Self-Sifting quantum key distribution
In this paper, we introduce a novel two-way quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol in which the sender (Alice) and receiver (Bob) employ one qubit of a maximally entangled Bell state as the quantum channel for key exchange. The protocol incorporates a new security mechanism based on a scrambling operator. Unlike conventional two-way QKD protocols, all sifting operations and eavesdropper detection procedures are postponed until the completion of the quantum communication stage and are performed exclusively by Bob. Since the control mode is never publicly announced, attacks that rely on mode-dependent adaptations or attempt to remain hidden within the control mode are inherently prevented. Furthermore, the traveling qubit does not directly encode key information, substantially limiting the information that can be extracted from attacks targeting the quantum channel alone. An additional distinctive feature of the protocol is that rounds that would ordinarily be discarded can instead be utilized to detect the presence of an eavesdropper. We analyze a broad class of ancilla-based attacks, in which an eavesdropper couples an ancillary system to the transmitted qubit in an attempt to gain information about the key, and show that such attacks are detectable in their most general form.