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Samuel Wiese

Publications and source records attributed to Samuel Wiese.

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Forecasting Macroeconomic Dynamics using a Calibrated Data-Driven Agent-based Model

In the last few years, economic agent-based models have made the transition from qualitative models calibrated to match stylised facts to quantitative models for time series forecasting, and in some cases, their predictions have performed as well or better than those of standard models (see, e.g. Poledna et al. (2023a); Hommes et al. (2022); Pichler et al. (2022)). Here, we build on the model of Poledna et al., adding several new features such as housing markets, realistic synthetic populations of individuals with income, wealth and consumption heterogeneity, enhanced behavioural rules and market mechanisms, and an enhanced credit market. We calibrate our model for all 38 OECD member countries using state-of-the-art approximate Bayesian inference methods and test it by making out-of-sample forecasts. It outperforms both the Poledna and AR(1) time series models by a highly statistically significant margin. Our model is built within a platform we have developed, making it easy to build, run, and evaluate alternative models, which we hope will encourage future work in this area.

econ.GN

Best-response dynamics, playing sequences, and convergence to equilibrium in random games

We analyze the performance of the best-response dynamic across all normal-form games using a random games approach. The playing sequence -- the order in which players update their actions -- is essentially irrelevant in determining whether the dynamic converges to a Nash equilibrium in certain classes of games (e.g. in potential games) but, when evaluated across all possible games, convergence to equilibrium depends on the playing sequence in an extreme way. Our main asymptotic result shows that the best-response dynamic converges to a pure Nash equilibrium in a vanishingly small fraction of all (large) games when players take turns according to a fixed cyclic order. By contrast, when the playing sequence is random, the dynamic converges to a pure Nash equilibrium if one exists in almost all (large) games.

econ.TH