.AI

MCM: Multi-layer Concept Map for Efficient Concept Learning from Masked Images

Masking strategies commonly employed in natural language processing are still underexplored in vision tasks such as concept learning, where conventional methods typically rely on full images. However, using masked images diversifies perceptual inputs, potentially offering significant advantages in concept learning with large-scale Transformer models. To this end, we propose Multi-layer Concept Map (MCM), the first work to devise an efficient concept learning method based on masked images. In particular, we introduce an asymmetric concept learning architecture by establishing correlations between different encoder and decoder layers, updating concept tokens using backward gradients from reconstruction tasks. The learned concept tokens at various levels of granularity help either reconstruct the masked image patches by filling in gaps or guide the reconstruction results in a direction that reflects specific concepts. Moreover, we present both quantitative and qualitative results across a wide range of metrics, demonstrating that MCM significantly reduces computational costs by training on fewer than 75% of the total image patches while enhancing concept prediction performance. Additionally, editing specific concept tokens in the latent space enables targeted image generation from masked images, aligning both the visible contextual patches and the provided concepts. By further adjusting the testing time mask ratio, we could produce a range of reconstructions that blend the visible patches with the provided concepts, proportional to the chosen ratios.

cs.CV

Active inference for action-unaware agents

Active inference is a formal approach to study cognition based on the notion that adaptive agents can be seen as engaging in a process of approximate Bayesian inference, via the minimisation of variational and expected free energies. Minimising the former provides an account of perceptual processes and learning as evidence accumulation, while minimising the latter describes how agents select their actions over time. In this way, adaptive agents are able to maximise the likelihood of preferred observations or states, given a generative model of the environment. In the literature, however, different strategies have been proposed to describe how agents can plan their future actions. While they all share the notion that some kind of expected free energy offers an appropriate way to score policies, sequences of actions, in terms of their desirability, there are different ways to consider the contribution of past motor experience to the agent's future behaviour. In some approaches, agents are assumed to know their own actions, and use such knowledge to better plan for the future. In other approaches, agents are unaware of their actions, and must infer their motor behaviour from recent observations in order to plan for the future. This difference reflects a standard point of departure in two leading frameworks in motor control based on the presence, or not, of an efference copy signal representing knowledge about an agent's own actions. In this work we compare the performances of action-aware and action-unaware agents in two navigations tasks, showing how action-unaware agents can achieve performances comparable to action-aware ones while at a severe disadvantage.

cs.AI

Decoding Vision Transformers: the Diffusion Steering Lens

Logit Lens is a widely adopted method for mechanistic interpretability of transformer-based language models, enabling the analysis of how internal representations evolve across layers by projecting them into the output vocabulary space. Although applying Logit Lens to Vision Transformers (ViTs) is technically straightforward, its direct use faces limitations in capturing the richness of visual representations. Building on the work of Toker et al. (2024)~\cite{Toker2024-ve}, who introduced Diffusion Lens to visualize intermediate representations in the text encoders of text-to-image diffusion models, we demonstrate that while Diffusion Lens can effectively visualize residual stream representations in image encoders, it fails to capture the direct contributions of individual submodules. To overcome this limitation, we propose \textbf{Diffusion Steering Lens} (DSL), a novel, training-free approach that steers submodule outputs and patches subsequent indirect contributions. We validate our method through interventional studies, showing that DSL provides an intuitive and reliable interpretation of the internal processing in ViTs.

cs.CV

Associative Transformer

Emerging from the pairwise attention in conventional Transformers, there is a growing interest in sparse attention mechanisms that align more closely with localized, contextual learning in the biological brain. Existing studies such as the Coordination method employ iterative cross-attention mechanisms with a bottleneck to enable the sparse association of inputs. However, these methods are parameter inefficient and fail in more complex relational reasoning tasks. To this end, we propose Associative Transformer (AiT) to enhance the association among sparsely attended input tokens, improving parameter efficiency and performance in various vision tasks such as classification and relational reasoning. AiT leverages a learnable explicit memory comprising specialized priors that guide bottleneck attentions to facilitate the extraction of diverse localized tokens. Moreover, AiT employs an associative memory-based token reconstruction using a Hopfield energy function. The extensive empirical experiments demonstrate that AiT requires significantly fewer parameters and attention layers outperforming a broad range of sparse Transformer models. Additionally, AiT outperforms the SOTA sparse Transformer models including the Coordination method on the Sort-of-CLEVR dataset.

cs.LG

ProcBench: Benchmark for Multi-Step Reasoning and Following Procedure

Reasoning is central to a wide range of intellectual activities, and while the capabilities of large language models (LLMs) continue to advance, their performance in reasoning tasks remains limited. The processes and mechanisms underlying reasoning are not yet fully understood, but key elements include path exploration, selection of relevant knowledge, and multi-step inference. Problems are solved through the synthesis of these components. In this paper, we propose a benchmark that focuses on a specific aspect of reasoning ability: the direct evaluation of multi-step inference. To this end, we design a special reasoning task where multi-step inference is specifically focused by largely eliminating path exploration and implicit knowledge utilization. Our dataset comprises pairs of explicit instructions and corresponding questions, where the procedures necessary for solving the questions are entirely detailed within the instructions. This setup allows models to solve problems solely by following the provided directives. By constructing problems that require varying numbers of steps to solve and evaluating responses at each step, we enable a thorough assessment of state-of-the-art LLMs' ability to follow instructions. To ensure the robustness of our evaluation, we include multiple distinct tasks. Furthermore, by comparing accuracy across tasks, utilizing step-aware metrics, and applying separately defined measures of complexity, we conduct experiments that offer insights into the capabilities and limitations of LLMs in reasoning tasks. Our findings have significant implications for the development of LLMs and highlight areas for future research in advancing their reasoning abilities. Our dataset is available at \url{https://huggingface.co/datasets/ifujisawa/procbench} and code at \url{https://github.com/ifujisawa/proc-bench}.

cs.AI

Scaling Law in Neural Data: Non-Invasive Speech Decoding with 175 Hours of EEG Data

Brain-computer interfaces (BCIs) hold great potential for aiding individuals with speech impairments. Utilizing electroencephalography (EEG) to decode speech is particularly promising due to its non-invasive nature. However, recordings are typically short, and the high variability in EEG data has led researchers to focus on classification tasks with a few dozen classes. To assess its practical applicability for speech neuroprostheses, we investigate the relationship between the size of EEG data and decoding accuracy in the open vocabulary setting. We collected extensive EEG data from a single participant (175 hours) and conducted zero-shot speech segment classification using self-supervised representation learning. The model trained on the entire dataset achieved a top-1 accuracy of 48\% and a top-10 accuracy of 76\%, while mitigating the effects of myopotential artifacts. Conversely, when the data was limited to the typical amount used in practice ($\sim$10 hours), the top-1 accuracy dropped to 2.5\%, revealing a significant scaling effect. Additionally, as the amount of training data increased, the EEG latent representation progressively exhibited clearer temporal structures of spoken phrases. This indicates that the decoder can recognize speech segments in a data-driven manner without explicit measurements of word recognition. This research marks a significant step towards the practical realization of EEG-based speech BCIs.

q-bio.NC

Remembering Transformer for Continual Learning

Neural networks encounter the challenge of Catastrophic Forgetting (CF) in continual learning, where new task learning interferes with previously learned knowledge. Existing data fine-tuning and regularization methods necessitate task identity information during inference and cannot eliminate interference among different tasks, while soft parameter sharing approaches encounter the problem of an increasing model parameter size. To tackle these challenges, we propose the Remembering Transformer, inspired by the brain's Complementary Learning Systems (CLS). Remembering Transformer employs a mixture-of-adapters architecture and a generative model-based novelty detection mechanism in a pretrained Transformer to alleviate CF. Remembering Transformer dynamically routes task data to the most relevant adapter with enhanced parameter efficiency based on knowledge distillation. We conducted extensive experiments, including ablation studies on the novelty detection mechanism and model capacity of the mixture-of-adapters, in a broad range of class-incremental split tasks and permutation tasks. Our approach demonstrated SOTA performance surpassing the second-best method by 15.90% in the split tasks, reducing the memory footprint from 11.18M to 0.22M in the five splits CIFAR10 task.

cs.LG

Stimulation technology for brain and nerves, now and future

In individuals afflicted with conditions such as paralysis, the implementation of Brain-Computer-Interface (BCI) has begun to significantly impact their quality of life. Furthermore, even in healthy individuals, the anticipated advantages of brain-to-brain communication and brain-to-computer interaction hold considerable promise for the future. This is attributed to the liberation from bodily constraints and the transcendence of existing limitations inherent in contemporary brain-to-brain communication methods. To actualize a comprehensive BCI, the establishment of bidirectional communication between the brain and the external environment is imperative. While neural input technology spans diverse disciplines and is currently advancing rapidly, a notable absence exists in the form of review papers summarizing the technology from the standpoint of the latest or potential input methods. The challenges encountered encompass the requisite for bidirectional communication to achieve a holistic BCI, as well as obstacles related to information volume, precision, and invasiveness. The review section comprehensively addresses both invasive and non-invasive techniques, incorporating nanotech/micro-device technology and the integration of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in brain stimulation.

q-bio.NC

Consciousness in Artificial Intelligence: Insights from the Science of Consciousness

Whether current or near-term AI systems could be conscious is a topic of scientific interest and increasing public concern. This report argues for, and exemplifies, a rigorous and empirically grounded approach to AI consciousness: assessing existing AI systems in detail, in light of our best-supported neuroscientific theories of consciousness. We survey several prominent scientific theories of consciousness, including recurrent processing theory, global workspace theory, higher-order theories, predictive processing, and attention schema theory. From these theories we derive "indicator properties" of consciousness, elucidated in computational terms that allow us to assess AI systems for these properties. We use these indicator properties to assess several recent AI systems, and we discuss how future systems might implement them. Our analysis suggests that no current AI systems are conscious, but also suggests that there are no obvious technical barriers to building AI systems which satisfy these indicators.

cs.AI

Logical Tasks for Measuring Extrapolation and Rule Comprehension

Logical reasoning is essential in a variety of human activities. A representative example of a logical task is mathematics. Recent large-scale models trained on large datasets have been successful in various fields, but their reasoning ability in arithmetic tasks is limited, which we reproduce experimentally. Here, we recast this limitation as not unique to mathematics but common to tasks that require logical operations. We then propose a new set of tasks, termed logical tasks, which will be the next challenge to address. This higher point of view helps the development of inductive biases that have broad impact beyond the solution of individual tasks. We define and characterize logical tasks and discuss system requirements for their solution. Furthermore, we discuss the relevance of logical tasks to concepts such as extrapolation, explainability, and inductive bias. Finally, we provide directions for solving logical tasks.

cs.AI

On the link between conscious function and general intelligence in humans and machines

In popular media, there is often a connection drawn between the advent of awareness in artificial agents and those same agents simultaneously achieving human or superhuman level intelligence. In this work, we explore the validity and potential application of this seemingly intuitive link between consciousness and intelligence. We do so by examining the cognitive abilities associated with three contemporary theories of conscious function: Global Workspace Theory (GWT), Information Generation Theory (IGT), and Attention Schema Theory (AST). We find that all three theories specifically relate conscious function to some aspect of domain-general intelligence in humans. With this insight, we turn to the field of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and find that, while still far from demonstrating general intelligence, many state-of-the-art deep learning methods have begun to incorporate key aspects of each of the three functional theories. Having identified this trend, we use the motivating example of mental time travel in humans to propose ways in which insights from each of the three theories may be combined into a single unified and implementable model. Given that it is made possible by cognitive abilities underlying each of the three functional theories, artificial agents capable of mental time travel would not only possess greater general intelligence than current approaches, but also be more consistent with our current understanding of the functional role of consciousness in humans, thus making it a promising near-term goal for AI research.

cs.AI

AI agents for facilitating social interactions and wellbeing

Wellbeing AI has been becoming a new trend in individuals' mental health, organizational health, and flourishing our societies. Various applications of wellbeing AI have been introduced to our daily lives. While social relationships within groups are a critical factor for wellbeing, the development of wellbeing AI for social interactions remains relatively scarce. In this paper, we provide an overview of the mediative role of AI-augmented agents for social interactions. First, we discuss the two-dimensional framework for classifying wellbeing AI: individual/group and analysis/intervention. Furthermore, wellbeing AI touches on intervening social relationships between human-human interactions since positive social relationships are key to human wellbeing. This intervention may raise technical and ethical challenges. We discuss opportunities and challenges of the relational approach with wellbeing AI to promote wellbeing in our societies.

cs.CY

Experimental Evidence that Empowerment May Drive Exploration in Sparse-Reward Environments

Reinforcement Learning (RL) is known to be often unsuccessful in environments with sparse extrinsic rewards. A possible countermeasure is to endow RL agents with an intrinsic reward function, or 'intrinsic motivation', which rewards the agent based on certain features of the current sensor state. An intrinsic reward function based on the principle of empowerment assigns rewards proportional to the amount of control the agent has over its own sensors. We implemented a variation on a recently proposed intrinsically motivated agent, which we refer to as the 'curious' agent, and an empowerment-inspired agent. The former leverages sensor state encoding with a variational autoencoder, while the latter predicts the next sensor state via a variational information bottleneck. We compared the performance of both agents to that of an advantage actor-critic baseline in four sparse reward grid worlds. Both the empowerment agent and its curious competitor seem to benefit to similar extents from their intrinsic rewards. This provides some experimental support to the conjecture that empowerment can be used to drive exploration.

cs.AI