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Sahar Ghoflsaz Ghinani

Publications and source records attributed to Sahar Ghoflsaz Ghinani.

2 recordsLinked to original sources

FuSeFL: Fully Secure and Scalable Federated Learning

Federated Learning (FL) enables collaborative model training without centralizing client data, making it attractive for privacy-sensitive domains. While existing approaches employ cryptographic techniques such as homomorphic encryption, differential privacy, or secure multiparty computation to mitigate inference attacks, including model inversion, membership inference, and gradient leakage, they often suffer from high computational and memory overheads. Moreover, many methods overlook the confidentiality of the global model itself, which may be proprietary and sensitive. These challenges limit the practicality of secure FL, especially in settings that involve large datasets and strict compliance requirements. We present FuSeFL, a Fully Secure and scalable FL scheme, which decentralizes training across client pairs using lightweight MPC, while confining the server's role to secure aggregation, client pairing, and routing. This design eliminates server bottlenecks, avoids full data offloading, and preserves full confidentiality of data, model, and updates throughout training. Based on our experiment, FuSeFL defends against unauthorized observation, reconstruction attacks, and inference attacks such as gradient leakage, membership inference, and inversion attacks, while achieving up to $13 \times$ speedup in training time and 50% lower server memory usage compared to our baseline.

cs.CR↗

Enabling Low-Cost Secure Computing on Untrusted In-Memory Architectures

Modern computing systems are limited in performance by the memory bandwidth available to processors, a problem known as the memory wall. Processing-in-Memory (PIM) promises to substantially improve this problem by moving processing closer to the data, improving effective data bandwidth, and leading to superior performance on memory-intensive workloads. However, integrating PIM modules within a secure computing system raises an interesting challenge: unencrypted data has to move off-chip to the PIM, exposing the data to attackers and breaking assumptions on Trusted Computing Bases (TCBs). To tackle this challenge, this paper leverages multi-party computation (MPC) techniques, specifically arithmetic secret sharing and Yao's garbled circuits, to outsource bandwidth-intensive computation securely to PIM. Additionally, we leverage precomputation optimization to prevent the CPU's portion of the MPC from becoming a bottleneck. We evaluate our approach using the UPMEM PIM system over various applications such as Deep Learning Recommendation Model inference and Logistic Regression. Our evaluations demonstrate up to a $14.66\times$ speedup compared to a secure CPU configuration while maintaining data confidentiality and integrity when outsourcing linear and/or nonlinear computation.

cs.CR↗