arXiv subjects

Saeed Seddighin

Publications and source records attributed to Saeed Seddighin.

35 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

arXiv2020

Asymmetric Streaming Algorithms for Edit Distance and LCS

The edit distance (ED) and longest common subsequence (LCS) are two fundamental problems which quantify how similar two strings are to one another. In this paper, we consider these problems in the asymmetric streaming model introduced by Andoni et al. (FOCS'10) and Saks and Seshadhri (SODA'13). In this model we have random access to one string and streaming access the other string. Our main contribution is a constant factor approximation algorithm for ED with the memory of $\tilde O(n^δ)$ for any constant $δ> 0$. In addition to this, we present an upper bound of $\tilde O_ε(\sqrt{n})$ on the memory needed to approximate ED or LCS within a factor $1+ε$. All our algorithms are deterministic and run in a single pass. For approximating ED within a constant factor, we discover yet another application of triangle inequality, this time in the context of streaming algorithms. Triangle inequality has been previously used to obtain subquadratic time approximation algorithms for ED. Our technique is novel and elegantly utilizes triangle inequality to save memory at the expense of an exponential increase in the runtime.

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arXiv2020

Approximating LCS in Linear Time: Beating the $\sqrt{n}$ Barrier

Longest common subsequence (LCS) is one of the most fundamental problems in combinatorial optimization. Apart from theoretical importance, LCS has enormous applications in bioinformatics, revision control systems, and data comparison programs. Although a simple dynamic program computes LCS in quadratic time, it has been recently proven that the problem admits a conditional lower bound and may not be solved in truly subquadratic time. In addition to this, LCS is notoriously hard with respect to approximation algorithms. Apart from a trivial sampling technique that obtains a $n^{x}$ approximation solution in time $O(n^{2-2x})$ nothing else is known for LCS. This is in sharp contrast to its dual problem edit distance for which several linear time solutions are obtained in the past two decades.

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arXiv2019

Computing Stackelberg Equilibria of Large General-Sum Games

We study the computational complexity of finding Stackelberg Equilibria in general-sum games, where the set of pure strategies of the leader and the followers are exponentially large in a natrual representation of the problem. In \emph{zero-sum} games, the notion of a Stackelberg equilibrium coincides with the notion of a \emph{Nash Equilibrium}~\cite{korzhyk2011stackelberg}. Finding these equilibrium concepts in zero-sum games can be efficiently done when the players have polynomially many pure strategies or when (in additional to some structural properties) a best-response oracle is available~\cite{ahmadinejad2016duels, DHL+17, KV05}. Despite such advancements in the case of zero-sum games, little is known for general-sum games. In light of the above, we examine the computational complexity of computing a Stackelberg equilibrium in large general-sum games. We show that while there are natural large general-sum games where the Stackelberg Equilibria can be computed efficiently if the Nash equilibrium in its zero-sum form could be computed efficiently, in general, structural properties that allow for efficient computation of Nash equilibrium in zero-sum games are not sufficient for computing Stackelberg equilibria in general-sum games.

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arXiv2019

Subcubic Equivalences Between Graph Centrality Measures and Complementary Problems

Despite persistent efforts, there is no known technique for obtaining unconditional super-linear lower bounds for the computational complexity of the problems in P. Vassilevska Williams and Williams introduce a fruitful approach to advance a better understanding of the computational complexity of the problems in P. In particular, they consider All Pairs Shortest Paths (APSP) and other fundamental problems such as checking whether a matrix defines a metric, verifying the correctness of a matrix product, and detecting a negative triangle in a graph. Abboud, Grandoni, and Vassilevska Williams study well-known graph centrality problems such as Radius, Median, etc., and make a connection between their computational complexity to that of two fundamental problems, namely APSP and Diameter. They show any algorithm with subcubic running time for these centrality problems, implies a subcubic algorithm for either APSP or Diameter. In this paper, we define vertex versions for these centrality problems and based on that we introduce new complementary problems. The main open problem of Abboud et al. is whether or not APSP and Diameter are equivalent under subcubic reduction. One of the results of this paper is APSP and CoDiameter, which is the complementary version of Diameter, are equivalent. Moreover, for some of the problems in this set, we show that they are equivalent to their complementary versions. Considering the slight difference between a problem and its complementary version, these equivalences give us the impression that every problem has such a property, and thus APSP and Diameter are equivalent. This paper is a step forward in showing a subcubic equivalence between APSP and Diameter, and we hope that the approach introduced in our paper can be helpful to make this breakthrough happen.

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arXiv2019

MapReduce Meets Fine-Grained Complexity: MapReduce Algorithms for APSP, Matrix Multiplication, 3-SUM, and Beyond

Distributed processing frameworks, such as MapReduce, Hadoop, and Spark are popular systems for processing large amounts of data. The design of efficient algorithms in these frameworks is a challenging problem, as the systems both require parallelism---since datasets are so large that multiple machines are necessary---and limit the degree of parallelism---since the number of machines grows sublinearly in the size of the data. Although MapReduce is over a dozen years old~\cite{dean2008mapreduce}, many fundamental problems, such as Matrix Multiplication, 3-SUM, and All Pairs Shortest Paths, lack efficient MapReduce algorithms. We study these problems in the MapReduce setting. Our main contribution is to exhibit smooth trade-offs between the memory available on each machine, and the total number of machines necessary for each problem. Overall, we take the memory available to each machine as a parameter, and aim to minimize the number of rounds and number of machines. In this paper, we build on the well-known MapReduce theoretical framework initiated by Karloff, Suri, and Vassilvitskii ~\cite{karloff2010model} and give algorithms for many of these problems. The key to efficient algorithms in this setting lies in defining a sublinear number of large (polynomially sized) subproblems, that can then be solved in parallel. We give strategies for MapReduce-friendly partitioning, that result in new algorithms for all of the above problems. Specifically, we give constant round algorithms for the Orthogonal Vector (OV) and 3-SUM problems, and $O(\log n)$-round algorithms for Matrix Multiplication, All Pairs Shortest Paths (APSP), and Fast Fourier Transform (FFT), among others. In all of these we exhibit trade-offs between the number of machines and memory per machine.

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arXiv2019

Optimal Strategies of Blotto Games: Beyond Convexity

The Colonel Blotto game, first introduced by Borel in 1921, is a well-studied game theory classic. Two colonels each have a pool of troops that they divide simultaneously among a set of battlefields. The winner of each battlefield is the colonel who puts more troops in it and the overall utility of each colonel is the sum of weights of the battlefields that s/he wins. Over the past century, the Colonel Blotto game has found applications in many different forms of competition from advertisements to politics to sports. Two main objectives have been proposed for this game in the literature: (i) maximizing the guaranteed expected payoff, and (ii) maximizing the probability of obtaining a minimum payoff $u$. The former corresponds to the conventional utility maximization and the latter concerns scenarios such as elections where the candidates' goal is to maximize the probability of getting at least half of the votes (rather than the expected number of votes). In this paper, we consider both of these objectives and show how it is possible to obtain (almost) optimal solutions that have few strategies in their support. One of the main technical challenges in obtaining bounded support strategies for the Colonel Blotto game is that the solution space becomes non-convex. This prevents us from using convex programming techniques in finding optimal strategies which are essentially the main tools that are used in the literature. However, we show through a set of structural results that the solution space can, interestingly, be partitioned into polynomially many disjoint convex polytopes that can be considered independently. Coupled with a number of other combinatorial observations, this leads to polynomial time approximation schemes for both of the aforementioned objectives.

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arXiv2018

Fast Algorithms for Knapsack via Convolution and Prediction

The \Problem{knapsack} problem is a fundamental problem in combinatorial optimization. It has been studied extensively from theoretical as well as practical perspectives as it is one of the most well-known NP-hard problems. The goal is to pack a knapsack of size $t$ with the maximum value from a collection of $n$ items with given sizes and values. Recent evidence suggests that a classic $O(nt)$ dynamic-programming solution for the \Problem{knapsack} problem might be the fastest in the worst case. In fact, solving the \Problem{knapsack} problem was shown to be computationally equivalent to the \Problem{$(\min, +)$ convolution} problem, which is thought to be facing a quadratic-time barrier. This hardness is in contrast to the more famous \Problem{$(+, \cdot)$ convolution} (generally known as \Problem{polynomial multiplication}), that has an $O(n\log n)$-time solution via Fast Fourier Transform. Our main results are algorithms with near-linear running times (in terms of the size of the knapsack and the number of items) for the \Problem{knapsack} problem, if either the values or sizes of items are small integers. More specifically, if item sizes are integers bounded by $\smax$, the running time of our algorithm is $\tilde O((n+t)\smax)$. If the item values are integers bounded by $\vmax$, our algorithm runs in time $\tilde O(n+t\vmax)$. Best previously known running times were $O(nt)$, $O(n^2\smax)$ and $O(n\smax\vmax)$ (Pisinger, J. of Alg., 1999).

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arXiv2018

Approximating Edit Distance in Truly Subquadratic Time: Quantum and MapReduce

The edit distance between two strings is defined as the smallest number of insertions, deletions, and substitutions that need to be made to transform one of the strings to another one. Approximating edit distance in subquadratic time is "one of the biggest unsolved problems in the field of combinatorial pattern matching". Our main result is a quantum constant approximation algorithm for computing the edit distance in truly subquadratic time. More precisely, we give an $O(n^{1.858})$ quantum algorithm that approximates the edit distance within a factor of $7$. We further extend this result to an $O(n^{1.781})$ quantum algorithm that approximates the edit distance within a larger constant factor. Our solutions are based on a framework for approximating edit distance in parallel settings. This framework requires as black box an algorithm that computes the distances of several smaller strings all at once. For a quantum algorithm, we reduce the black box to \textit{metric estimation} and provide efficient algorithms for approximating it. We further show that this framework enables us to approximate edit distance in distributed settings. To this end, we provide a MapReduce algorithm to approximate edit distance within a factor of $3$, with sublinearly many machines and sublinear memory. Also, our algorithm runs in a logarithmic number of rounds.

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arXiv2017

Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods: Improvement and Generalization

We study the problem of fair allocation for indivisible goods. We use the the maxmin share paradigm introduced by Budish as a measure for fairness. Procaccia and Wang (EC'14) were first to investigate this fundamental problem in the additive setting. In contrast to what real-world experiments suggest, they show that a maxmin guarantee (1-MMS allocation) is not always possible even when the number of agents is limited to 3. While the existence of an approximation solution (e.g. a $1/2$-MMS allocation) is quite straightforward, improving the guarantee becomes subtler for larger constants. Procaccia provide a proof for existence of a $2/3$-MMS allocation and leave the question open for better guarantees. Our main contribution is an answer to the above question. We improve the result of [Procaccia and Wang] to a $3/4$ factor in the additive setting. The main idea for our $3/4$-MMS allocation method is clustering the agents. To this end, we introduce three notions and techniques, namely reducibility, matching allocation, and cycle-envy-freeness, and prove the approximation guarantee of our algorithm via non-trivial applications of these techniques. Our analysis involves coloring and double counting arguments that might be of independent interest. One major shortcoming of the current studies on fair allocation is the additivity assumption on the valuations. We alleviate this by extending our results to the case of submodular, fractionally subadditive, and subadditive settings. More precisely, we give constant approximation guarantees for submodular and XOS agents, and a logarithmic approximation for the case of subadditive agents. Furthermore, we complement our results by providing close upper bounds for each class of valuation functions. Finally, we present algorithms to find such allocations for additive, submodular, and XOS settings in polynomial time.

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arXiv2017

Stochastic k-Server: How Should Uber Work?

In this paper, we study a stochastic variant of the celebrated k-server problem. In the k-server problem, we are required to minimize the total movement of k servers that are serving an online sequence of t requests in a metric. In the stochastic setting we are given t independent distributions in advance, and at every time step i a request is drawn from Pi. Designing the optimal online algorithm in such setting is NP-hard, therefore the emphasis of our work is on designing an approximately optimal online algorithm. We first show a structural characterization for a certain class of non-adaptive online algorithms. We prove that in general metrics, the best of such algorithms has a cost of no worse than three times that of the optimal online algorithm. Next, we present an integer program that finds the optimal algorithm of this class for any arbitrary metric. Finally, by rounding the solution of the linear relaxation of this program, we present an online algorithm for the stochastic k-server problem with the approximation factor of 3 in the line and circle metrics and O(log n) in a general metric of size n. Moreover, we define the Uber problem, in which each demand consists of two endpoints, a source and a destination. We show that given an a-approximation algorithm for the k-server problem, we can obtain an (a+2)-approximation algorithm for the Uber problem. Motivated by the fact that demands are usually highly correlated with the time we study the stochastic Uber problem. Furthermore, we extend our results to the correlated setting where the probability of a request arriving at a certain point depends not only on the time step but also on the previously arrived requests.

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arXiv2017

Online Weighted Degree-Bounded Steiner Networks via Novel Online Mixed Packing/Covering

We design the first online algorithm with poly-logarithmic competitive ratio for the edge-weighted degree-bounded Steiner forest(EW-DB-SF) problem and its generalized variant. We obtain our result by demonstrating a new generic approach for solving mixed packing/covering integer programs in the online paradigm. In EW-DB-SF we are given an edge-weighted graph with a degree bound for every vertex. Given a root vertex in advance we receive a sequence of terminal vertices in an online manner. Upon the arrival of a terminal we need to augment our solution subgraph to connect the new terminal to the root. The goal is to minimize the total weight of the solution while respecting the degree bounds on the vertices. In the offline setting edge-weighted degree-bounded Steiner tree (EW-DB-ST) and its many variations have been extensively studied since early eighties. Unfortunately the recent advancements in the online network design problems are inherently difficult to adapt for degree-bounded problems. In contrast in this paper we obtain our result by using structural properties of the optimal solution, and reducing the EW-DB-SF problem to an exponential-size mixed packing/covering integer program in which every variable appears only once in covering constraints. We then design a generic integral algorithm for solving this restricted family of IPs. We demonstrate a new technique for solving mixed packing/covering integer programs. Define the covering frequency k of a program as the maximum number of covering constraints in which a variable can participate. Let m denote the number of packing constraints. We design an online deterministic integral algorithm with competitive ratio of O(k log m) for the mixed packing/covering integer programs. We believe this technique can be used as an interesting alternative for the standard primal-dual techniques in solving online problems.

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arXiv2017

Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods to Asymmetric Agents

We study fair allocation of indivisible goods to agents with unequal entitlements. Fair allocation has been the subject of many studies in both divisible and indivisible settings. Our emphasis is on the case where the goods are indivisible and agents have unequal entitlements. This problem is a generalization of the work by Procaccia and Wang wherein the agents are assumed to be symmetric with respect to their entitlements. Although Procaccia and Wang show an almost fair (constant approximation) allocation exists in their setting, our main result is in sharp contrast to their observation. We show that, in some cases with $n$ agents, no allocation can guarantee better than $1/n$ approximation of a fair allocation when the entitlements are not necessarily equal. Furthermore, we devise a simple algorithm that ensures a $1/n$ approximation guarantee. Our second result is for a restricted version of the problem where the valuation of every agent for each good is bounded by the total value he wishes to receive in a fair allocation. Although this assumption might seem w.l.o.g, we show it enables us to find a $1/2$ approximation fair allocation via a greedy algorithm. Finally, we run some experiments on real-world data and show that, in practice, a fair allocation is likely to exist. We also support our experiments by showing positive results for two stochastic variants of the problem, namely stochastic agents and stochastic items.

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arXiv2017

From Duels to Battefields: Computing Equilibria of Blotto and Other Games

We study the problem of computing Nash equilibria of zero-sum games. Many natural zero-sum games have exponentially many strategies, but highly structured payoffs. For example, in the well-studied Colonel Blotto game (introduced by Borel in 1921), players must divide a pool of troops among a set of battlefields with the goal of winning (i.e., having more troops in) a majority. The Colonel Blotto game is commonly used for analyzing a wide range of applications from the U.S presidential election, to innovative technology competitions, to advertisement, to sports. However, because of the size of the strategy space, standard methods for computing equilibria of zero-sum games fail to be computationally feasible. Indeed, despite its importance, only a few solutions for special variants of the problem are known. In this paper we show how to compute equilibria of Colonel Blotto games. Moreover, our approach takes the form of a general reduction: to find a Nash equilibrium of a zero-sum game, it suffices to design a separation oracle for the strategy polytope of any bilinear game that is payoff-equivalent. We then apply this technique to obtain the first polytime algorithms for a variety of games. In addition to Colonel Blotto, we also show how to compute equilibria in an infinite-strategy variant called the General Lotto game; this involves showing how to prune the strategy space to a finite subset before applying our reduction. We also consider the class of dueling games, first introduced by Immorlica et al. (2011). We show that our approach provably extends the class of dueling games for which equilibria can be computed: we introduce a new dueling game, the matching duel, on which prior methods fail to be computationally feasible but upon which our reduction can be applied.

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arXiv2016

Faster and Simpler Algorithm for Optimal Strategies of Blotto Game

In the Colonel Blotto game, which was initially introduced by Borel in 1921, two colonels simultaneously distribute their troops across different battlefields. The winner of each battlefield is determined independently by a winner-take-all rule. The ultimate payoff of each colonel is the number of battlefields he wins. This game is commonly used for analyzing a wide range of applications such as the U.S presidential election, innovative technology competitions, advertisements, etc. There have been persistent efforts for finding the optimal strategies for the Colonel Blotto game. After almost a century Ahmadinejad, Dehghani, Hajiaghayi, Lucier, Mahini, and Seddighin provided a poly-time algorithm for finding the optimal strategies. They first model the problem by a Linear Program (LP) and use Ellipsoid method to solve it. However, despite the theoretical importance of their algorithm, it is highly impractical. In general, even Simplex method (despite its exponential running-time) performs better than Ellipsoid method in practice. In this paper, we provide the first polynomial-size LP formulation of the optimal strategies for the Colonel Blotto game. We use linear extension techniques. Roughly speaking, we project the strategy space polytope to a higher dimensional space, which results in a lower number of facets for the polytope. We use this polynomial-size LP to provide a novel, simpler and significantly faster algorithm for finding the optimal strategies for the Colonel Blotto game. We further show this representation is asymptotically tight in terms of the number of constraints. We also extend our approach to multi-dimensional Colonel Blotto games, and implement our algorithm to observe interesting properties of Colonel Blotto; for example, we observe the behavior of players in the discrete model is very similar to the previously studied continuous model.

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arXiv2016

Price of Competition and Dueling Games

We study competition in a general framework introduced by Immorlica et al. and answer their main open question. Immorlica et al. considered classic optimization problems in terms of competition and introduced a general class of games called dueling games. They model this competition as a zero-sum game, where two players are competing for a user's satisfaction. In their main and most natural game, the ranking duel, a user requests a webpage by submitting a query and players output an ordering over all possible webpages based on the submitted query. The user tends to choose the ordering which displays her requested webpage in a higher rank. The goal of both players is to maximize the probability that her ordering beats that of her opponent and gets the user's attention. Immorlica et al. show this game directs both players to provide suboptimal search results. However, they leave the following as their main open question: "does competition between algorithms improve or degrade expected performance?" In this paper, we resolve this question for the ranking duel and a more general class of dueling games. More precisely, we study the quality of orderings in a competition between two players. This game is a zero-sum game, and thus any Nash equilibrium of the game can be described by minimax strategies. Let the value of the user for an ordering be a function of the position of her requested item in the corresponding ordering, and the social welfare for an ordering be the expected value of the corresponding ordering for the user. We propose the price of competition which is the ratio of the social welfare for the worst minimax strategy to the social welfare obtained by a social planner. We use this criterion for analyzing the quality of orderings in the ranking duel. We prove the quality of minimax results is surprisingly close to that of the optimum solution.

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arXiv2016

A Tight Algorithm for Strongly Connected Steiner Subgraph On Two Terminals With Demands

Given an edge-weighted directed graph $G=(V,E)$ on $n$ vertices and a set $T=\{t_1, t_2, \ldots, t_p\}$ of $p$ terminals, the objective of the \scss ($p$-SCSS) problem is to find an edge set $H\subseteq E$ of minimum weight such that $G[H]$ contains an $t_{i}\rightarrow t_j$ path for each $1\leq i\neq j\leq p$. In this paper, we investigate the computational complexity of a variant of $2$-SCSS where we have demands for the number of paths between each terminal pair. Formally, the \sharinggeneral problem is defined as follows: given an edge-weighted directed graph $G=(V,E)$ with weight function $ω: E\rightarrow \mathbb{R}^{\geq 0}$, two terminal vertices $s, t$, and integers $k_1, k_2$ ; the objective is to find a set of $k_1$ paths $F_1, F_2, \ldots, F_{k_1}$ from $s\leadsto t$ and $k_2$ paths $B_1, B_2, \ldots, B_{k_2}$ from $t\leadsto s$ such that $\sum_{e\in E} ω(e)\cdot ϕ(e)$ is minimized, where $ϕ(e)= \max \Big\{|\{i\in [k_1] : e\in F_i\}|\ ,\ |\{j\in [k_2] : e\in B_j\}|\Big\}$. For each $k\geq 1$, we show the following: The \sharing problem can be solved in $n^{O(k)}$ time. A matching lower bound for our algorithm: the \sharing problem does not have an $f(k)\cdot n^{o(k)}$ algorithm for any computable function $f$, unless the Exponential Time Hypothesis (ETH) fails. Our algorithm for \sharing relies on a structural result regarding an optimal solution followed by using the idea of a "token game" similar to that of Feldman and Ruhl. We show with an example that the structural result does not hold for the \sharinggeneral problem if $\min\{k_1, k_2\}\geq 2$. Therefore \sharing is the most general problem one can attempt to solve with our techniques.

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arXiv2015

Revenue Maximization for Selling Multiple Correlated Items

We study the problem of selling $n$ items to a single buyer with an additive valuation function. We consider the valuation of the items to be correlated, i.e., desirabilities of the buyer for the items are not drawn independently. Ideally, the goal is to design a mechanism to maximize the revenue. However, it has been shown that a revenue optimal mechanism might be very complicated and as a result inapplicable to real-world auctions. Therefore, our focus is on designing a simple mechanism that achieves a constant fraction of the optimal revenue. Babaioff et al. propose a simple mechanism that achieves a constant fraction of the optimal revenue for independent setting with a single additive buyer. However, they leave the following problem as an open question: "Is there a simple, approximately optimal mechanism for a single additive buyer whose value for $n$ items is sampled from a common base-value distribution?" Babaioff et al. show a constant approximation factor of the optimal revenue can be achieved by either selling the items separately or as a whole bundle in the independent setting. We show a similar result for the correlated setting when the desirabilities of the buyer are drawn from a common base-value distribution. It is worth mentioning that the core decomposition lemma which is mainly the heart of the proofs for efficiency of the mechanisms does not hold for correlated settings. Therefore we propose a modified version of this lemma which is applicable to the correlated settings as well. Although we apply this technique to show the proposed mechanism can guarantee a constant fraction of the optimal revenue in a very weak correlation, this method alone can not directly show the efficiency of the mechanism in stronger correlations.

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