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Sanjukta Roy

Publications and source records attributed to Sanjukta Roy.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

Complexity of Eliminating (Majority) Illusion in Directed Networks

We study illusion elimination problems on directed social networks where each vertex is colored either red or blue. A vertex is under \textit{majority illusion} if it has more red out-neighbors than blue out-neighbors when there are more blue vertices than red ones in the network. In a more general phenomenon of $p$-illusion, a vertex under illusion has at least $p$ fraction of the out-neighbors (as opposed to $1/2$ for majority) of a vertex is red. In the directed illusion elimination problem, we recolor minimum number of vertices so that no vertex is under $p$-illusion, for $p\in (0,1)$. Unfortunately, the problem is NP-hard for $p =1/2$ even when the network is a grid. Moreover, the problem is NP-hard and W[2]-hard when parameterized by the number of recoloring for each $p \in (0,1)$ even on bipartite DAGs. Thus, we can neither get a polynomial time algorithm on DAGs, unless P=NP, nor we can get a FPT algorithm even by combining solution size and directed graph parameters that measure distance from acyclicity, unless FPT=W[2]. Furthermore, the problem is NP-complete in graphs of degree at most three for $p\in (0,\frac{2}{3}]$. We show that the problem can be solved in polynomial time in structured, sparse networks such as outerplanar networks, outward grids, trees, and cycles. Finally, we show tractable algorithms parameterized by treewidth of the underlying undirected graph and maximum deficiency of the graph combined, and by the number of vertices under illusion.

cs.DS

Menu Selection: A Computational Approach to Minimizing Food Waste

We introduce a novel collective decision making problem that captures the ubiquitous issue of ordering food to cater for varied dietary preferences and requirements. Our settings involve agents with diverse dietary requirements over menu options with varied serving sizes. The goal is to select a menu where everyone has enough food they can consume and wastage of food is minimized. We introduce two different consumption models: optimistic and pessimistic. Optimistic consumption assumes a situation when a central planner can optimally allocate the food ordered among the agents to maximize the number of people who get enough to eat. Pessimistic considers the worst case guarantee on consumption when agents fill their own plates in an arbitrary order. Under either consumption model, we seek valid menus (under which all agents are sufficiently fed) of minimum size. Our work provides two sets of characterizations: (1) we characterize valid menus under either consumption model and (2) we characterize the space of instances that admit polynomial-time algorithms to find minimum sized menus. Our results also help us design Integer Linear Programs to find minimum sized menus in general settings. Furthermore, we present polynomial-time algorithms for important special cases. We then consider the worst case discrepancy between the size of minimum sized optimistic and pessimistic menus. We call this the waste of pessimism, captured by the ratio of the minimum sized pessimistic menu to that of the minimum sized optimistic menu. We show tight upper bounds on this ratio. Our results also provide additional insights on the problem of finding a minimum sized maximal matching, which may be of independent interest.

cs.GT

Quantile agent utility and implications to randomized social choice

We initiate a novel direction in randomized social choice by proposing a new definition of agent utility for randomized outcomes. Each agent has a preference over all outcomes and a {\em quantile} parameter. Given a {\em lottery} over the outcomes, an agent gets utility from a particular {\em representative}, defined as the least preferred outcome that can be realized so that the probability that any worse-ranked outcome can be realized is at most the agent's quantile value. In contrast to other utility models that have been considered in randomized social choice (e.g., stochastic dominance, expected utility), our {\em quantile agent utility} compares two lotteries for an agent by just comparing the representatives, as is done for deterministic outcomes. This yields a purely ordinal yet informative comparison of randomized outcomes. We revisit fundamental questions in randomized social choice using the new utility definition. We study the compatibility of efficiency and strategyproofness for randomized voting rules, and of efficiency, fairness, and strategyproofness for randomized one-sided matching mechanisms. In contrast to classical impossibility results, we show that under quantile agent utilities, these properties can often be satisfied simultaneously.

cs.GT

Fair Societies: Algorithms for House Allocations

House Allocations concern with matchings involving one-sided preferences, where houses serve as a proxy encoding valuable indivisible resources (e.g. organs, course seats, subsidized public housing units) to be allocated among the agents. Every agent must receive exactly one resource. We study algorithmic approaches towards ensuring fairness in such settings. Minimizing the number of envious agents is known to be NP-complete (Kamiyama et al. 2021). We present two tractable approaches to deal with the computational hardness. When the agents are presented with an initial allocation of houses, we aim to refine this allocation by reallocating a bounded number of houses to reduce the number of envious agents. We show an efficient algorithm when the agents express preference for a bounded number of houses. Next, we consider single peaked preference domain and present a polynomial time algorithm for finding an allocation that minimize the number of envious agents. We further extend it to satisfy Pareto efficiency. Our former algorithm works for other measures of envy such as total envy, or maximum envy, with suitable modifications. Finally, we present an empirical analysis recording the fairness-welfare trade-off of our algorithms.

cs.GT

Algorithms for Stable Roommate with Externalities

In the roommate matching model, given a set of 2n agents and n rooms, we find an assignment of a pair of agents to a room. Although the roommate matching problem is well studied, the study of the model when agents have preference over both rooms and roommates was recently initiated by Chan et al. [11]. We study two types of stable roommate assignments, namely, 4-person stable (4PS) and 2-person stable (2PS) in conjunction with efficiency and strategy-proofness. We design a simple serial dictatorship based algorithm for finding a 4PS assignment that is Pareto optimal and strategy-proof. However, the serial dictatorship algorithm is far from being 2PS. Next, we study top trading cycle (TTC) based algorithms. We show that variations of TTC cannot be strategy-proof or PO. Finally, as Chan et al. (2016) showed that deciding the existence of 2PS assignment is NP-complete, we identify preference structures where a 2PS assignment can be found in polynomial time.

cs.GT

FPT-Approximability of Stable Matching Problems

We study parameterized approximability of three optimization problems related to stable matching: (1) Min-BP-SMI: Given a stable marriage instance and a number k, find a size-at-least-k matching that minimizes the number $β$ of blocking pairs; (2) Min-BP-SRI: Given a stable roommates instance, find a matching that minimizes the number $β$ of blocking pairs; (3) Max-SMTI: Given a stable marriage instance with preferences containing ties, find a maximum-size stable matching. The first two problems are known to be NP-hard to approximate to any constant factor and W[1]-hard with respect to $β$, making the existence of an EPTAS or FPT-algorithms unlikely. We show that they are W[1]-hard with respect to $β$ to approximate to any function of $β$. This means that unless FPT=W[1], there is no FPT-approximation scheme for the parameter $β$. The last problem (Max-SMTI) is known to be NP-hard to approximate to factor-29/33 and W[1]-hard with respect to the number of ties. We complement this and present an FPT-approximation scheme for the parameter "number of agents with ties".

cs.GT

Observation of effects of inter-atomic interaction on Autler-Townes splitting in cold Rydberg atoms

We demonstrate the effect of inter-atomic interaction in highly excited Rydberg atoms via Autler- Townes splitting in cold atoms. We measure the Autler-Townes (AT) splitting of the 5S1/2, F=2 to 5P3/2, F'=3 transition of 87Rb atoms arising due to the strong coupling of the transition via the cooling beams used for the magneto-optical trap (MOT). The AT splitting is probed using a weakly coupled transition from 5P3/2, F'=3 state to highly excited Rydberg states for a wide range of principal quantum numbers (n = 35 - 117). We observe the AT splitting via trap-loss spectroscopy in the MOT by scanning the probe frequency. We observe a drastic increase in the broadening of the AT splitting signal as a result of interaction-induced dephasing effect in cold Rydberg atoms for highly excited Rydberg states with principal quantum number n > 100. We explain our observations using theoretical modelling and numerical simulations based on the Lindblad Master equation. We find a good agreement of the results of the numerical simulation with the experimental measurements.

physics.atom-ph

Non-resonant inter-species interaction and its effect on the position response function of cold atoms

In the context of non-equilibrium statistical physics, the position response of a particle, coupled to a bath, subjected to an external force is a topic of broad interest. A topic of further interest is two distinguishable sets of interacting particles in contact with two different baths. Here, we report the experimental evidence of the modification of the position response function (PRF) of an ensemble of cold atoms in a magneto-optical trap when it is placed alongside a dilute cloud of cold atoms of a different species. Our experiment consists of a mass-imbalanced cold atomic mixture of Potassium and Sodium atoms. We focus on the position response of Potassium atoms when subjected to a sudden displacement in the presence of a cold Sodium atomic cloud. Notably, we find that, in the underdamped regime of motion, the oscillation frequency of motion of the cold atoms changes as much as 30 $\%$ depending on the effective inter-species light-assisted interaction strength. On the other hand, in the overdamped regime, there is a reduction, as high as 10.5 $\%$ in the damping coefficient, depending on the interaction strength. Using a quantum Langevin approach, we develop a framework that aligns well with experimental results, with potential applications in mass and charge transport studies under varied physical conditions simulated in cold atoms.

cond-mat.quant-gas

Strategyproof Matching of Roommates and Rooms

We initiate the study of matching roommates and rooms wherein the preferences of agents over other agents and rooms are complementary and represented by Leontief utilities. In this setting, 2n agents must be paired up and assigned to n rooms. Each agent has cardinal valuations over the rooms as well as compatibility values over all other agents. Under Leontief preferences, an agents utility for a matching is the minimum of the two values. We focus on the tradeoff between maximizing utilitarian social welfare and strategyproofness. Our main result shows that, in a stark contrast to the additive case, under binary Leontief utilities, there exist strategyproof mechanisms that maximize the social welfare. We further devise a strategyproof mechanism that implements such a welfare maximizing algorithm and is parameterized by the number of agents. Along the way, we highlight several possibility and impossibility results, and give upper bounds and lower bounds for welfare with or without strategyproofness.

cs.GT

Putting Gale & Shapley to Work: Guaranteeing Stability Through Learning

Two-sided matching markets describe a large class of problems wherein participants from one side of the market must be matched to those from the other side according to their preferences. In many real-world applications (e.g. content matching or online labor markets), the knowledge about preferences may not be readily available and must be learned, i.e., one side of the market (aka agents) may not know their preferences over the other side (aka arms). Recent research on online settings has focused primarily on welfare optimization aspects (i.e. minimizing the overall regret) while paying little attention to the game-theoretic properties such as the stability of the final matching. In this paper, we exploit the structure of stable solutions to devise algorithms that improve the likelihood of finding stable solutions. We initiate the study of the sample complexity of finding a stable matching, and provide theoretical bounds on the number of samples needed to reach a stable matching with high probability. Finally, our empirical results demonstrate intriguing tradeoffs between stability and optimality of the proposed algorithms, further complementing our theoretical findings.

cs.GT

Eliminating Majority Illusion is Easy

Majority Illusion is a phenomenon in social networks wherein the decision by the majority of the network is not the same as one's personal social circle's majority, leading to an incorrect perception of the majority in a large network. In this paper, we present polynomial-time algorithms which can eliminate majority illusion in a network by altering as few connections as possible. Additionally, we prove that the more general problem of ensuring all neighbourhoods in the network are at least a $p$-fraction of the majority is NP-hard for most values of $p$.

cs.MA

The Degree of Fairness in Efficient House Allocation

The classic house allocation problem is primarily concerned with finding a matching between a set of agents and a set of houses that guarantees some notion of economic efficiency (e.g. utilitarian welfare). While recent works have shifted focus on achieving fairness (e.g. minimizing the number of envious agents), they often come with notable costs on efficiency notions such as utilitarian or egalitarian welfare. We investigate the trade-offs between these welfare measures and several natural fairness measures that rely on the number of envious agents, the total (aggregate) envy of all agents, and maximum total envy of an agent. In particular, by focusing on envy-free allocations, we first show that, should one exist, finding an envy-free allocation with maximum utilitarian or egalitarian welfare is computationally tractable. We highlight a rather stark contrast between utilitarian and egalitarian welfare by showing that finding utilitarian welfare maximizing allocations that minimize the aforementioned fairness measures can be done in polynomial time while their egalitarian counterparts remain intractable (for the most part) even under binary valuations. We complement our theoretical findings by giving insights into the relationship between the different fairness measures and conducting empirical analysis.

cs.GT

Effect of light-assisted tunable interaction on the position response function of cold atoms

The position response of a particle subjected to a perturbation is of general interest in physics. We study the modification of the position response function of an ensemble of cold atoms in a magneto-optical trap in the presence of tunable light-assisted interactions. We subject the cold atoms to an intense laser light tuned near the photoassociation resonance and observe the position response of the atoms subjected to a sudden displacement. Surprisingly, we observe that the entire cold atomic cloud undergoes collective oscillations. We use a generalised quantum Langevin approach to theoretically analyse the results of the experiments and find good agreement.

physics.atom-ph

Gerrymandering Planar Graphs

We study the computational complexity of the map redistricting problem (gerrymandering). Mathematically, the electoral district designer (gerrymanderer) attempts to partition a weighted graph into $k$ connected components (districts) such that its candidate (party) wins as many districts as possible. Prior work has principally concerned the special cases where the graph is a path or a tree. Our focus concerns the realistic case where the graph is planar. We prove that the gerrymandering problem is solvable in polynomial time in $λ$-outerplanar graphs, when the number of candidates and $λ$ are constants and the vertex weights (voting weights) are polynomially bounded. In contrast, the problem is NP-complete in general planar graphs even with just two candidates. This motivates the study of approximation algorithms for gerrymandering planar graphs. However, when the number of candidates is large, we prove it is hard to distinguish between instances where the gerrymanderer cannot win a single district and instances where the gerrymanderer can win at least one district. This immediately implies that the redistricting problem is inapproximable in polynomial time in planar graphs, unless P=NP. This conclusion appears terminal for the design of good approximation algorithms -- but it is not. The inapproximability bound can be circumvented as it only applies when the maximum number of districts the gerrymanderer can win is extremely small, say one. Indeed, for a fixed number of candidates, our main result is that there is a constant factor approximation algorithm for redistricting unweighted planar graphs, provided the optimal value is a large enough constant.

cs.GT

Maximizing Social Welfare in Score-Based Social Distance Games

Social distance games have been extensively studied as a coalition formation model where the utilities of agents in each coalition were captured using a utility function $u$ that took into account distances in a given social network. In this paper, we consider a non-normalized score-based definition of social distance games where the utility function $u^s$ depends on a generic scoring vector $s$, which may be customized to match the specifics of each individual application scenario. As our main technical contribution, we establish the tractability of computing a welfare-maximizing partitioning of the agents into coalitions on tree-like networks, for every score-based function $u^s$. We provide more efficient algorithms when dealing with specific choices of $u^s$ or simpler networks, and also extend all of these results to computing coalitions that are Nash stable or individually rational. We view these results as a further strong indication of the usefulness of the proposed score-based utility function: even on very simple networks, the problem of computing a welfare-maximizing partitioning into coalitions remains open for the originally considered canonical function $u$.

cs.GT

Fast loading of a cold mixture of Sodium and Potassium atoms from compact and versatile cold atomic beam sources

We present the design, implementation and detailed experimental characterization of two-dimensional Magneto-optical traps (MOT) of bosonic $^{23}$Na and $^{39}$K atoms for loading the cold atomic mixture in a dual-species 3DMOT with a large number of atoms. We report our various measurements pertaining to the characterisation of the two 2D$^+$MOTs via the capture rate in the 3DMOT and also present the optimised parameters for the best performance of the system of the cold atomic mixture. In the optimised condition, we capture more than $3 \times 10^{10}$ $^{39}$K atoms and $5.8 \times 10^8$ $^{23}$Na atoms in the 3DMOT simultaneously from the individual 2D$^+$MOTs with the capture rate of $5 \times 10^{10}$ atoms/sec and $3.5 \times 10^8$ atoms/sec for $^{39}$K and $^{23}$Na, respectively. We also demonstrate improvements of more than a factor of 5 in the capture rate into the 3DMOT from the cold atomic sources when a relatively high-power ultra-violet light is used to cause light-induced atomic desorption (LIAD) in the 2D$^+$MOT glass cells. The cold atomic mixture would be useful for further experiments on Quantum simulation with ultra-cold quantum mixtures in optical potentials.

physics.atom-ph

Doppler-Enhanced Quantum Magnetometry with thermal Rydberg atoms

We report experimental measurements showing how one can combine quantum interference and thermal Doppler shifts at room temperature to detect weak magnetic fields. We pump ${}^{87}$Rb atoms to a highly-excited, Rydberg level using a probe and a coupling laser, leading to narrow transmission peaks of the probe due to destructive interference of transition amplitudes, known as Electromagnetically Induced Transparency (EIT). While it is customary in such setups to use counterpropagating lasers to minimize the effect of Doppler shifts, here we show, on the contrary, that one can harness Doppler shifts in a copropagating arrangement to produce an enhanced response to a magnetic field. In particular, we demonstrate an order-of-magnitude bigger splitting in the transmission spectrum as compared to the counterpropagating case. We explain and generalize our findings with theoretical modelling and simulations based on a Lindblad master equation. Our results pave the way to using quantum effects for magnetometry in readily deployable room-temperature platforms.

physics.atom-ph

Maximizing Social Welfare in Score-Based Social Distance Games

Social distance games have been extensively studied as a coalition formation model where the utilities of agents in each coalition were captured using a utility function u that took into account distances in a given social network. In this paper, we consider a non-normalized score-based definition of social distance games where the utility function u_v depends on a generic scoring vector v, which may be customized to match the specifics of each individual application scenario. As our main technical contribution, we establish the tractability of computing a welfare-maximizing partitioning of the agents into coalitions on tree-like networks, for every score-based function u_v. We provide more efficient algorithms when dealing with specific choices of u_v or simpler networks, and also extend all of these results to computing coalitions that are Nash stable or individually rational. We view these results as a further strong indication of the usefulness of the proposed score-based utility function: even on very simple networks, the problem of computing a welfare-maximizing partitioning into coalitions remains open for the originally considered canonical function u.

cs.GT