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Sarah H. Q. Li

Publications and source records attributed to Sarah H. Q. Li.

25 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

General sum stochastic games with networked information flows

Inspired by applications such as supply chain management, epidemics, and social networks, we formulate a stochastic game model that addresses three key features common across these domains: 1) network-structured player interactions, 2) pair-wise mixed cooperation and competition among players, and 3) limited global information toward individual decision-making. In combination, these features pose significant challenges for black box approaches taken by deep learning-based multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) algorithms and deserve more detailed analysis. We formulate a networked stochastic game with pair-wise general sum objectives and asymmetrical information structure, and empirically explore the effects of information availability on the outcomes of different MARL paradigms such as individual learning and centralized learning decentralized execution.

cs.LG↗

Variable Demand and Multi-commodity Flow in Markovian Network Equilibrium

Markovian network equilibrium generalizes the classical Wardrop equilibrium in network games. At a Markovian network equilibrium, each player of the game solves a Markov decision process instead of a shortest path problem. We propose two novel extensions of Markovian network equilibrium by considering 1) variable demand, which offers the players a quitting option, and 2) multi-commodity flow, which allows players to have heterogeneous ending time. We further develop dynamic-programming-based iterative algorithms for the proposed equilibrium problems, together with their arithmetic complexity analysis. Finally, we illustrate our network equilibrium model via a multi-commodity ride-sharing example, and compare the computational efficiency of our algorithms against state-of-the-art optimization software Mosek over extensive numerical experiments.

math.OC↗

Bounding Fixed Points of Set-Based Bellman Operator and Nash Equilibria of Stochastic Games

Motivated by uncertain parameters encountered in Markov decision processes (MDPs) and stochastic games, we study the effect of parameter uncertainty on Bellman operator-based algorithms under a set-based framework. Specifically, we first consider a family of MDPs where the cost parameters are in a given compact set; we then define a Bellman operator acting on a set of value functions to produce a new set of value functions as the output under all possible variations in the cost parameter. We prove the existence of a fixed point of this set-based Bellman operator by showing that it is contractive on a complete metric space, and explore its relationship with the corresponding family of MDPs and stochastic games. Additionally, we show that given interval set bounded cost parameters, we can form exact bounds on the set of optimal value functions. Finally, we utilize our results to bound the value function trajectory of a player in a stochastic game.

cs.GT↗

Disturbance Decoupling for Gradient-based Multi-Agent Learning with Quadratic Costs

Motivated by applications of multi-agent learning in noisy environments, this paper studies the robustness of gradient-based learning dynamics with respect to disturbances. While disturbances injected along a coordinate corresponding to any individual player's actions can always affect the overall learning dynamics, a subset of players can be disturbance decoupled---i.e., such players' actions are completely unaffected by the injected disturbance. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions to guarantee this property for games with quadratic cost functions, which encompass quadratic one-shot continuous games, finite-horizon linear quadratic (LQ) dynamic games, and bilinear games. Specifically, disturbance decoupling is characterized by both algebraic and graph-theoretic conditions on the learning dynamics, the latter is obtained by constructing a game graph based on gradients of players' costs. For LQ games, we show that disturbance decoupling imposes constraints on the controllable and unobservable subspaces of players. For two player bilinear games, we show that disturbance decoupling within a player's action coordinates imposes constraints on the payoff matrices. Illustrative numerical examples are provided.

cs.GT↗

Fixed Points of the Set-Based Bellman Operator

Motivated by uncertain parameters encountered in Markov decision processes (MDPs), we study the effect of parameter uncertainty on Bellman operator-based methods. Specifically, we consider a family of MDPs where the cost parameters are from a given compact set. We then define a Bellman operator acting on an input set of value functions to produce a new set of value functions as the output under all possible variations in the cost parameters. Finally we prove the existence of a fixed point of this set-based Bellman operator by showing that it is a contractive operator on a complete metric space.

math.OC↗

Sensitivity Analysis for Markov Decision Process Congestion Games

We consider a non-atomic congestion game where each decision maker performs selfish optimization over states of a common MDP. The decision makers optimize for their own expected costs, and influence each other through congestion effects on the state-action costs. We analyze on the sensitivity of MDP congestion game equilibria to uncertainty and perturbations in the state-action costs by applying an implicit function type analysis. The occurrence of a stochastic Braess paradox is defined, analyzed based on sensitivity of game equilibria and demonstrated in simulation. We further analyze how the introduction of stochastic dynamics affects the magnitude of Braess paradox in comparison to deterministic dynamics.

cs.GT↗

Tolling for Constraint Satisfaction in Markov Decision Process Congestion Games

Markov decision process (MDP) congestion game is an extension of classic congestion games, where a continuous population of selfish agents solves Markov decision processes with congestion: the payoff of a strategy decreases as more population uses it. We draw parallels between key concepts from capacitated congestion games and MDP. In particular, we show that population mass constraints in MDP congestion games are equivalent to imposing tolls/incentives on the reward function, which can be utilized by social planners to achieve auxiliary objectives. We demonstrate such methods in a simulated Seattle ride-share model, where tolls and incentives are enforced for two separate objectives: to guarantee minimum driver density in downtown Seattle, and to shift the game equilibrium towards a maximum social output.

cs.GT↗