arXiv subjects

Salavat Ishbulatov

Publications and source records attributed to Salavat Ishbulatov.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Attribution Markets: A Fisher-Market Formulation for Fractional Credit Assignment Between Planned Tasks and Performed Actions

Personal and organizational planning systems maintain two records that drift apart: what was planned (a task's effort budget) and what was done (a logged action's duration and description). Existing systems bridge them with an exclusive, all-or-nothing link that strands genuinely related but unlinked effort and reports false stalls on active goals. We formulate the bridge as a quasi-linear Fisher market: planned tasks are budget-constrained buyers, performed actions are divisible goods, and a fused text/structural/temporal signal sets each buyer's valuation. Two market instruments - a seller reserve price and a buyer cash option - yield conservation, a hard budget cap, and a provable junk filter as theorems. We extend the market with a concave completion utility discounting progress as a task nears its plan; standard convergence theory for the market's algorithm does not transfer here, resolved by a satiation-threshold fixed point with existence (Brouwer) and local uniqueness under an explicit diagonal-dominance condition, validated empirically on random and adversarial instances. A de-circularized, multi-seed benchmark - observed affinity corrupted independently of the scored ground truth - surfaces a genuine weak spot: the market's sharp, zero-entropy equilibrium is more sensitive to affinity noise than entropy-regularized optimal transport's permanently smoothed one. We resolve this with a one-parameter entropy-regularized generalization unifying the two, plus a noise-adaptive rule for its regularization strength. We report full reproducibility parameters, discuss limitations candidly, and relate the result to multi-touch attribution, optimal transport, and online Fisher-market algorithms.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2026

Reliability and Identifiability in Persona-Trained Monte Carlo: Variance Decomposition, Stability Bounds, and the Identifiability of Heterogeneous News Reaction

Persona-Trained Monte Carlo (PTMC) estimates distributions of market-outcome functionals by repeatedly simulating limit-order-book interaction among $K$ neural policy bots whose behavioral personas are drawn from a learned heterogeneity distribution $\mathcal{P}$. This paper develops the statistical theory that makes the word "reliable" precise for such estimators. We decompose estimator variance into a persona-draw component $σ_P^2$ and a within-run component $σ_w^2$, give unbiased ANOVA estimators of both, and derive the variance-optimal allocation of a fixed compute budget between outer persona draws and inner replications. A coupling-based stability bound quantifies how misestimation of $\mathcal{P}$ and error in the trained policy propagate into the estimand, yielding a three-term total-error budget whose terms are separately estimable; a uniform-in-horizon version holds under a Doeblin condition on the market chain. The main contribution is an identification theory for heterogeneous news reaction: under a fixed response nonlinearity, the aggregate impact curve $A(z)=\mathbb{E}_Q[g(ηz)]$ detects heterogeneous news sensitivity through a strict Jensen gap and identifies the distribution $Q$ locally via odd moments and Hausdorff determinacy, with sharp failure when the response family is unknown. We provide $\sqrt{n}$-consistent estimators and a boundary-corrected test of homogeneous news reaction. Two separation theorems delimit when PTMC is provably preferable to homogeneous-population simulators and reduced-form forecasters, formalizing an irreducible Jensen bias floor and the Lucas critique as a minimax limit on intervention extrapolation. All proofs are given in full; guarantees are classified as unconditional (Monte Carlo convergence), conditional worst-case (the error budget), or open (the large-$K$ mean-field limit).

cs.LG↗

arXiv2026

Persona-Trained Monte Carlo: Estimating Market-Outcome Distributions via Swarms of Persona-Conditioned Neural Policy Bots in a Limit Order Book

We propose Persona-Trained Monte Carlo (PTMC), a method for estimating distributions of market-outcome statistics by repeatedly simulating limit-order-book interaction among swarms of persona-conditioned neural-policy trading bots. Each run instantiates many bots sharing one trained policy network but conditioned on heterogeneous, individually sampled persona parameters drawn from a learned trader-heterogeneity distribution; the bots interact in a continuous double auction, and the resulting price path is one Monte Carlo sample. Repeating this over independent persona-population draws yields an ensemble from which a target market statistic is estimated. Randomness enters through persona draws, within-run action sampling, and optional exogenous shocks, not solely through price as in classical Monte Carlo. We distinguish PTMC from adjacent paradigms, including classical Monte Carlo, hand-coded agent-based models, single-agent reinforcement learning, and large-language-model-based generative agents. To justify the design, we survey cross-disciplinary foundations -- agent-based computational economics, market microstructure, behavioral finance, deep reinforcement learning, generative/LLM-based agents, news-driven trading, systemic risk, econophysics, and game theory -- connecting each literature to a specific design choice in the policy network, training data, or validation protocol. We formalize the PTMC estimator and its convergence properties, specify a candidate bot architecture and training objective, and propose a four-level validation methodology: stylized-fact matching, microstructure- and agent-level checks, and historical stress-test comparison against a zero-intelligence baseline. The framework is proposed but not implemented: we contribute a formal estimator, a cross-disciplinary design justification, and a validation roadmap, and conclude with open research questions.

cs.LG↗