arXiv subjects

Samuel Gruetter

Publications and source records attributed to Samuel Gruetter.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2025

Sockeye: a language for analyzing hardware documentation

The ever increasing complexity of hardware platforms poses a challenge to systems programmers. Correctly programming a multitude of components, providing functionality and security, is difficult: semantics of individual units are described in prose, underspecified, and prone to inaccuracies. Rigorous statements about platform security are often impossible. We introduce a domain-specific language to describe hardware semantics, assumptions about software behavior, and desired security properties. We then create machine-readable specifications for a diverse set of eight platforms from their reference manuals, and formally prove their (in-)security. In addition to security proofs about memory confidentiality and integrity, we discover a handful of documentation errors. Finally, our analysis also revealed a vulnerability on a real-world server chip, which was confirmed by the vendor to apply to a wide family of deployed network appliances. Our tooling offers system integrators a way of formally describing security properties for whole platforms, and the means to find counterexamples, or proving them correct.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2022

Flexible Instruction-Set Semantics via Type Classes

Instruction sets, from families like x86 and ARM, are at the center of many ambitious formal-methods projects. Many verification, synthesis, programming, and debugging tools rely on formal semantics of instruction sets, but different tools can use semantics in rather different ways. As a result, a central challenge for that community is how semantics should be written and what techniques should be used to connect them to new use cases. The best-known work applying single semantics across quite-different tools relies on domain-specific languages like Sail, where the language and its translation tools are specialized to the realm of instruction sets. We decided to explore a different approach, with semantics written in a carefully chosen subset of Haskell. This style does not depend on any new language translators, relying instead on parameterization of semantics over type-class instances. As a result, a semantics can be a first-class object within a logic, and application of a semantics for a new kind of tool can be a first-class operation in the logic, allowing sharing of theorems across applications. Our case study is for the open RISC-V instruction-set family, and we have used a single core semantics to support testing, interactive proof, and model checking of both software and hardware. We especially highlight an application of a first-class semantics within Coq that can be instantiated in different ways within one proof: simulation between variants where multiplication is implemented in hardware or in the machine code of a particular software trap handler.

cs.LO↗

arXiv2017

VST-Flow: Fine-grained low-level reasoning about real-world C code

We show how support for information-flow security proofs could be added on top of the Verified Software Toolchain (VST). We discuss several attempts to define information flow security in a VST-compatible way, and present a statement of information flow security in "continuation-passing" style. Moreover, we present Hoare rules augmented with information flow control assertions, and sketch how these rules could be proven sound with respect to the definition given before. We also discuss how this can be implemented in the Coq proof assistant, and how VST's proof automation framework (VST-Floyd) can be adapted to support convenient information flow security proofs.

cs.LO↗