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Sagar Chakraborty

Publications and source records attributed to Sagar Chakraborty.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

Stochastic ultimatum game: Spite-driven resource feedback fosters fairness

Resource scarcity can fundamentally encourage antisocial behaviour, whereas resource abundance can promote fair behaviour. Experimental evidence indeed suggests that scarcity induces spiteful behaviour, while repeated interactions enhance fairness. However, existing studies of game--environment feedback systems are largely confined to the evolution of cooperation and they overlook the interplay between resources, spite, and fairness. To address this lacuna, we develop a stochastic ultimatum game framework in which an offerer and an accepter repeatedly interact to negotiate exploitation of a self-renewable resource under the ownership of the offerer. Successful agreements deplete the resource, whereas unsuccessful agreements inhibit exploitation and facilitate replenishment. The mutation--selection driven two-species stochastic evolutionary dynamics reveal that the emergence of spite and fairness strongly depends on the resource growth rate. Fairness predominantly prevails for resources with high growth rates. Intriguingly, low resource growth rates give rise to a resource feedback loop driven by spite: spiteful behaviour dominates in the depleted state, facilitating transition of the resource state to replete state which, in turn, promotes fairness through repeated interactions.

nlin.AO

Upstream reciprocity versus downstream reciprocity: Catalyzing cooperation

Why would anyone help a stranger, knowing they may never meet again? Indirect reciprocity offers one of the most compelling evolutionary answers, yet its two canonical forms -- upstream reciprocity (experience-based), and downstream reciprocity (reputation-based) -- have been studied mostly in isolation. Their joint dynamics in finite and structured populations remain largely unexplored. Here, we fill this gap using agent-based simulations in which an agent is behaviourally either defector, upstream reciprocator, or downstream reciprocator, and the agents' population state is temporally updated using different evolutionary update mechanisms. We show that update mechanism plays a surprisingly decisive role in shaping the fate of downstream and especially upstream reciprocators. Whether agents' experiences and reputations are updated globally or locally can shift outcomes from rich behavioural coexistence to the dominance of downstream reciprocators alone. Intriguingly, we uncover a robust structural feature that persists across all the explored update rules and population sizes: an optimal network degree at which upstream reciprocity is maximized, reflecting a fundamental tug-of-war between cooperative clustering and exposure to defectors. Our results highlight that while downstream reciprocity can either foster or inhibit upstream reciprocity depending on the update mechanism, its net effect on cooperation remains largely positive.

q-bio.PE

Overcoming unfairness via repeated interactions in mini-ultimatum game

Repeated interactions are ubiquitous and known to promote social behaviour. While research often focuses on cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma, experimental evidence suggests repeated interactions also foster fairness. This study addresses a gap in the literature by theoretically modelling the evolution of fairness within a repeated mini-ultimatum game. Specifically, we construct a repeated-game framework where offerers and accepters interact using reactive strategies. We then investigate whether fair reactive strategy pairs are resilient against unfair mutants in a two-species population. By analyzing short-term evolutionary stability via the concept of two-species evolutionary stable strategy, we identify a critical effective game length: below this value, fairness is promoted by offerers and accepters who comply with their partner's past actions. Above this critical value, fairness is maintained by `complier' offerers and fair accepters. We also show that specific reactive strategies effectively facilitate the emergence and sustenance of fairness in long-term mutation-selection dynamics. To this end, we develop a two-population stochastic dynamics model -- a generalization of classical adaptive dynamics -- that accounts for finite population sizes and non-local mutants in the reactive strategy space.

nlin.AO

Braess's paradox in tandem-running ants: When shortest path is not the quickest

Braess's paradox -- where adding network capacity increases travel time -- is typically attributed to selfish agents. Although eusocial colonies maximize collective fitness, we find experimentally that \emph{Diacamma indicum} ants exhibit this paradox: Leaders favour the shortest path even when it slows the colony. We present a quantitative model of the exploration-exploitation trade-off, demonstrating that evolutionary forces selecting for shortest-path identification can force suboptimal global states. This proves the paradox can emerge in highly cooperative systems without individual selfishness.

physics.bio-ph

Hostility prevents the tragedy of the commons in metapopulation with asymmetric migration: A lesson from queenless ants

A colony of the queenless ant species, \emph{Pristomyrmex punctatus}, can broadly be seen as consisting of small-body sized worker ants and relatively larger body-sized cheater ants. Hence, in the presence of inter-colony migration, a set of constituent colonies act as a metapopulation exclusively composed of cooperators and defectors. Such a set-up facilitates an evolutionary game-theoretic replication-selection model of population dynamics of the ants in a metapopulation. Using the model, we analytically probe the effects of territoriality induced hostility. Such hostility in the ant-metapopulation proves to be crucial in preventing the tragedy of the commons, specifically, the workforce, a social good formed by cooperation. This mechanism applies to any metapopulation -- not necessarily the ants -- composed of cooperators and defectors where inter-population migration occurs asymmetrically, i.e., cooperators and defectors migrate at different rates. Furthermore, our model validates that there is evolutionary benefit behind the queenless ants' behavior of showing more hostility towards the immigrants from nearby colonies than those from the far-off ones. In order to calibrate our model's parameters, we have extensively used the data available on the queenless ant species, \emph{Pristomyrmex punctatus}

q-bio.PE

Collaboration drives phase transitions towards cooperation in prisoner's dilemma

We present a collaboration ring model -- a network of players playing the prisoner's dilemma game and collaborating among the nearest neighbours by forming coalitions. The microscopic stochastic updating of the players' strategies are driven by their innate nature of seeking selfish gains and shared intentionality. Cooperation emerges in such a structured population through non-equilibrium phase transitions driven by propensity of the players to collaborate and by the benefit that a cooperator generates. The robust results are qualitatively independent of number of neighbours and collaborators.

physics.soc-ph

Adaptive dynamics of eco-evolutionary repeated games: Effect of reward and punishment

Long-term evolutionary processes can strongly influence common-pool resource conservation by generating new traits or behaviours that modify the feedback between population strategies and the resource state. Here we develop an eco-evolutionary framework in which individuals repeatedly interact with the same opponent and follow direct reciprocity through reactive strategies. The strategic dynamics is coupled to a renewable common resource and analyzed using adaptive dynamics. After our exhaustive non-linear dynamical analysis of $2\times2$ strategic games, we focus on comparative and combined usefulness of institutional incentives in the form of rewards and punishments in preventing the Tragedy of the Commons even when defection dominates in the replete resource state. We also report possibility of robust stable oscillations -- emerging via Hopf bifurcation -- in resource state and population strategies.

q-bio.PE

Oscillatory evolutionarily stable state and limit cycle in replicator dynamics

The idea of evolutionarily stable state (ESS) of a population is a cornerstone of evolutionary game theory; moreover, it coincides with the game-theoretic concept of Nash equilibrium. Such a state corresponds to a strategy adopted by the population such that a rare mutant strategy cannot invade the population. In parallel, the dynamical formulation of evolutionary game theory -- particularly through replicator dynamics embodying the tenet of survival of the fittest -- provides a framework for modelling frequency-dependent selection over time. While it is well known that an ESS corresponds to stable fixed point in replicator dynamics, the evolutionary game-theoretic characterization of limit cycles is unknown. Here we fill this lacuna by defining oscillatory ESS (OESS) which we prove to be a stable limit cycle. We also show when an OESS is unique and if there are multiple OESSes, then what their locations are in the phase space.

nlin.AO

Noisy information channel mediated prevention of the tragedy of the commons

Synergy between evolutionary dynamics of cooperation and fluctuating state of shared resource being consumed by the cooperators is essential for averting the tragedy of the commons. Not only in humans, but also in the cognitively-limited organisms, this interplay between the resource and the cooperation is ubiquitously witnessed. The strategically interacting players engaged in such game-environment feedback scenarios naturally pick strategies based on their perception of the environmental state. Such perception invariably happens through some sensory information channels that the players are endowed with. The unfortunate reality is that any sensory channel must be noisy due to various factors; consequently, the perception of the environmental state becomes faulty rendering the players incapable of adopting the strategy that they otherwise would. Intriguingly, situation is not as bad as it sounds. Here we introduce the hitherto neglected information channel between players and the environment into the paradigm of stochastic evolutionary games with a view to bringing forward the counterintuitive possibility of emergence and sustenance of cooperation on account of the noise in the channel. Our primary study is in the simplest non-trivial setting of two-state stochastically fluctuating resource harnessed by a large unstructured population of cooperators and defectors adopting either memory-1 strategies or reactive strategies while engaged in repeated two-player interactions. The effect of noisy information channel in enhancing the cooperation in reactive-strategied population is unprecedented. We find that the propensity of cooperation in the population is inversely related to the mutual information (normalized by the channel capacity) of the corresponding information channel.

q-bio.PE

Bayesian tit-for-tat fosters cooperation in evolutionary stochastic games

Learning from experience is a key feature of decision-making in cognitively complex organisms. Strategic interactions involving Bayesian inferential strategies can enable us to better understand how evolving individual choices to be altruistic or selfish can affect collective outcomes in social dilemmas. Bayesian strategies are distinguished, from their reactive opponents, in their ability to modulate their actions in the light of new evidence. We investigate whether such strategies can be resilient against reactive strategies when actions not only determine the immediate payoff but can affect future payoffs by changing the state of the environment. We use stochastic games to mimic the change in environment in a manner that is conditioned on the players' actions. By considering three distinct rules governing transitions between a resource-rich and a resource-poor states, we ascertain the conditions under which Bayesian tit-for-tat strategy can resist being invaded by reactive strategies. We find that the Bayesian strategy is resilient against a large class of reactive strategies and is more effective in fostering cooperation leading to sustenance of the resource-rich state. However, the extent of success of the Bayesian strategies depends on the other strategies in the pool and the rule governing transition between the two different resource states.

physics.bio-ph

Evolutionarily stable strategy in asymmetric games: Dynamical and information-theoretical perspectives

Evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is the defining concept of evolutionary game theory. It has a fairly unanimously accepted definition for the case of symmetric games which are played in a homogeneous population where all individuals are in same role. However, in asymmetric games, which are played in a population with multiple subpopulations (each of which has individuals in one particular role), situation is not as clear. Various generalizations of ESS defined for such cases differ in how they correspond to fixed points of replicator equation which models evolutionary dynamics of frequencies of strategies in the population. Moreover, some of the definitions may even be equivalent, and hence, redundant in the scheme of things. Along with reporting some new results, this paper is partly indented as a contextual mini-review of some of the most important definitions of ESS in asymmetric games. We present the definitions coherently and scrutinize them closely while establishing equivalences -- some of them hitherto unreported -- between them wherever possible. Since it is desirable that a definition of ESS should correspond to asymptotically stable fixed points of replicator dynamics, we bring forward the connections between various definitions and their dynamical stabilities. Furthermore, we find the use of principle of relative entropy to gain information-theoretic insights into the concept of ESS in asymmetric games, thereby establishing a three-fold connection between game theory, dynamical system theory, and information theory in this context. We discuss our conclusions also in the backdrop of asymmetric hypermatrix games where more than two individuals interact simultaneously in the course of getting payoffs.

q-bio.PE

Prejudice driven spite: A discontinuous phase transition in ultimatum game

In a mix of prejudiced and unprejudiced individuals engaged in strategic interactions, the individual intensity of prejudice is expected to have effect on overall level of societal prejudice. High level of prejudice should lead to discrimination that may manifest as unfairness and, perhaps, even spite. In this paper, we investigate this idea in the classical paradigm of the ultimatum game which we theoretically modify to introduce prejudice at the level of players, terming its intensity as prejudicity. The stochastic evolutionary game dynamics, in the regime of replication-selection, reveals the emergence of spiteful behaviour as a dominant behaviour via a first order phase transition -- a discontinuous jump in the frequency of spiteful individuals at a threshold value of prejudicity. The phase transition is quite robust and becomes progressively conspicuous in the limit of large population size where deterministic evolutionary game dynamics, viz., replicator dynamics, approximates the system closely. The emergence of spite driven by prejudice is also found to persist when one considers long-term evolutionary dynamics in the mutation-selection dominated regime.

physics.soc-ph

A game played by tandem-running ants: Hint of procedural rationality

Navigation through narrow passages during colony relocation by the tandem-running ants, $\textit{Diacamma}$ $\textit{indicum}$, is a tour de force of biological traffic coordination. Even on one-lane paths, the ants tactfully manage a bidirectional flow: Informed individuals (termed leaders) guide nest-mates (termed followers) from a suboptimal nest to a new optimal nest, and then return to recruit additional followers. We propose that encounters between the ants moving in opposite directions can be modelled within the framework of game theory leading to an understanding of the mechanism behind observed behaviours. Our experiments reveal that, upon encountering a tandem pair (a leader and its follower) on a narrow path, the returning leader reverses her direction and proceeds toward the new nest again as if she becomes the leader guiding a follower. This observed behaviour is consistent with game-theoretic predictions, provided the assumption of perfect rationality is relaxed in favour of bounded rationality -- specifically, procedural rationality. In other words, the experimental outcomes are consistent with sampling equilibrium but not with Nash equilibrium. Our work, which strives to induct the essence of behavioural game theory into the world of ants, is first ever report of realizing sampling equilibrium in scenarios not involving human players.

nlin.AO

Coordinating cooperation in stag-hunt game: Emergence of evolutionarily stable procedural rationality

Humans are bounded rational at best and this, we argue, has worked in their favour in the hunter-gatherer society where emergence of a coordinated action, leading to cooperation, is otherwise the standard stag-hunt dilemma (when individuals are rational). In line with the fact the humans strive for developing self-reputation by having less propensity to cheat than to be cheated, we observe that the payoff structure of the stag-hunt game appropriately modifies to that of coordination-II game. Subsequently, within the paradigm of evolutionary game theory, we establish that a population -- consisting of procedural rational players (a type of bounded rationality) -- is unequivocally evolutionarily stable against emergence of more rational strategies in coordination-II game. The cooperation is, thus, shown to have been established by evolutionary forces picking less rational individuals.

physics.soc-ph

Bayesian eco-evolutionary game dynamics

The symbiotic relationship between the frameworks of classical game theory and evolutionary game theory is well-established. However, evolutionary game theorists have mostly tapped into the classical game of complete information where players are completely informed of all other players' payoffs. Of late, there is a surge of interest in eco-evolutionary interactions where the environment's state is changed by the players' actions which, in turn, are influenced by the changing environment. However, in real life, the information about the true environmental state must pass through some noisy channel (like usually imperfect sensory apparatus of the players) before it is perceived by the players: The players naturally are prone to sometimes perceive the true state erroneously. Given the uncertain perceived environment, the players may adopt bet-hedging kind of strategies in which they play different actions in different perceptions. In a population of such ill-informed players, a player would be confused about the information state of her opponent, and an incomplete information situation akin to a Bayesian game surfaces. In short, we contemplate possibility of natural emergence of symbiotic relationship between the frameworks of Bayesian games and eco-evolutionary games when the players are equipped with inefficient sensory apparatus. Herein, we illustrate this connection using a setup of infinitely large, well-mixed population of players equipped with two actions for exploiting a resource (the environment) at two different rates so that the resource state evolves accordingly. The state of the resource impacts every player's decision of playing particular action. We investigate continuous state environment in the presence of a Gaussian noisy channel. Employing the formalism of replicator dynamics, we find that noisy information can be effective in preventing resource from going extinct.

q-bio.PE

Observation of tunable discrete time crystalline phases

Discrete time crystals (DTCs) are emergent non-equilibrium phases of periodically driven many-body systems, with potential applications ranging from quantum computing to sensing and metrology. There has been significant recent interest in understanding mechanisms leading to DTC formation and a search for novel DTC phases beyond subharmonic entrainment. Here, we report observation of multiple DTC phases in a nanoelectromechanical system (NEMS) based on coupled graphene and silicon nitride membranes. We confirm the time-crystalline nature of these symmetry broken phases by establishing their many-body characters, long-range time and spatial order, and rigidity against parameter fluctuation or noise. Furthermore, we employ controlled mechanical strain to drive the transitions between phases with different symmetries, thereby mapping the emergent time-crystalline phase diagram. Overall, our work takes a step towards establishing time crystals as a system with complexity rivaling that of solid state crystals.

cond-mat.mes-hall

On the cardinality of unique range sets with weight one

Two meromorphic functions $f$ and $g$ are said to share the set $S\subset \mathbb{C}\cup\{\infty\}$ with weight $l\in\mathbb{N}\cup\{0\}\cup\{\infty\}$, if $E_{f}(S,l)=E_{g}(S,l)$ where $$E_{f}(S,l)=\bigcup\limits_{a \in S}\{(z,t) \in \mathbb{C}\times\mathbb{N}~ |~ f(z)=a ~\text{with~ multiplicity}~ p\},$$ where $t=p$ if $p\leq l$ and $t=p+1$ if $p>l$. In this paper, we improve and supplement the result of L. W. Liao and C. C. Yang (On the cardinality of the unique range sets for meromorphic and entire functions, Indian J. Pure appl. Math., 31 (2000), no. 4, 431-440) by showing that there exist a finite set $S$ with cardinality $\geq 13$ such that $E_{f}(S,1)=E_{g}(S,1)$ implies $f\equiv g$.

math.CV

Oscillatory equilibrium in asymmetric evolutionary games: Generalizing evolutionarily stable strategy

The concept of evolutionarily stability and its relation with the fixed points of the replicator equation are important aspects of evolutionary game dynamics. In the light of the fact that oscillating state of a population and individuals (or players) of different roles are quite natural occurrences, we ask the question how the concept of evolutionarily stability can be generalized so as to associate game-theoretic meaning to oscillatory behaviours of players asymmetrically interacting, i.e., if there are both intraspecific and interspecific interactions between two subpopulations in the population. We guide our scheme of generalization such that the evolutionary stability is related to the dynamic stability of the corresponding periodic orbits of a time-discrete replicator dynamics. We name the generalization of evolutionarily stable state as two-species heterogeneity stable orbit. Furthermore, we invoke the principle of decrease of relative entropy in order to associate the generalization of evolutionary stability with an information-theoretic meaning. This particular generalization is aptly termed as two-species information stable orbit.

q-bio.PE