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Santiago R. Balseiro

Publications and source records attributed to Santiago R. Balseiro.

12 recordsLinked to original sources

DLB: Distributed Load Balancing at Scale for Generative AI Inference

The reliance on scarce and expensive accelerators such as GPUs and TPUs in modern datacenters places unprecedented demands on backend infrastructure. For workloads characterized by heterogeneous service times and complex multi-stage processing, such as Generative AI, conventional load balancing techniques are often inadequate, relying heavily on costly overprovisioning to maintain service level objectives. This paper introduces DLB, the Distributed Load Balancer, a novel system designed to minimize end-to-end user latency for large-scale, heterogeneous workloads. DLB employs a scalable, distributed design with peer-to-peer probing to maintain real-time visibility into server capacity across large-scale, geographically distributed infrastructure. The system continuously learns latency models to estimate the latency impact of routing decisions, allowing it to effectively manage heterogeneous hardware and diverse model architectures. We provide a novel theoretical analysis of our routing algorithms that establishes their stability and global performance guarantees over time. We also evaluate DLB through extensive simulations, which show substantial gains compared to state-of-the-art load balancing algorithms. Finally, following a 22-month deployment of DLB at Google, where it facilitates large-scale Generative AI inference for thousands of different machine learning models and millions of requests per second, we detail the design choices and practical experiences gained from the system in production. Analysis of production migrations demonstrates that DLB yields statistically significant latency reductions compared to the legacy baseline, including a 17\% decrease in median latency and a 13\% decrease at the p95 tail.

cs.DC↗

Battery Operations in Electricity Markets: Strategic Behavior and Distortions

Battery storage can reduce electricity generation costs by shifting energy across time, but as privately owned batteries become large, they may also be able to exert market power. We study how this market power distorts storage decisions in a two-settlement electricity market with stochastic demand and heterogeneous generator flexibility. We compare centralized battery operations, which minimize generation cost, with decentralized battery operations, in which each battery maximizes its own profit. For a baseline model with linear inverse supply curves, we characterize equilibrium battery policies and generation costs in closed form. Relative to centralized operations, a strategic battery distorts storage decisions in three ways: it withholds discharge, shifts participation from the day-ahead market to the real-time market, and responds too weakly to real-time demand fluctuations. These distortions raise generation cost, but the resulting efficiency loss admits tight, distribution-free bounds. We measure the resulting efficiency loss through the Price of Anarchy metric, which compares the cost reduction achieved by centralized batteries to that achieved by strategic batteries. For a single battery, the Price of Anarchy lies between $9/8$ and $4/3$; with $n$ competing batteries, the Price of Anarchy is bounded above by $1+1/(n(n+2))$. Similar bounds continue to hold in richer settings with capacity constraints, battery inefficiency, and virtual bidding. We also show why market power mitigation is subtle: interventions that target one distortion can backfire by redirecting behavior toward another and increasing system cost. Numerical experiments calibrated to California and Texas markets show that losses from a single strategic battery are meaningful but moderate, and that even limited battery competition brings the Price of Anarchy close to one across the specifications we study.

econ.TH↗

Distributed Load Balancing with Workload-Dependent Service Rates

Modern service systems, including cloud platforms and large language model inference endpoints, must distribute jobs across servers whose processing speeds depend on current workloads. At scale, centralized coordination is costly, while naive distributed policies can perform arbitrarily poorly. We study how to design a simple distributed load balancing policy that achieves globally optimal latency performance in such settings. We model the system as a bipartite queueing network with an arbitrary compatibility graph and servers with concave, workload-dependent service rates. We propose the Greatest Marginal Service Rate (GMSR) policy, which routes jobs to a connected server where it has the largest marginal impact on service rate. In a discrete-time stochastic model, we show that as time discretization is refined (shrinking time step and job size proportionally), the scaled workload process converges almost surely to a fluid limit governed by a differential inclusion. In the fluid regime, GMSR reaches an $ε$-suboptimal solution in $\mathcal{O}(δ+ \log(1/ε))$ time from any $δ$-suboptimal initial state, implying global convergence to the centrally optimal routing. When the system is overloaded, GMSR maximizes throughput, maximizes the number of stabilized backends among throughput-optimal policies, and minimizes total workload over those stabilized backends. GMSR yields a practical routing rule that requires neither demand-rate knowledge nor centralized coordination. By relying only on local information, service providers can achieve near-optimal latency performance through decentralized decisions, making the policy well suited to large-scale cloud computing, LLM serving, and other distributed service environments where centralized control is costly or infeasible.

cs.DC↗

Dynamic Pricing for Reusable Resources: The Power of Two Prices

Motivated by real-world applications such as rental and cloud computing services, we investigate pricing for reusable resources. We consider a system where a single resource with a fixed number of identical copies serves customers with heterogeneous willingness-to-pay (WTP), and the usage duration distribution is general. Optimal dynamic policies are computationally intractable when usage durations are not memoryless, so existing literature has focused on static pricing, which incurs a steady-state performance loss of ${O}(\sqrt{c})$ compared to optimality when supply and demand scale with $c$. We propose a class of dynamic "stock-dependent" policies that 1) are computationally tractable and 2) can attain a steady-state performance loss of $o(\sqrt{c})$. We give parametric bounds based on the local shape of the reward function at the optimal fluid admission probability and show that the performance loss of stock-dependent policies can be as low as ${O}((\log{c})^2)$. We characterize the tight performance loss for stock-dependent policies and show that they can in fact be achieved by a simple two-price policy that sets a higher price when the stock is below some threshold and a lower price otherwise. We extend our results to settings with multiple resources and multiple customer classes. Finally, we demonstrate this "minimally dynamic" class of two-price policies performs well numerically, even in non-asymptotic settings, suggesting that a little dynamicity can go a long way.

math.OC↗

Load Balancing with Network Latencies via Distributed Gradient Descent

Motivated by the growing demand for serving large language model inference requests, we study distributed load balancing for global serving systems with network latencies. We consider a fluid model in which continuous flows of requests arrive at different frontends and need to be routed to distant backends for processing whose processing rates are workload dependent. Network latencies can lead to long travel times for requests and delayed feedback from backends. The objective is to minimize the average latency of requests, composed of the network latency and the serving latency at the backends. We introduce Distributed Gradient Descent Load Balancing (DGD-LB), a probabilistic routing algorithm in which each frontend adjusts the routing probabilities dynamically using gradient descent. Our algorithm is distributed: there is no coordination between frontends, except by observing the delayed impact other frontends have on shared backends. The algorithm uses an approximate gradient that measures the marginal impact of an additional request evaluated at a delayed system state. Equilibrium points of our algorithm minimize the centralized optimal average latencies, and we provide a novel local stability analysis showing that our algorithm converges to an optimal solution when started sufficiently close to that point. Moreover, we present sufficient conditions on the step-size of gradient descent that guarantee convergence in the presence of network latencies. Numerical experiments show that our algorithm is globally stable and optimal, confirm our stability conditions are nearly tight, and demonstrate that DGD-LB can lead to substantial gains relative to other load balancers studied in the literature when network latencies are large.

cs.DC↗

Robust Auction Design with Support Information

A seller wants to sell an item to $n$ buyers. Buyer valuations are drawn i.i.d. from a distribution unknown to the seller; the seller only knows that the support is included in $[a, b]$. To be robust, the seller chooses a DSIC mechanism that optimizes the worst-case performance relative to the ideal expected revenue the seller could have collected with knowledge of buyers' valuations. Our analysis unifies the regret and the ratio objectives. For these objectives, we derive an optimal mechanism and the corresponding performance in quasi-closed form, as a function of the support information $[a, b]$ and the number of buyers $n$. Our analysis reveals three regimes of support information and a new class of robust mechanisms. i.) When $a/b$ is below a threshold, the optimal mechanism is a second-price auction (SPA) with random reserve, a focal class in earlier literature. ii.) When $a/b$ is above another threshold, SPAs are strictly suboptimal, and an optimal mechanism belongs to a class of mechanisms we introduce, which we call pooling auctions (POOL); whenever the highest value is above a threshold, the mechanism still allocates to the highest bidder, but otherwise the mechanism allocates to a uniformly random buyer, i.e., pools low types. iii.) When $a/b$ is between two thresholds, a randomization between SPA and POOL is optimal. We also characterize optimal mechanisms within nested central subclasses of mechanisms: standard mechanisms that only allocate to the highest bidder, SPA with random reserve, and SPA with no reserve. We show strict separations in terms of performance across classes, implying that deviating from standard mechanisms is necessary for robustness.

econ.TH↗

On the Robustness of Second-Price Auctions in Prior-Independent Mechanism Design

Classical Bayesian mechanism design relies on the common prior assumption, but such prior is often not available in practice. We study the design of prior-independent mechanisms that relax this assumption: the seller is selling an indivisible item to $n$ buyers such that the buyers' valuations are drawn from a joint distribution that is unknown to both the buyers and the seller; buyers do not need to form beliefs about competitors, and the seller assumes the distribution is adversarially chosen from a specified class. We measure performance through the worst-case regret, or the difference between the expected revenue achievable with perfect knowledge of buyers' valuations and the actual mechanism revenue. We study a broad set of classes of valuation distributions that capture a wide spectrum of possible dependencies: independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) distributions, mixtures of i.i.d. distributions, affiliated and exchangeable distributions, exchangeable distributions, and all joint distributions. We derive in quasi closed form the minimax values and the associated optimal mechanism. In particular, we show that the first three classes admit the same minimax regret value, which is decreasing with the number of competitors, while the last two have the same minimax regret equal to that of the single buyer case. Furthermore, we show that the minimax optimal mechanisms have a simple form across all settings: a second-price auction with random reserve prices, which shows its robustness in prior-independent mechanism design. En route to our results, we also develop a principled methodology to determine the form of the optimal mechanism and worst-case distribution via first-order conditions that should be of independent interest in other minimax problems.

econ.TH↗

Auto-bidding and Auctions in Online Advertising: A Survey

In this survey, we summarize recent developments in research fueled by the growing adoption of automated bidding strategies in online advertising. We explore the challenges and opportunities that have arisen as markets embrace this autobidding and cover a range of topics in this area, including bidding algorithms, equilibrium analysis and efficiency of common auction formats, and optimal auction design.

cs.GT↗

The Best of Many Robustness Criteria in Decision Making: Formulation and Application to Robust Pricing

In robust decision-making under non-Bayesian uncertainty, different robust optimization criteria, such as maximin performance, minimax regret, and maximin ratio, have been proposed. In many problems, all three criteria are well-motivated and well-grounded from a decision-theoretic perspective, yet different criteria give different prescriptions. This paper initiates a systematic study of overfitting to robustness criteria. How good is a prescription derived from one criterion when evaluated against another criterion? Does there exist a prescription that performs well against all criteria of interest? We formalize and study these questions through the prototypical problem of robust pricing under various information structures, including support, moments, and percentiles of the distribution of values. We provide a unified analysis of three focal robust criteria across various information structures and evaluate the relative performance of mechanisms optimized for each criterion against the others. We find that mechanisms optimized for one criterion often perform poorly against other criteria, highlighting the risk of overfitting to a particular robustness criterion. Remarkably, we show it is possible to design mechanisms that achieve good performance across all three criteria simultaneously, suggesting that decision-makers need not compromise among criteria.

math.OC↗

Analysis of Dual-Based PID Controllers through Convolutional Mirror Descent

Dual-based proportional-integral-derivative (PID) controllers are often employed in practice to solve online allocation problems with global constraints, such as budget pacing in online advertising. However, controllers are used in a heuristic fashion and come with no provable guarantees on their performance. This paper provides the first regret bounds on the performance of dual-based PID controllers for online allocation problems. We do so by first establishing a fundamental connection between dual-based PID controllers and a new first-order algorithm for online convex optimization called \emph{Convolutional Mirror Descent} (CMD), which updates iterates based on a weighted moving average of past gradients. CMD recovers, in a special case, online mirror descent with momentum and optimistic mirror descent. We establish sufficient conditions under which CMD attains low regret for general online convex optimization problems with adversarial inputs. We leverage this new result to give the first regret bound for dual-based PID controllers for online allocation problems. As a byproduct of our proofs, we provide the first regret bound for CMD for non-smooth convex optimization, which might be of independent interest.

math.OC↗

A Field Guide for Pacing Budget and ROS Constraints

Budget pacing is a popular service that has been offered by major internet advertising platforms since their inception. Budget pacing systems seek to optimize advertiser returns subject to budget constraints by smoothly spending advertiser budgets. In the past few years, autobidding products that provide real-time bidding as a service to advertisers have seen a prominent rise in adoption. A popular autobidding strategy is value maximization subject to return-on-spend (ROS) constraints. For historical/business reasons, the systems that govern these two services, namely budget pacing and ROS pacing, are not always a unified and coordinated entity that optimizes a global objective subject to both constraints. The purpose of this work is to theoretically and empirically compare algorithms with different degrees of coordination between these two pacing systems. In particular, we compare (a) a fully-decoupled sequential algorithm that first constructs the advertiser's ROS-pacing bid and then lowers that bid for budget pacing; (b) a minimally-coupled min-pacing algorithm that runs these two services independently, obtains the bid multipliers from both of them and applies the minimum of the two multipliers as the effective multiplier; and (c) a fully-coupled dual-based algorithm that optimally combines the dual variables from both the systems. Our main contribution is to theoretically analyze the min-pacing algorithm and show that it attains similar guarantees to the fully-coupled canonical dual-based algorithm. On the other hand, we show that the sequential algorithm, even though appealing by virtue of being fully decoupled, could badly violate the constraints. We validate our theoretical findings empirically by showing that the min-pacing algorithm performs almost as well as the canonical dual-based algorithm on a semi-synthetic dataset based on a large online advertising platform's data.

cs.GT↗

Uniformly Bounded Regret in Dynamic Fair Allocation

We study a dynamic allocation problem in which $T$ sequentially arriving divisible resources are to be allocated to a number of agents with linear utilities. The marginal utilities of each resource to the agents are drawn stochastically from a known joint distribution, independently and identically across time, and the central planner makes immediate and irrevocable allocation decisions. Most works on dynamic resource allocation aim to maximize the utilitarian welfare, i.e., the efficiency of the allocation, which may result in unfair concentration of resources on certain high-utility agents while leaving others' demands under-fulfilled. In this paper, aiming at balancing efficiency and fairness, we instead consider a broad collection of welfare metrics, the Hölder means, which includes the Nash social welfare and the egalitarian welfare. To this end, we first study a fluid-based policy derived from a deterministic surrogate to the underlying problem and show that for all smooth Hölder mean welfare metrics it attains an $O(1)$ regret over the time horizon length $T$ against the hindsight optimum, i.e., the optimal welfare if all utilities were known in advance of deciding on allocations. However, when evaluated under the non-smooth egalitarian welfare, the fluid-based policy attains a regret of order $Θ(\sqrt{T})$. We then propose a new policy built thereupon, called Backward Infrequent Re-solving with Thresholding ($\mathsf{BIRT}$), which consists of re-solving the deterministic surrogate problem at most $O(\log\log T)$ times. We prove the $\mathsf{BIRT}$ policy attains an $O(1)$ regret against the hindsight optimal egalitarian welfare, independently of the time horizon length $T$. We conclude by presenting numerical experiments to corroborate our theoretical claims and to illustrate the significant performance improvement against several benchmark policies.

math.OC↗