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Samir Wadhwa

Publications and source records attributed to Samir Wadhwa.

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On the Sample Complexity of Causal Discovery and the Value of Domain Expertise

Causal discovery methods seek to identify causal relations between random variables from purely observational data, as opposed to actively collected experimental data where an experimenter intervenes on a subset of correlates. One of the seminal works in this area is the Inferred Causation algorithm, which guarantees successful causal discovery under the assumption of a conditional independence (CI) oracle: an oracle that can states whether two random variables are conditionally independent given another set of random variables. Practical implementations of this algorithm incorporate statistical tests for conditional independence, in place of a CI oracle. In this paper, we analyze the sample complexity of causal discovery algorithms without a CI oracle: given a certain level of confidence, how many data points are needed for a causal discovery algorithm to identify a causal structure? Furthermore, our methods allow us to quantify the value of domain expertise in terms of data samples. Finally, we demonstrate the accuracy of these sample rates with numerical examples, and quantify the benefits of sparsity priors and known causal directions.

cs.LG

Equilibrium Selection in Data Markets: Multiple-Principal, Multiple-Agent Problems with Non-Rivalrous Goods

There are several aspects of data markets that distinguish them from a typical commodity market: asymmetric information, the non-rivalrous nature of data, and informational externalities. Formally, this gives rise to a new class of games which we call multiple-principal, multiple-agent problem with non-rivalrous goods. Under the assumption that the principal's payoff is quasilinear in the payments given to agents, we show that there is a fundamental degeneracy in the market of non-rivalrous goods. This multiplicity of equilibria also affects common refinements of equilibrium definitions intended to uniquely select an equilibrium: both variational equilibria and normalized equilibria will be non-unique in general. This implies that most existing equilibrium concepts cannot provide predictions on the outcomes of data markets emerging today. The results support the idea that modifications to payment contracts themselves are unlikely to yield a unique equilibrium, and either changes to the models of study or new equilibrium concepts will be required to determine unique equilibria in settings with multiple principals and a non-rivalrous good.

cs.GT